INDIA’S abrupt decision to cut off water supplies to Pakistan on April 1, 1948, a day after a bilateral agreement expired, left vast tracts of agricultural land in Pakistan dry, threatening the livelihoods of millions. Although Pakistan had a strong legal case against this act of aggression, the geopolitical context of the time complicated Pakistan’s ability to seek redress. The post-World War-II era was a time of reshaping global power structures. The Atlantic Charter of 1941, signed by the United States and Great Britain, envisioned a world where colonial subjects would achieve self-rule. For the US, fostering sovereign states offered both political alliances and lucrative business opportunities. It was in this climate of economic and political realignment that the Indus waters dispute unfolded.
David E. Lilienthal, the former Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and a consultant for Lazard Frères – an investment consultant for the World Bank, played a pivotal role in shaping the eventual Indus Waters Treaty. His experience on public infrastructure projects worldwide triggered his interest for investment in the Indus Basin. In 1951, Lilienthal visited India and Pakistan as an envoy of Collier Magazine, where he met the leaders of both nations to understand the water conflict.Lilienthal’s observations were coloured by Cold War anxieties. He recognized India as a critical partner in the US strategy to contain Communism. In his writings, he described Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as democracy’s best hope in Asia, despite Nehru’s non-alignment policy. By contrast, his portrayal of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was one of quiet resolve, emphasizing Pakistan’s existential dependence on water from the Indus Basin.
For Lilienthal, the water dispute was not merely a bilateral issue but a potential flashpoint in the Cold War. He warned that unresolved tensions between India and Pakistan could lead to another Korea-like conflict, drawing in global powers. His solution was to frame the problem as an engineering and financial challenge rather than a political dispute. He proposed utilizing Indus Waters through damming and diversions by both nations and prevent it from being ‘wasted’ into the sea, involving a number of mega infrastructure projects – an idea that aligned with the interests of international financial institutions like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now known as the World Bank. The World Bank’s involvement was far from altruistic. By the early 1950s, the Bank was seeking opportunities to finance large-scale development projects and the Indus Basin presented a lucrative opportunity. With Lilienthal’s encouragement, the Bank offered its mediation to resolve the dispute. However, this came with conditions that heavily favoured India – forcing Pakistan to waive its strong legal position as the lower riparian, effectively conceding to India’s future water diversion projects.
The treaty negotiations, which began in earnest in 1953, reflected this imbalance. India, having already initiated several major water infrastructure projects, demanded full control over the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) and a fair share from the Western Rivers too (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab), while Pakistan was left to depend on the leftover Western Rivers. Pakistan initially resisted India’s ongoing projects which violated international norms governing the transboundary rivers. However, the lure of development loans from the World Bank eventually outweighed Pakistan’s objections. Finally, when Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960, India gained exclusive rights to the Eastern Rivers and its demanded share on the Western Rivers, through massive infrastructure projects, such as the Rajasthan Canal, ostensibly to green the desert. India also gained the permission to dump unlimited volumes of waste water into the empty beds of Ravi and Sutlej in Pakistan. Pakistan, in turn, received funding to construct storage dams like Mangla and Tarbela and some link canals to transfer water from the Western Rivers to the emptied parts of the Eastern Rivers.
Despite its framing as a peace-building measure, the treaty did little to foster goodwill between the neighbours. Instead, it legitimized India’s controversial water projects, leaving Pakistan with a system heavily reliant on external funding and infrastructure prone to silting. Meanwhile, India’s grandiose plans, such as the Rajasthan Canal, failed to deliver the anticipated agricultural transformation, highlighting the short-sightedness of the treaty’s provisions. The Indus Waters Treaty was shaped as much by Cold War geopolitics as by regional dynamics. The US and its allies saw the treaty as a way to advancing their own strategic and economic interests in South Asia. For India, it was an opportunity to assert control over critical resources and bolster its development ambitions. For Pakistan, it was a compromise born of necessity, though one that left enduring vulnerabilities in its water management system.
Today, as climate change exacerbates water scarcity and environmental degradation, the limitations of the treaty are increasingly apparent. The rigid division of rivers fails to account for the ecological and social complexities of the Indus Basin. The treaty’s emphasis on engineering solutions, while sidelining political and environmental considerations, has led to unsustainable water management practices on both sides. Revisiting the Indus Waters Treaty is not merely a technical challenge but a moral and environmental imperative. The “riparian iron curtain,” as historian Alice Albinia calls it, has divided a river system that once supported millions in harmony. Breaking this artificial barrier could pave the way for more cooperative and sustainable water-sharing arrangements, benefiting both nations. In a world where shared resources are increasingly under strain, the lessons of the Indus Waters Treaty are clear. Geopolitics may dictate the terms of agreements, but the rivers themselves remind us that nature knows no borders.
—The writer is water resource management expert.
