PRESIDENT Donald Trump’s European policy has sparked discussions on the state of transatlantic relations and nuclear deterrence in Europe.
It has starkly revealed Europe’s vulnerability to the formidable Russian military and prompted immediate debates on bolstering conventional and nuclear deterrence in Europe.
Given the perceptible limitations in the nuclear weapons domain, the need for Europe to fortify its conventional defensive capabilities by swiftly increasing defense spending for producing and acquiring military hardware is now more pressing than ever.
This urgency underscores the gravity of the situation, emphasizing the critical need for action.
Besides the nuclear deterrence debate, the discourse on the modernization of the nuclear lexicon is gaining momentum.
Since 1949, the United States has provided crucial security guarantees to European nations within the NATO security framework, leading to their reliance on the American nuclear arsenal.
Despite many European countries possessing the nuclear knowledge and material to establish their sovereign nuclear deterrence, they have chosen to rely on the US extended nuclear deterrence and became non-nuclear weapon states by joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the 1970s.
Indeed, the shift in European nuclear strategy significantly challenges the twentieth-century architecture of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The Trump Administration has not announced a withdrawal of US troops or nuclear weapons from Europe to date.
Presently, America’s nuclear umbrella includes 100 tactical weapons stationed in Europe.
According to a “nuclear sharing” agreement within NATO, these are under American control but are designed to be carried and dropped by fighter jets flown by Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkeye.
However, the European leaders’ meetings in London, Paris and Brussels revealed their frustration over Washington’s altered approach towards the Russia-Ukraine war and regional security.
It also echoed European defence policy-makers’ realization of greater defence autonomy, including nuclear deterrence.
Among the European countries, France has maintained a sovereign nuclear deterrent.
It developed nearly 300 nuclear warheads, which can be fired from France-based aircraft or submarines.
President Emmanuel Macron made an idealistic nuclear umbrella offer to the European allies.
On March 5, 2025, he opined that France’s deterrence force (force de frappe) could be associated with the defence of other European countries in this highly uncertain new era.
Defence Minister Sébastien Lecornu immediately quashed Macron’s nuclear umbrella offer.
He said the nuclear deterrent “is French and will remain French – from its conception to its production to its operation, under a decision of the President.
” Comparatively speaking, the French nuclear arsenal is too small compared to the Russian nuclear arsenal, having declared 5889 nuclear weapons.
Germany has completely transformed its nuclear policy.
Following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Okuma, Fukushima, Japan, on March 11, 2011, Germany permanently shut down eight of its reactors.
It pledged to close the rest by 2022.
It was a bold decision of the then Chancellor Angela Dorothea Merkel, a trained physicist who believed in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Moreover, over 22% of its power was from nuclear sources in 2010.
Before the starting of the Ukraine war on February 24, 2022, many Germans opposed hosting US nuclear weapons on their territory and were in favor of signing the nuclear ban treaty.
The country that decided to give up the peaceful use of nuclear energy entirely is presently contemplating developing nuclear weapons.
On February 21, 2025, Germany’s center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) future chancellor, Friedrich Merz, opined that he intended to discuss expanding nuclear protection with London and Paris.
In reality, Germany cannot rely entirely on French nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom, which has about 250.
Notably, the Bristishers’ arsenal is not sovereign because the UK did not wholly develop it; therefore, it relies on US technical input.
It would undermine the UK nuclear deterrent if the US suspends relations with the UK, including the Mutual Defence Agreement.
Hence, for credible deterrence, sooner or later, Germany can develop its indigenous nuclear weapons, which is not an easy task due to financial and technical barriers in terms of acquiring fissile material, weaponizing and testing a device and mating with delivery vehicles.
France and the UK sharing of nuclear weapons or the European countries developing indigenous nuclear weapons take them into uncharted territory, i.e., nuclear doctrine, nuclear safety, security and safeguards.
The potential consequences of this new nuclear deterrence architecture are significant and should be carefully considered, as it will start a new wave of nuclear vertical and horizontal proliferation coupled with new emerging technologies.
The latest nuclear deterrence architecture for European security will inspire many non-European countries to pursue sovereign nuclear deterrence in the rapidly transforming international strategic environment, underlining the weight of the decisions being made.
The first casualty of the new construct of nuclear deterrence in Europe will be the NPT, the nuclear non-proliferation regime’s core treaty.
The implications of the NPT’s rupture are serious, as the Treaty’s Articles 1 and 11 do not permit the sharing of France and the UK nuclear weapons with any European country, including Germany.
Secondly, Germany and its like-minded European countries, such as Poland, will first exit the NPT by using withdrawal Article X, clause I, as North Korea did in 2003, to develop sovereign nuclear deterrence.
The NPT’s rupture also necessitates the modernization of the current nuclear lexicon.
The existing nuclear lexicon is grossly inadequate to address the challenges of the third nuclear age, which is increasingly exposed to growing nuclear risks and a diminishing consensus on how to mitigate them.
Thus, we are at the cusp of a new nuclear world order entailing a new nuclear lexicon, highlighting the necessity for change in our understanding and communication about nuclear issues.
—The writer is Prof at the School of Politics and IR, Quaid-i-Azam University. (jaspal_99@hotmail.com)
