SIX years ago, India launched a false flag operation at Balakot (KP) via an airstrike conducted on February 26, 2019, and attempted to throw dust in the eye of the international community to build its global image.
The Indian airstrike at Balakot is often labeled as a military misadventure.
Critics argue that India unjustly used the doctrine of a ‘pre-emptive attack’ against terrorist targets allegedly linked to the Pulwama attack because India failed to provide credible evidence of success or justification for the strike, leading to questions about its effectiveness and rationale.
The operation did not yield proof, jettisoning the claims of its necessity.
Yet in response to this misadventure, Pakistan Air Force demonstrated its professional capability as it launched its operation swift retort on Feb 27, 2019.
On February 14, 2019, a Central Reserve Police Force convoy was attacked by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber near Pulwama in Kashmir. The blast which killed 40 personnel was alleged by India the involvement of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a banned terror outfit from Pakistan. In response to a domestic terrorist attack, on February 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) while violating Pakistan’s space claimed to target a JeM terrorist camp at Balakot, located in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. On 27 February 2019, Pakistan through its operation swift retort conducted six airstrikes targeting six locations in Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), thereby shooting down two Indian fighter jets, including one helicopter MI-17 while capturing an Indian pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, and later, the held pilot was released by Pakistan as a gesture of peace.
In the ensuing aerial battle on Feb 27, India falsely claimed to have shot down a Pakistani F-16 fighter aircraft while losing a MIG-21 whose pilot was captured after he was forced to eject over Pakistani-administered Kashmir — as no evidence supported the Indian claim. Later the US department of Defence confirmed the Pakistan-held stance by stating that it had counted the Pakistani F-16 fleet and found none was missing.
As for the Balakot incident, ‘’ publicly available imagery acquired by European Space Imaging the day after the strike suggests that buildings at the camp were not visibly damaged or destroyed.. There are two striking aspects to the images. The first is that all three weapons missed by similar (but not identical) distances and certainly by much more than the three metre ‘circular error probable’ attributed to the SPICE 2000. The second is that all three weapons missed in virtually the same direction. These two factors suggest that the misses were caused by a systematic targeting error.
There is significant evidence suggesting that India’s claims of success regarding the Balakot airstrike may be overstated. Reports indicate that no casualties have been confirmed, as there is no international media validation of deaths among militants following the strike. Additionally, there are indications that the SPICE 2000 bombs used were inaccurately programmed, resulting in misses that were not effectively targeted. From Pakistan’s perspective, the Balakot airstrike conducted by India aimed at targeting a Jaish-e-Mohammad training camp was seen as a failure. Pakistan claimed that the Indian attack did not achieve its intended military objectives, asserting that there were no significant casualties or damage to militants. This assertion contributed to the narrative of a victorious defence against Indian aggression, thus reinforcing Pakistan’s stance of resilience and capability in the face of Indian military action.
On the morning of 26 February 2019, the Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, issued a statement claiming that a “non-military preemptive action” (sic) was undertaken by the Indian Air Force against a military camp of the JeM located in Balakot, Pakistan. Examining India’s Balakot attack under international law, we may discern that India’s official statement mentions that the “preemptive” strikes were undertaken “in the face of imminent danger”, which was based on credible intelligence that the JeM was planning another terror attack against the country. It is argued that the usage of the phrase “preemptive strikes” hovers between two variations of the right of self-defence – anticipatory and preventive.
Arguably, India’s use of such phraseology in the wake of an unrecognized ‘preventive right of self-defence’, is imbibed with ambiguity regarding India’s official stance on the Balakot strike simply because the phrase “imminent danger”, in the absence of any concrete evidence of the imminent threat, loses its applicability, thereby ensuring illegality of the attack. Moreover, the Indian side must bear this fact in mind that on the pretext of India’s terrorist involvement in Balochistan, if Pakistan security forces attack on India’s territory, what will be New Delhi’s take on it? Of course such attacks will be a clear violation of international law. Thus, analogically, by unjustifiably using the pretext of Pulwama attack, India violated the sovereignty of Pakistan airspace at Balakot on February 26, 2019.
Whereas, on February 27, 2019, Pakistan invoked its right of self-defence and conducted airstrikes in India-occupied Kashmir. In contrast to India’s phony claims, Pakistan rightly argued that their actions were in self-defence to counter what they considered aggressive Indian military operations, aligning with the principles of international law that allow for self-defence in the face of an armed attack. India’s Balakot airstrike in February 2019 serves as a critical lesson in the complexities of rapid military response and its implications for the South Asian security landscape amid India’s growing intelligence and operational failures.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also an expert in Conflict and Peace Studies (with special focus on Palestine, Kashmir), is member of European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), including the Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law.
(rizvipeaceresearcher@gmail.com)
