THE situation in the Korean Peninsula is alarming due to the US determination to contain China, Beijing’s assertiveness in East Asia, the North Korean nuclear program, missile tests and threatening overtures. South Korea is struggling to solidify its defensive fence. Many analysts recommended that to deter North Korean aggressive designs, the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea which it withdrew in 1991. If Washington remains reluctant to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons, Seoul could develop nuclear weapons.
The end of the Cold War and the demise of the (former) Soviet Union have lessened the threat of the US Treaty allies, including South Korea, in Asia-Pacific. Besides, in 1985, North Korea joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state with the expectation to normalize relations with the US and South Korea. Pyongyang agreed to stop developing nuclear weapons and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear facilities routinely. These sequential developments undercut the requirement of the American nuclear weapons deployed in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991 which had been stationed there since the late 1950s.
The failure of North Korea and the IAEA to amicably resolve the issue of plutonium waste inspection prompted the former to withdraw from NPT in 1993. Pyongyang warned to withdraw the Treaty on the pretext the Agency’s demand for inspection violated its sovereignty and undermined its national interests. However, it backed down from the withdrawal action after signing the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. In reciprocity, Pyongyang received economic and technical assistance from the United States. The arrangement proved short-lived due to North Korea’s renewal of plutonium facilities and the starting of a highly enriched uranium program in 1997.
North Korea expelled the IAEA team in 2001, officially exited from the NPT in 2003 and tested nuclear weapons in 2006. Though the international community claimed that its 2006 nuclear test fizzled out, it acknowledged that the 2009 nuclear test was successful. The overt nuclearization of North Korea and threatening nuclear posture toward South Korea has not instigated the Americans to revisit their nuclear pull-out strategy.
The US frequently reassured South Korea that its security commitments are steadfast and its extended deterrence commitments remain ironclad. In April 2023, the US reaffirmed that any nuclear attack by North Korea against South Korea “will be met with a swift, overwhelming and decisive response.” On June 10, 2024, Richard C. Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy, said, “Just the establishment of that Group (NCG), I think, was very important to demonstrate how we are elevating the discussion that we’re having on nuclear deterrence issues, but the work that we’re doing is really key, whether that’s from information sharing to joint planning and execution.” Realistically, the mere rhetorical assurances are insufficient in the rapidly transforming Asia-Pacific strategic environment. The South Koreans appealed to the Americans to consider redeploying non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea to deter North Korean military adventurism.
Last week, the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) had its third meeting in Seoul. The Group is a bilateral consultative body that strengthens the US-South Korea Alliance and extends deterrence to contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. It primarily focuses on how Washington will use its nuclear arsenal to defend against North Korean threats. The participants in the NCG agreed that integration of South Korea’s conventional capabilities with US nuclear operations “substantively strengthens the allied deterrence and response capabilities against the [North Korea] nuclear and missile threat.”
The chances of US redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea are remote because it has 200 tactical nuclear weapons in its active inventory; 100 are located in Europe and the other 100 are stored as a strategic reserve in the US. Second, the US cannot pull-out a few weapons from Europe and deploy them in Korean Peninsula due to war in Ukraine. Third, the US military also opposes the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons due to their vulnerability to a North Korean attack.
The US reluctance to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons at the 38 parallel lines (in the vicinity of Seoul) fuels the already-strong South Korean public sentiment for the country to acquire nuclear weapons. The public will compel the South Korean ruling elite to develop indigenous non-strategic nuclear weapons, i.e., low-yield tactical nuclear weapons designed to be used on the battlefield. South Korea maintains an advanced civilian nuclear program and a modern indigenous nuclear industry which enables it to manufacture nuclear devices. The development of nukes by South Korea confirms it does not fully trust US extended deterrence. To conclude, the redeployment of the US nuclear assets or the development of nukes by South Korea to deter North Korean threats will unleash a devastating nuclear arms race in the Korean Peninsula.
—The writer is professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University.
