CPEC after the Sino-Iranian strategic partnership
THE US drawdown from the Pak-Afghan region has brought forth considerable geo-economic space for China in the region. Beijing has recently forged a long-term strategic partnership with Iran. This partnership bodes well for the security and timely completion of CPEC.
After considering the long-term feasibility and effectiveness of CPEC, Iran has repeatedly displayed its inclination to join the grand economic corridor. If CPEC is converted into the China-Pakistan-Iran Economic Corridor (CPIEC), it will make the corridor a greater and safer game-changer in terms of regional trade and connectivity.
After the Sino-Iranian strategic partnership, both Pakistan and China should give serious consideration to the Iranian request of joining CPEC to make the grand project a prodigious success by minimising its security threats. As the Biden Administration is making efforts to rejoin the Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal, energy-rich Iran is once again set to become a major regional economic and military power in the foreseeable future.
Iran’s exceptional geostrategic and geo-economic location, potential energy resources and developing economy will presumably make CPIEC more effective, less perilous and more efficient for Pakistan and China to reap richer dividends.
CPIEC will greatly help Pakistan and Iran make the Gwadar and Chabahar ports supplementary rather than disruptively competitive. Iran will likely provide China with a greater role in completing the remaining construction works of the strategically important Chabahar Port, thus lessening Indian engagement with the port. After making both the ports fully operational, Pakistan and Iran may formally determine their shares of Central Asian exports and imports, thereby dispelling the impression of projected competition and a zero-sum game.
Second, Iran’s partnership in the grand economic corridor will immensely assist in the better security of CPIEC. Having a stake in the corridor, Iran will not permit regional powers – India–to use its soil for fomenting militancy and insurgency in Balochistan. The clandestine networks of RAW reportedly based in southern and eastern Iran could be easily dismantled.
More importantly, certain quarters within the Iranian security establishment have been secretly funnelling substantial money and sophisticated arms to some sectarian, militant and insurgent groups based in the bordering and central areas of Balochistan. After becoming a member of the project, Iran could be persuaded to sternly rein in these disruptive elements to safeguard Balochistan from insurgency and sectarianism.
Furthermore, Pakistan can seek all-out Iranian assistance to block the burgeoning cross-border smuggling of cheap Iranian oil and drugs to Balochistan. Narcotics and oil smuggling have made non-state actors financially sound to continue their troublesome shenanigans in the province. Proper regulation of oil black-marketing will help both countries earn substantial revenue.
Third, after connecting Iran to China via Pakistan through CPIEC, bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan and Iran and China will increase manifold. Both Pakistan and Iran have already decided to increase annual trade volume between the two countries to $5bn. Closer economic ties will also help Pakistan import a great amount of cheap Iranian electricity to industrialise the city of Gwadar and decrease hours of outages plaguing other parts of the country.
Closer economic ties with Iran will facilitate Pakistan and China to import more and more Iranian oil and gas. The Iran-Pakistan (IP) pipeline could be expanded to include China as a member. With financial and technical support from China, Pakistan will be able to construct its portion of 785 km of IP pipeline in the shortest period. Therefore, Iran will gain the much-needed revenue to revive its sanctions-hit economy, while Pakistan and China will import enough Iranian gas to meet their ever-increasing requirements of natural gas.
Lastly, greater cooperation between Pakistan and Iran will be instrumental in bringing political stability to Afghanistan. With all-out Pak-Iranian support, the Afghan Taliban will be in a stronger position to dismantle the organizational structure of Daesh in Afghanistan. Moreover, for the security of CPIEC, Pakistan and Iran can also crank up the pressure on Afghanistan into taking stringent actions against TTP fugitives hiding in eastern Afghanistan.
However, Pakistan and China should not forget that a longer corridor entails more risks and threats to be tackled. After finding Iran on this regional bandwagon, the new American president could think of tightening economic sanctions around the nose of Iran. Moreover, the Indo-American bloc could expedite hectic efforts to foment terrorism and militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas and shepherd ragtag insurgents in Balochistan. In this regard, any broad-brush and blinkered approach to the security of CPIEC is unlikely to dampen the obstructive effects of geo-politics on the corridor.
Therefore, it is imperative to warily craft some needed counterterrorism, counter-militancy and counter-sectarianism measures to protect CPIEC from regional terrorism and hegemonic designs of the US and India. Both Pakistan and China should stand with Iran diplomatically – especially during the process of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear deal – with the intent to make CPIEC fall through amid the disruptive geopolitics of the region.
