TENSIONS over water between Pakistan and India have long simmered beneath the surface of broader geopolitical rivalry.
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 under the mediation of the World Bank, was designed to prevent precisely such tensions from spilling over into full-blown conflict.
In recent days, claims have resurfaced that India has effectively ‘stopped’ water from flowing into Pakistan.
While emotionally resonant, such claims often lack scientific, geographical and legal accuracy.
Understanding the reality requires examining the treaty’s structure, the physical geography of the Indus Basin, the current situation and Pakistan’s options moving forward.
The IWT apportions the use of six rivers of the Indus Basin between the two countries.
Pakistan was granted exclusive rights to the western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, while India retained rights over the eastern rivers, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej.
The division was inherently generous to Pakistan, granting it around 80% of the total water flow in the basin.
Crucially, the treaty allows India limited non-consumptive use of western rivers for purposes such as irrigation and hydroelectric power generation, provided it does not alter the flow downstream.
The notion that India can unilaterally stop water flowing into Pakistan contradicts both the treaty’s stipulations and the geography of the region.
Most of the rivers assigned to Pakistan originate in the Himalayas and flow naturally from India into Pakistan.
For example, the Indus originates in Tibet, flows through Ladakh and then enters Pakistan.
The Jhelum starts in India-occupied Kashmir and follows a similar path.
The Chenab rises in Himachal Pradesh and passes through Jammu before entering Pakistan.
The control India has is primarily limited to certain headworks and potential storage from dams within its territory, but the treaty caps the storage and diversion rights.
India has built several hydroelectric projects on these western rivers, including Kishanganga (on a tributary of the Jhelum) and Ratle (on the Chenab).
Critics in Pakistan often cite these as evidence of water denial, but international adjudications, including those facilitated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the World Bank, have repeatedly found these projects to be within India’s rights under the treaty, assuming proper design protocols are followed.
As of March 2025, India has built or planned more than 30 projects on the western rivers, with cumulative storage not exceeding the limits set by the IWT.
Most of these are run-of-the-river projects, which do not permanently block water but momentarily divert it for energy generation before returning it to the riverbed.
Seasonal variations in river flow further explain perceived shortages.
During winter months (October to March), the snow-fed rivers of the Himalayas experience naturally reduced flows due to frozen precipitation in upstream areas.
Conversely, summer months (April to September) bring heavy glacial melt and monsoon rains, leading to floods in Pakistan’s lowlands.
Any decrease in winter water availability is likely linked to climate change and environmental degradation rather than political intent.
Glacial recession in the Karakoram and Himalayan ranges is altering hydrological cycles in both countries, affecting both quantity and timing of flows.
Scientifically, completely cutting off a river is not feasible without enormous infrastructure and violation of international law.
Even if India wanted to block Pakistan’s water illegally, doing so would require constructing massive dams with storage capacities far exceeding those currently available.
Pakistan faces genuine water security challenges, but they stem more from domestic mismanagement than from India’s upstream activities.
Pakistan loses an estimated 30-40% of its water to wastage, leakage and unregulated usage.
Over-irrigation, outdated canal systems, and lack of water pricing contribute to inefficiency.
Pakistan’s water storage capacity is alarmingly low, only about 30 days of storage compared to India’s 170 days.
Pakistan has only three major dams, Tarbela, Mangla and the newly added Diamer-Bhasha while India has built over 5,100 large dams across its territory, including over a hundred on rivers that feed into the Indus system.
To ensure water security, Pakistan needs to invest in both infrastructure and policy reform.
Building additional reservoirs and dams, such as Mohmand and Dasu, is crucial.
Efficient irrigation systems like drip and sprinkler irrigation can significantly reduce agricultural water usage, which currently consumes over 90% of available freshwater.
Enforcing groundwater regulation is vital, as over-extraction is depleting aquifers at unsustainable rates.
On the diplomatic front, Pakistan must continue to engage with international institutions to uphold the Indus Waters Treaty while developing a modern legal and scientific capacity to interpret and monitor India’s hydrological projects.
Data sharing, satellite surveillance, and institutional collaboration with global water organizations should form the basis of future strategy.
Climate adaptation strategies are also critical.
As rainfall patterns become less predictable and glacial melt accelerates, Pakistan must develop integrated water management policies that include reforestation, watershed rehabilitation, and urban water conservation.
Diversifying agricultural practices, reducing reliance on water-intensive crops like sugarcane and rice in arid regions, and promoting water-efficient technologies can help reduce stress.
What Pakistan needs is not confrontation but transformation of its water policies, infrastructure, and agricultural systems.
With a proactive approach and regional cooperation, water can remain a shared resource rather than a weapon of conflict in South Asia.
—The writer is PhD in Political Science, and visiting faculty at QAU Islamabad.([email protected])
