THE 2020 Doha Agreement between the United States and the Taliban marked a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of South Asia and the Middle East. While its primary goal was to facilitate the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and establish a framework for peace, the agreement generated significant apprehensions in Pakistan. These fears were rooted in historical precedents, regional dynamics and global strategic recalibrations, particularly the potential exploitation of the Taliban by external powers to destabilize Pakistan. Pakistan’s apprehensions were informed by a history of US engagement in South Asia, where non-state actors were often used as tools of foreign policy. During the Cold War, the US, with Pakistan’s support, backed the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union. However, this partnership took a dramatic turn post-9/11, as Pakistan faced allegations of supporting the Taliban while simultaneously participating in the US-led War on Terror. The rise of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) post-2007 exemplifies the destabilizing consequences of these policies.
Empirical evidence underscores these concerns. A 2021 report by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies documented a 56% increase in cross-border attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas following the 2014 NATO drawdown in Afghanistan. Similarly, the US withdrawal created a power vacuum, allowing the Taliban to consolidate power and anti-Pakistan elements, like the TTP, to regroup. A 2021 UN Security Council report highlighted the TTP’s consolidation in Afghanistan and a sharp rise in cross-border attacks against Pakistan. Pakistan’s concerns were further exacerbated by India’s growing influence in Afghanistan. India’s significant investment and alleged support for anti-Pakistan groups, detailed in a 2020 dossier submitted by Islamabad to the UN, heightened Pakistan’s insecurities. Islamabad also perceived a retaliatory strategy from the US, rooted in Pakistan’s dual policies during the War on Terror. This perception was reinforced by Washington’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific, deepening ties with India and the exclusion of Pakistan from post-withdrawal regional dialogues.
The post-Doha period witnessed a sharp escalation in terrorist activities within Pakistan. Data from the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) revealed a 42% increase in attacks in 2021, with most attributed to the TTP. The reunification of various TTP factions in Afghanistan under Taliban protection worsened the situation. A 2022 International Crisis Group report highlighted how these groups exploited Afghan territory as a safe haven for launching attacks on Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategic support for the Taliban emerged as a double-edged sword. While it countered Indian influence in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s return to power emboldened anti-Pakistan groups. Islamabad’s advocacy for an inclusive Afghan government and its engagement with China and Russia reflect its efforts to stabilize the region and counterbalance US influence.
Pakistan’s evolving terminology for tribal factions—from “Mujahideen” during the Cold War, to “Taliban” post-1990s, and now “al-Khawarij”—has sparked significant debate. While these terms were strategically employed to align with shifting political narratives, they exposed inconsistencies that undermined Pakistan’s credibility. During the Afghan-Soviet War, the term “Mujahideen” symbolized resistance and was embraced with pride. However, with the Taliban’s rise, Pakistan portrayed them as a stabilizing force against Indian influence. As these groups turned against Pakistan, they were labelled “al-Khawarij,” delegitimizing their actions as heretical. Critics argue that this rhetorical shift, while politically expedient, obscured Pakistan’s historical policy missteps.
Academics and intellectuals emphasize the need for Pakistan to reconcile these contradictions. Without acknowledging past policy failures, such selective framing risks undermining the state’s credibility. For Pakistan to regain trust and credibility, a transparent and introspective approach is essential. To address these challenges, Pakistan must adopt a multifaceted strategy, involving the strengthening of the Durand Line with fencing, surveillance and counter-insurgency measures; Engaging China, Russia and Iran through platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can help stabilize Afghanistan; Domestically, Pakistan must bolster its counter-terrorism framework and prioritize socio-economic development in tribal areas; and Rebuilding trust with the US by emphasizing Pakistan’s role in regional stability is vital for restoring bilateral relations.
By confronting its policy contradictions and engaging in an honest evaluation of its strategies, Pakistan can foster sustainable and coherent policies. Accepting past misjudgements is not a sign of weakness but a necessary step toward genuine reform. Without such introspection, Pakistan risks perpetuating cycles of mistrust and instability, both domestically and internationally. This comprehensive strategy will enable Pakistan to navigate the complexities of the post-Doha geopolitical landscape and reclaim its role as a stabilizing force in the region.
—The writer is Assistant Professor of International Relations at National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad.
