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EASA restrictions on Pakistan registered airlines

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THE last nail in the coffin of PCAA and PIA was the statement on the floor of NA by Aviation Minister Ghulam Sarwar Khan, in the presence of Prime Minister Imran Khan, following the crash of Pk-8303 on May 22, 2020, that almost 262 pilot licenses were dubious. It sent shockwaves, which cast doubts about capability and competence of the regulator PCAA to perform its oversight functions. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) imposed restrictions on operation by PCAA regulated airlines, such as PIA, Airblue etc., from operating into their airspace in 2020 and this ban remains in force even in 2024, because of failure by PCAA to comply and submit to EASA Safety Audit Inspections.

If they had followed and implemented Corrective Action Plans, these restrictions could have been lifted by 2021. This hesitation in submitting to EASA Safety Audit continued till November 2023, when EASA visited Pakistan between 27 to 30 November. They carried out “sample assessments of two air carriers” certified by Pakistan “Fly Jinnah” and Airblue, apart from assessment of PCAA for its oversight role and responsibilities. They noticed regarding PCAA’s safety oversight “a noticeable lack of depth of scrutiny” as regards “closure of findings based on Corrective Action Plans” which was mutually agreed upon and a “lack of proper assessment of the proposed CAPs”.

“Common shortcomings were observed throughout the organization, such as underscoring of non-conformities and lack of internal verification”. The report also highlights “deviations from PCAA procedures, as evidenced by the fact that some AOCs (Airline Operators Certificates) were granted with findings open, wrongly classified, or safety oversight plans not performed as planned”. They also noticed that “at the time of visit the Flight Standards Directorate was severely understaffed in terms of sufficiently quailed personnel to perform all certification and safety oversight risks. The situation is aggravated by the assignment of tasks that do not necessarily fall within Flight Standards remit”. They also pointed out “that root cause identification and its analysis is an area that needs to be properly implemented”.

“During the hearings Fly Jinnah discrepancies were noticed and flaws in “QMS Audit planning and management of continuous airworthiness. The air carrier presented the outsourced functions such as crew training, FDM analysis, crew planning and maintenance, most of them externalized to the company Air Arabia. Of specific note were the proposals presented to address the observations related to the identified flaws in its QMS”. PCAA was to “address the identified shortcomings of its safety oversight capacity and capability, notably in terms of ensuring an appropriate organizational structure, task allocation, recruitment and retention of qualified personnel, a commensurate number of qualified inspectors and an appropriate training programme”. The team did note that they have only recently increased number of qualified inspectors from 1 to 19”, but there needs to be a thorough follow up in all cadres. EASA report has recommended “member states should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Pakistan with relevant international safety standards through prioritization of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

While privatization of PIA was long overdue, given the mismanagement by cronies of every successive civil and non-civil government and escalation in losses, the process must be transparent. Commercial aviation has more in common with hospitality business than military and air-force aviation. While the success or failure of commercial airlines depends on revenue passenger’s satisfaction with services offered, route structure, convenience of connections, safety records, regularity of schedules and in-flight services and revenues from cargo they carry; military aviation works on a command and control structure, with minimal of regulatory oversight. In commercial aviation, safety and comfort of passenger is of primary importance. The difference is as vast as that between an Oncologist and a Dentist.

Earlier in March 2007, PIA was included in Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 restricting operation of a part of its fleet into EU airspace. This was subsequently removed in November 2007 by EASA on assurances that both CAA and PIA will comply with safety standards of EASA for Third Country Operator assessment. Problems with PIA maintenance started, when DMD AVM Niaz, a direct lateral appointee, decided to deviate from aviation industry practice of selecting multiple vendors, along the route, for supply of essential parts and selected a single vendor in 2003, with first right of refusal in a remote location in UK. This led to rise in maintenance costs.

In the event of an aircraft grounded along the route, other than UK, parts were bought on an AOG basis at almost twice or thrice its price. This led to delays and compromises which finally resulted in 2007 partial ban. No lessons were learned, because again in 2011 another direct appointee DMD Salim Sayani chose an unknown single vendor located in Fze Dubai, with first right of refusal, resulting in escalation in maintenance costs, causing delays and PIA once again became a subject of random ramp inspections in Europe. An airline like PIA, once under scrutiny, must set its house in order, instead of embarking on nonstandard practices. Decline in PIA started, when AM Nur Khan resigned because of political interference by Zia junta. Thereafter, except a few short spans, this decline has deteriorated. To add salt to the injury CAA Pakistan became a dumping ground for welfare of retired officers, who had no experience in commercial aviation, nor the mindset required of a regulator.

Senior executives, devoid of commercial aviation experience and regulatory controls were themselves on OJT and by the time they became familiar, they were changed. We need to understand that commercial airlines are subjected to regulatory control of every country, whose airspace they overfly, or land enroute. No other industry in Pakistan is subjected to thorough international regulatory controls and scrutiny like commercial airlines. It is because of this, that the necessity of relevant qualifications and experience in commercial aviation industry is vital for appointments in both PIA and PCAA. When a regulator gets involved in commercial ventures, regulation becomes a casualty. For Pakistan commercial aviation industry to survive and air carriers able to operate into EU airspace, PCAA must be reformed and restructured.

—The writer is contributing columnist, based in Lahore.

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