THE Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has evolved from a fragmented alliance of militant groups into a highly organized force which encompasses 42 factions by 2024.
This transformation is largely credited to Noor Wali Mehsud, who became the TTP’s leader in 2017.
Under his leadership, the group has restructured into a more formalized organization resembling a shadow government, with ministries, Wilayahs (provinces) and a strict and stringent Code of Conduct that governs its operations.
A critical factor in the TTP’s resilience is its well-organized financial system, which funds its activities.
The group generates income through extortion, smuggling and kidnapping, taking a percentage—typically 5-20%—from local businesses and individuals.
These activities are regulated by an Operational Code designed to prevent exploitation within the organization which ensures that the financial system operates efficiently and under strict guidelines.
The TTP’s propaganda strategy has also shifted significantly over time.
While initially focused on military glorification, it now includes socio-political messaging that aims to address public grievances.
The group has expanded its media presence, producing magazines, podcasts and video series that address issues such as governance, political repression and regional inequalities.
Through these platforms, the TTP portrays itself as a legitimate alternative to Pakistan’s government, particularly in areas where the state’s authority is weak or absent.
The 2021 takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban significantly strengthened the TTP.
With Afghanistan under Taliban control, the TTP found a safe haven and operational base by using the country’s porous borders to launch cross-border attacks into Pakistan.
However, the TTP avoids direct confrontation with the Taliban and maintains a careful balance while benefiting from their tacit support.
Efforts at peace talks between Pakistan and the TTP, notably in 2021 and 2022, failed due to irreconcilable demands.
The TTP insisted on reversing the merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and rejecting the Durand Line, which demarcates the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
As a result, violence escalated, with the TTP intensifying its insurgency.
Rather than advocating for separatism, the TTP presents itself as an alternative governance model, aligning with Pashtun grievances and anti-state narratives.
Its rhetoric focuses on Pashtun nationalism and cultural autonomy, gaining traction among disaffected Pashtun populations.
Despite Pakistan’s military efforts to curb the TTP, the group continues to thrive.
This resilience can be attributed to the political instability, corruption and poor governance that plague much of the region.
Additionally, weak border controls between Pakistan and Afghanistan have allowed the TTP to operate with relative impunity.
TTP’s rise and consolidation reflect a broader pattern of insurgency fuelled by deep-seated political, ethnic and economic grievances.
By exploiting this discontentment, the group has positioned itself as a formidable force in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Until the root causes of the conflict are addressed, the TTP’s influence is unlikely to diminish and the instability in this volatile region is set to persist.
—The writer is an alumnus of QAU, MPhil scholar & a freelance columnist, based in Islamabad. (fa7263125@gmail.com)
