ON 19 December 2024, Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer expressed concerns about Pakistan’s development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities, stating that such advancements could enable Pakistan to strike targets beyond South Asia, including the United States. Finer described this progression as an “emerging threat” to the US. In response to these developments, the US government imposed sanctions on entities involved in Pakistan’s missile program, including the National Development Complex. These sanctions aim to impede further advancements in missile technology that could threaten regional and global security. Pakistan’s current missile systems, including its longest-range Shaheen-III with a range of 2,750 km, cannot reach the United States, which is over 12,000 km away. The missile arsenal includes the Hatf-I, with a range of 70 km and a payload capacity of 500 kg and the Nasr (Hatf-9), a tactical nuclear-capable missile with a range of 60–70 km. Additionally, the Shaheen-II and Shaheen-III medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) have respective ranges of 2,500 km and 2,750 km. However, none of these systems are capable of covering the vast distance required to target the US mainland.
Interestingly, it is difficult to comprehend why the US, with its vastly superior and highly sophisticated missile systems and formidable military might—far exceeding the combined capabilities of the rest of the world—perceives Pakistan’s missile program as a potential long-term threat. The US’s concern most probably stems from the progression of Pakistan’s missile technology, which demonstrates increasing sophistication and could eventually lead to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Additionally, the US is apprehensive about the dual-use nature of these missiles—capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads—which could exacerbate tensions in South Asia and destabilize regional security, a region critical to US strategic interests. Another significant perceived concern could be the risk of missile technology proliferation to countries hostile to the US or it could have stemmed from US’s misconceived notion that this technology or expertise could fall into the hands of non-state actors hostile to US interests. Moreover, while Pakistan’s missiles cannot currently target the US, their deployment in regional or third-party conflicts, or their potential transfer to allies or adversaries, could directly impact US forces or allies.
The US’s fears may be due to its perceived risks to US interests in South Asia, the Middle East and the broader Indo-Pacific region. In South Asia, Pakistan’s missile arsenal, particularly its nuclear-capable systems, contributes to heightened tensions with India. This nuclear rivalry increases the risk of an arms race and potential conflicts that could destabilize the region. Given the US’s strong economic and strategic ties to India and its role as a promoter of regional stability, any disruption in South Asia could directly impact American interests.
In the Middle East, the reach of Pakistan’s Shaheen-III missile, which extends to parts of the region, raises concerns for US allies such as Israel. The possibility of missile proliferation or use by Pakistan or its proxies could endanger US military operations and vital interests such as energy security. Furthermore, the Indian Ocean, a critical trade and strategic route, is another area of concern. Pakistan’s development of naval and submarine-based platforms for missile deployment poses a potential threat to maritime security, including US naval operations and those of its allies.
Finally, the broader Indo-Pacific strategy also factors into US concerns. Although Pakistan is not the primary focus, its growing missile capabilities indirectly affect regional security dynamics, especially with China’s influence in the background. In this context, Pakistan’s missile program is viewed as a destabilizing force with implications far beyond its immediate neighborhood, affecting US strategic, economic and military interests.
The United States has imposed a series of sanctions targeting Pakistan’s ballistic missile program, aiming to curb its development and proliferation. In December 2024, the US sanctioned Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex (NDC) and three Karachi-based companies—Akhtar and Sons Private Limited, Affiliates International and Rockside Enterprise—for their involvement in advancing Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile capabilities, particularly the Shaheen series. These sanctions freeze any US assets belonging to the targeted entities and prohibit American individuals and businesses from engaging in transactions with them. Earlier, in September 2024, the US The State Department sanctioned the Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machine Building Industry and several Chinese firms for supplying equipment to Pakistan’s missile program, specifically for testing rocket motors for the Shaheen-3 and Ababeel systems.
Looking ahead, the US may consider additional measures to further impede Pakistan’s missile development. Potential actions could include expanding sanctions to encompass a broader range of entities and individuals involved in the program, increasing diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to halt its missile advancements and enhancing collaboration with international partners to restrict the transfer of missile-related technologies to Pakistan. Such measures would aim to reinforce non-proliferation norms and address the security concerns associated with the expansion of Pakistan’s missile capabilities.
Given the context of US concerns over Pakistan’s missile capabilities and the sanctions imposed, it is likely that future measures will aim to balance strategic objectives with maintaining bilateral relations. The US has significant interests in preventing missile proliferation and ensuring regional stability but also recognizes the fragility of Pakistan’s economy and its geopolitical importance, especially in South Asia. Sanctions are likely to remain targeted, focusing on specific entities and individuals directly involved in Pakistan’s missile program, such as manufacturers, suppliers and research institutions. This approach would allow the US to address its security concerns without severely impacting Pakistan’s broader economy or bilateral ties.
The US is unlikely to pursue blanket sanctions that could destabilize Pakistan’s already fragile economic situation, as this could inadvertently exacerbate regional instability and complicate US efforts to engage with Pakistan on counterterrorism, regional security and other shared interests. By confining sanctions to missile-related entities and technologies, the US can exert pressure on Pakistan’s missile program while leaving room for diplomatic engagement. This approach reflects a careful balancing act—addressing missile proliferation risks without jeopardizing the broader US-Pakistan relationship, which includes cooperation on counterterrorism, regional diplomacy and maintaining stability in South Asia.
—The writer is a former Press Secretary to the President of Pakistan.
