Syed Qamar Afzal Rizvi
THE Sino-American conflict has already become a core issue in the run-up to the US presidential election this November because President Trump’s Administration has vehemently decided that bashing China is one way to divert attention from its own failings. But sorry, this synergy of Bashing China by the Trump administration could hardly work vis-à-vis the EU-China relations. The European Think-Tank Network on China (ETNC) has profoundly imparted its research to analyse –from a national, bottom-up approach– how the EU is responding to increased US-Chinese geopolitical rivalry.
There is no denying that China will be an increasingly important part of the global economy in the years ahead. Because Europe can no longer count on the US as a reliable, like-minded partner, it will have to develop its own approach. The new European strategy toward China should be based on two pillars. On the one hand, engagement on issues of common concern can and must continue. China accounts for nearly 30% of global greenhouse-gas emissions. Because one of Europe’s chief policy objectives is now to pursue a green-energy transition – achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 – spurning dialogue with China is not an option. The aim is not to start another cold war, but to practise what the late Gerald Segal called “constrainment” vis-à-vis China. In his view, liberal democracies must defend their belief in a global order based on credible international agreements and the rule of law. So, we the Europeans should be prepared to offer China incentives for good behaviour, and we must be prepared to deter bad behaviour vigorously.
The arising differences between EU member states notwithstanding, its key finding is that all the countries analysed are in a similar position. Though all European states consider the US their most important ally and they all depend on its military protection, they also want to do as much business with China as possible. These contradictory trends are even more glaring since Washington is increasing its security presence in countries— like Hungary, Greece and Poland, whereas the economic growth dynamic appears synonymous with China’s favouring. Hence, far from being persuaded about a possible decoupling, the European economies are trying to maintain and even enhance their economic engagement with China particularly in the post-Covid world—being done with more awareness of the strategic dimensions involved and with new defensive tools, such as the European investment screening mechanism. In several European chapters, China is regarded as an instrumental actor of tackling global challenges and global governance issues such as climate change, the reform of the WTO and the Iran nuclear deal.
For years now, Germany has been leaning on China for cheap supply and as a market for its exports. Following the 2008 financial crisis, when most of Europe was suffering, Germany kept itself rather unscathed thanks to a strong export-orientated economy and partly thanks to China. Germany was not concerned about any geo-economic advances Beijing was making. It cared little about the 16+1 forum with Central and Eastern European countries launched in 2012 or the Belt and Road Initiative unveiled in 2013, and the ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy intended to establish Chinese dominance in emerging technologies.
China is France’s 7th largest customer (France has a 1.4% market share in China) and 2nd largest supplier (China has a 9% market share in France). Our trade is significantly imbalanced: China represents France’s largest bilateral trade deficit (€29.2 billion in 2018), ahead of Germany. Investment in both directions is booming. France has a long-standing presence in China (foreign direct investment stock of €25 billion in 2017) in all sectors, including agri-food, industry, transport, urban development, major retail and financial services. More than 1,100 French companies are present in China where they employ around 570,000 people. Chinese investment in France has grown significantly in recent years (€6 billion in FDI stock). A total of 700 subsidiaries of Chinese and Hong Kong companies have been set up in France and employ 45,000 people. France supports Chinese investment which creates jobs and forges long-term, balanced partnership.
Belgium is China’s sixth largest trading partner in the EU. China is Belgium’s second, largest trading partner outside the EU. Practical cooperation in economy and trade between the two countries developed steadily. Bilateral trade began to rebound after emerging from the negative impact of the economic crisis. Among the CEE countries, some — like Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia — are staunch U.S. allies; some, like Bulgaria or Croatia, are more flexible; and there are pro-China governments in Serbia or Hungary. One important difference is that Baltic countries are very passionate about human rights, while others, like Serbia or Hungary, are less interested in this topic. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are among the few countries around the world that have a parliamentary support group for Tibet
Though the UK-China relations have undergone sea change because of the British policy towards the Hong Kong citizenry as the Premier Johnson Government is offering a “path to UK citizenship” for almost 3m Hongkongers who hold or are eligible to apply for British National (Overseas) passports, the ultimate truth is that please use the sharing tools found via the share button at the top or side of articles. The West as a whole needs realistic engagement with China, not the retreat into hostile opposing camps that typified cold war relations with Russia. The UK should be no exception to that principle. Because of the London-Washington factor, it could hardly maintain its business with Beijing on the same basis as before.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law.
