US-India strategic partnership
THE US-India Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) has underperformed its goals.
Indian interlocutors suggested that the United States has viewed DTTI as a way to sell hardware by bypassing India’s cumbersome defence acquisition process, whereas India views DTTI as a way to access privileged US technology.
This mismatch in expectations has hamstrung collaboration. American interlocutors suggested that the focus of DTTI should move away from big-ticket items to co-development of smaller platforms and nascent technologies where both sides genuinely seek collaboration.
This can build India’s indigenous defence technology ecosystem and absorptive capacity, though more slowly than India would like. This has already begun, with cooperation on air-launched swarming drones.
An increase in private sector involvement and introduction of higher thresholds for FDI are two recent changes in the Indian defence industry that could reinvigorate US-India defence cooperation.
Even if defence sales slow, American participants suggested, the United States and India could concentrate on greater maritime collaboration and intelligence sharing.
Indian participants suggested that although high-level reforms such as the long-delayed institution of a tri-service Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Department of Military Affairs had taken place, these are likely to prove disruptive rather than generate the expected changes to defence restructuring amid heightened nationalism and the ongoing border crisis with China.
The civilian bureaucracy’s long-term planning remains constrained by departmental divisions, inadequate coordination, inexperienced or non-expert political appointees, and the absence of a common understanding of India’s strategic goals exacerbated by a lack of apex strategy documents like a National Security Strategy or National Military Strategy.
The United States has expressed particular concern regarding new streams of arms like the S-400 air defence system, because they fuel Russian power, diminish prospects for interoperability and secure communications between US and Indian forces, and preclude sharing of existing sensitive weapons technologies.
They also restrict Indo-US co-development of new technologies, which would likely be exposed to Russian technician observation, or espionage.
The United States refuses to countenance the transfer of certain high-end items like nuclear submarines to India, offers non-competitive or inflated prices like air defence systems and is only in the nascent stages of enabling co-production.
Despite clear convergence on the challenge and threat posed by China, both Indian and American interlocutors remain concerned that potential US.
post-election political turbulence and greater focus on America’s domestic challenges could result in incrementalism or drift in US-India cooperation.
Uncertainty over US political turbulence and domestic priorities may motivate Indian hedging until the next administration demonstrates national cohesion and clarifies foreign policy direction.
The very careful, anodyne statements made at the October 6, 2020 Quadrilateral ministerial meeting might presage some equivocation, both from India but also other US allies, until a more cohesive US strategic establishment charts a clear course.
Trepidation over the United States’ direction over the next couple of years is compounded by the surprising, resignation of Japanese PM Shinzo Abe that has likewise introduced new uncertainty into the Indo-Pacific equation.
Biden Administration could rebalance some priorities in the bilateral relationship beyond the defence portfolio
. Despite expected consistency in the US approach to China, Indian participants anticipated greater US scrutiny of Kashmir and other matters that India considers its internal affairs, suspected a diminished commitment to the Quad and feared reprised efforts towards a G-2 arrangement with China.
Participants from both countries recognized a new administration’s differential approach to other areas namely Russia, the Middle East, and counterterrorism might have second-order effects on the US-India relationship.
These might not all track in the same direction, however, and could presage more hostility towards Russia, less towards Iran, and diminished appetite for counterterrorism or overseas commitments especially in Afghanistan.
Implicit in some of the Indian concerns was an expectation of policy reversal with a new party in the executive.
Though this fear belies two decades of durable, bipartisan support for US-India ties, it suggests recognition of some of the recent politicization of the relationship along with broader concerns about American political stability.
Both sides concurred the bilateral relationship does not hinge on election outcomes in either country. India-US ties have consistent bipartisan support in the United States and increasingly firm backing across the Indian political spectrum.
Seven years after essentially blocking a military arrangement between the United States and Maldives, India welcomed one in September 2020, along with the announcement of a US there.
India’s China challenge, regional and global aspirations and increasing role in multilateral fora and a growing acceptance of and reliance on US cooperation in these spheres all but ensure the two countries will continue to find convergence in the long-term.
—The writer, based in Islamabad, is book ambassador, columnist and author of several books.
