Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the long frontline of Pakistan’s fight against militancy, is again under severe strain. There has been a sharp rise in militant activity across the province, while government in KP has regrouped, expanded its aims and exploited political divisions to gain operational space. The result has been a devastating mix of more attacks, eroded public confidence and a policy debate that risks confusing politics with counter-terrorism strategy.
The current spike in violence is not inexplicable. Multiple reviews show that the TTP’s resurgence has been fuelled by sanctuaries across the Durand Line, by fractures inside Pakistan’s past approaches to militant groups, and by episodic ceasefires and negotiations that have given fighters the opportunity to regroup. Since 2021, ceasefire talks, many brokered with the help of the Afghan Taliban, included the release of prisoners and pauses in operations. When these talks collapsed, violence resumed, often more intense than before.
The frequent emphasis on negotiations and the politicization of counterterrorism are two areas where provincial strategy in KP becomes particularly divisive. KP government was driving force behind the negotiations with the TTP. The current provincial setup also continued to adopt an appeasing posture, which has made operations less clear and have emboldened the extremists. Further, the political narratives from PTI aligned movements are undermining national consensus and sowing confusion about the legitimacy of CT operations. These serious actions directly undermine national security and require scrutiny.
Dialogue without clearly defined red lines and verification mechanisms risks legitimising militants and prolonging instability. History shows that multiple Pakistani ceasefires with TTP and subsequent releases of detainees have been followed by renewed attacks. The practice of exchanging pauses in violence for prisoner releases has repeatedly allowed the organisation to reconstitute operational capacity. When the state negotiates from a position perceived as weak, militants can convert tactical pauses into strategic advantage.
Moreover, politicising counter-terrorism, whether by portraying operations as externally driven “Dollar Wars” or by insisting that the federal government consult provincial assemblies before action, can slow operational responses and fracture intelligence-led campaigns. KP’s elected leadership has publicly urged consultation with the Centre over federal operations, an insistence that on paper defends provincial prerogative but in practice can delay decisive action against fast-moving threats. In an environment where militants exploit time and terrain, procedural delays matter.
This is not to imply that negotiation is always illegitimate. Broader measures may include ceasefires and confidence-building, but only if they are part of a comprehensive governmental strategy that includes strong intelligence, political reconciliation, credible enforcement, and socioeconomic investment in remote regions. Military operations have occasionally been successful in KP in terms of kinetics, but the political and developmental follow-through required to prevent militants from recruiting and finding refuge has lagged. It is argued that the province’s marginalisation after merger and slow delivery of reforms create recruitment space the TTP is quick to exploit.
Moving ahead, KP’s leadership should avoid binary choices between talks and force. Any dialogue process must be transparent, bound by clear, enforceable criteria and run in tandem with operations that deny militants freedom of movement. Second, provincial-federal coordination needs urgent improvement: joint operational planning and intelligence-sharing should not be sacrificed to political point-scoring. Third, in order for communities to perceive a concrete alternative to militant narratives, the state must increase civic resilience by upholding the rule of law and establishing pathways for growth, education, and employment creation. Last but not least, Pakistan needs to improve its relations with Afghanistan; persistent bilateral and regional pressure is needed to address the external sanctuaries, which continue to be the most significant factor in the TTP’s resurgence.
Practically, KP should deepen cooperation with federal bodies such as the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), implement robust counter-narrative campaigns, and fast-track reforms that integrate former tribal districts into regular governance structures. These measures, when combined with targeted, intelligence-led operations, reduce the temptation of short-term deals that yield long-term costs. Pakistan needs a unified national response, a stronger repatriation and refugee policy where necessary, and a firm stance against groups that exploit political activism to spread extremist propaganda.
KP is a province with enormous strategic and economic significance. It also carries a scarred history from insurgency and counter-insurgency. To prevent another cycle of rupture and recrimination, Pakistan needs a multi-dimensional strategy, one that blends hard security, principled politics and long-term development, not one that trades immediate calm for future chaos. Instead of continuing the old oscillation between appeasement and force, the state should build a durable, consensus-driven approach to deny militants the spaces they exploit.
Afghanistan’s complicity in cross-border terrorism cannot be ignored
