THE rapid transformations in international geopolitics negatively influence Pakistan and the United States’ multidimensional decades-old relationship. Instead of applying a reactionary or dismissal attitude, Islamabad must pursue a conciliatory approach to avert the diminishing trend in its rapport with Washington. Indeed, it’s a diplomatic debacle that an ally is expressing its serious apprehension over the long-range ballistic missile program of the country, which is vital to deter the military aggression of India.
Pakistan’s relevance in Washington’s foreign and strategic calculations has significantly lessened since the American troops withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021. Besides, the US’s increasing competition for great power with China and expanding threshold alliance with India have created a divergence in Islamabad and Washington’s geopolitical outlook. Despite the deviation in their strategic interests and the outgoing Biden administration’s numerous sanctions aimed to undermine Pakistan’s missile capability, the Pakistani ruling elite is struggling to improve relations with the United States.
Pakistan’s military doctrine, especially its nuclear weapons posture, the principal goal is deterrence of any aggression by India. Therefore, its nuclear doctrine and posture were planned to offset India’s disparity in conventional forces and prevent it from nuclear blackmail. Consequently, they were influenced by the quantitative and qualitative reforms in India’s conventional and nuclear forces, entailing alteration in its war fighting military doctrine and blackmailing nuclear posture. The critical examination of Pakistan’s defence policy reveals that Islamabad has chalked out and executed defensive measures to effectively check India’s military threats by modernizing its defence forces and revamping its nuclear posture. Moreover, its long-range ballistic missile ranges (Shaheen-III range 2750 km, and Ababeel range 2200 km) testify that Pakistan is only capable of striking targets on the Indian territory. Thus, it has neither the ambition nor intention to develop or acquire the capability to strike targets farther than the 2750 km range out of South Asia.
Rationally, one understands the political purpose of Americans last month’s sanctions on Pakistan’s state-owned missile development agency—National Development Complex (NDC), and three of its vendor companies—Akhtar and Sons Private Limited, Affiliates International, and Rockside Enterprise. It seems to be a continuity of the U.S. non-proliferation policy and carrot-and-stick approach towards Pakistan. However, one fails to grasp the rationale of US Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer’s December 19, 2024 statement, “Candidly, it’s hard for us to see Pakistan’s actions as anything other than an emerging threat to the United States.” It is disturbing that an ally is viewing the limited long-range ballistic missile systems of Pakistan threateningly. Is it heralding a fundamental shift in Pakistan and the US relationship?
The disparity in military potential between Pakistan and the US is apparent, and the balance of power immensely favours the latter. The US military is currently the most advanced and influential in the world, with a mega defence budget, advanced force structure, unparalleled resources, cutting-edge technology and a global reach. Pakistan’s military is formidable in its own right, especially within the South Asian region, but the US military’s overwhelming scale, technology and global operational reach dwarf it. Thus, Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile potential is vastly overshadowed by the sheer scale and technological sophistication of the US military, as well as its offensive and defensive missile inventories.
The outgoing Biden Administration’s recent sanctions have not only put Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile program under more scrutiny but also threatened to thwart the indigenous modernization processes. In contrast, it has generously assisted India’s modernization by transferring state-of-the-art military hardware and technology. The US’s discriminatory South Asian policy may have a short-term dividend, i.e., cementing the Indo-US threshold alliance, but it also has the potential to create lasting regional strategic instability, a concern that should not be overlooked.
The American strategic pundits seem convinced that militarily and economically strong India will significantly contain China’s rise. However, Sino-India’s increasing bilateral trade, because China is India’s top trading partner, and mature approach to decrease the tension at the Line of Actual Control (border deal signed on October 23, 2024, and subsequently implemented to end a military standoff on their disputed Himalayan border) indicate that New Delhi is not prepared to pose an economic and military challenge to China in the region. Moreover, the Modi government is contemplating opening to Chinese foreign direct investments that can generate jobs, particularly in sectors like solar panel and battery manufacturing. Indeed, the border agreement and arrangements to offset some trade imbalance between the two countries raised questions about New Delhi’s commitment to the Quad, widely seen as a U.S.-led bid to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific.
While the prospects of improved relations with the new Trump administration may seem distant, Islamabad must intensify its diplomatic efforts. This is necessary to dispel mistrust and prevent further deterioration in bilateral relations. Cultivating constructive, cooperative ties with the Trump administration is imperative for Pakistan’s national interest. However, it’s equally essential for Pakistani policymakers to maintain their independence in relations with neighbouring states, including their stance on Kashmir and the solidification of their defensive capabilities.
—The writer is Prof at the School of Politics and IR, Quaid-i-Azam University.
