Our Afghan imbroglio and the TTP factor
RECENT violent incidents of terrorism in Pakistan clearly show how Afghan soil is again used by the non-state actors to carry out their terror agenda against Pakistan. The striking increase in attacks in Pakistan highlights the growing security tasks to the rulers of Afghanistan and, of course, Pakistan being the neighbouring country with shared borders are equally concerned as the peace in Afghanistan is linked with the peace in Pakistan. Yet the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan factor is fundamental to determine the scope of our future relations with Kabul.
Needless to say, there is always a propensity of violence in Afghanistan, crossing the border into Pakistan and disturb internal situation here. With the power vacuum prevalent in Afghanistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has regained strength and has up-scaled its activities inside Pakistan in recent months. Although Pakistan is fencing border between Pakistan and Afghanistan yet the Taliban regime is not very much in consort with Pakistan on the subject due to the Durand Line issue. The trajectory of Afghan-India-Pakistan angle plays an important role in this connection.
It seems more pragmatic to estimate that terrorism in Pakistan has been curtailed, but by no means eliminated. The number of terror attacks and the number of resulting fatalities have started to tick up again; sectarianism is growing and the causes feeding into radicalization of the population not only continue to exist but, in some instances, are aggravating the problem. Though our security forces have made great sacrifices to fight against the devilish forces of terrorism richly manifested by the glaring operations carried out in the Zarb-e Azab (2014) and Radull Fassad (2017). Needless to say, Pakistan’s security forces owe great credit for terminating the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) reign of terror (roughly 2007-2015). Obviously, the Pakistani state has had ample reason to be concerned about blowback from the Afghan Taliban across the Durand Line.
All the while, it is an undeniable fact that the TTP is the largest militant organization fighting against the State of Pakistan. According to the UN, the TTP also boasts several thousand fighters in Afghanistan, with strongholds on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Actually, the TTP’s operative wings are associated in four categories: first, the Al-Qaeda remains, second, the Indian or the RAW-backed wing, third those based in Afghanistan and fourth those who are based in South and North Waziristan or in the associated tribal vicinities of the KP province. Some of the TTPs splinter factions either merged into ISK or pledged allegiance to it. The TTP’s most lethal splinter Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), in collaboration with TTP’s Tariq Gidar Group, was responsible for major terrorist attacks, including on Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014.
However, beyond the TTP sphere, there are also some elements in the Afghan Taliban, who have shown in recent months that they are willing to strengthen relations with India, including defence ties endorsed by the statement— of the Afghan Defence Minister Mohammad Yaqoob—about sending Afghan army personnel to India for training. Moreover, the Afghan Taliban’s strategy of supporting and facilitating Pakistani talks with the TTP—as opposed to fighting the group militarily—has nonetheless multiple geostrategic angles.
The most consequential effect is that Pakistan must now contend with the facilitator of its talks with the TTP using relations with one of its prime security threats to force negotiations on the latter’s terms. This argument gets much heat in some policy quarters that not only does this benefit the TTP— as the Afghan Taliban’s brethren-in-arms (since the two have a long history of ties)— but it also allows the Afghan Taliban to build a favourable image for themselves as peacemakers, putting Pakistan on the defensive so as not to meddle into Afghan affairs. This complex scenario has put Pakistan’s policy makers under the dilemma. Bewilderedly, the ideological connection that has helped Pakistan control the Taliban in Afghanistan has also paved the way for growing Islamist radicalization in Pakistan itself. Islamist and jihadist forces are now invoking Islam not so much in opposition to India, as they have traditionally done, but more to pressure the Pakistani government to assert the country’s Islamic character.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani government had long argued the TTP was the US’ proxy presence in Afghanistan, combined with external support from the former Afghan government in cahoots with India. Nevertheless, it was argued in the Pakistani policy quarters that the US forces’ exit from the Afghan soil would limit the TTP’s threat against Pakistan. But the contemporary circumstances strongly negate this hypothesis. Some analysts have pointed to the TTP’s downplaying of transnational jihad goals in its declared aims recently. But that doesn’t mean it has broken its ideological wings with Al-Qaeda.
And yet, Islamabad is cognizant of the fact that the Taliban could assuage international concerns with regard to both governance and security if Western pressure is to let up. So far, our traditional security challenges remained unchanged. Still, pragmatically, Pakistan is bound to have ties with the Taliban Government in Kabul. Yet arguably, it should use those ties carefully, to nudge the Taliban toward compromises on governance, including on respect for basic rights and adherence to counter-terrorism commitments that might win them greater favour abroad and help ease Afghanistan’s humanitarian tragedy.
Even with a seemingly pro-Islamabad regime in Kabul led by the Afghan Taliban, the underlying issues between the two capitals remain yet a big diplomatic challenge. Kabul’s consistent refusal to accept the Durand Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which has triggered the recent clashes between their security forces, remains a key driver of tension, undermining trust and provoking tension. From the Pakistani perspective, Islamabad’s benign relationship with Kabul largely depends on the TTP behaviour.
Moreover, the new Afghan rulers are still grappling with numerous challenges in terms of international recognition, humanitarian aid, basic healthcare, women’s education and infrastructure development, as well as countering the terrorism threat from ISIS-Khorasan Province (ISKP). Against this backdrop, it looks hard to predict the future horizon. Most importantly, Kabul’s failure to take action against Pakistani militants operating from Afghan territory could endanger Pakistan’s internal security. Here, one thing is certainly proven by the record that our security forces are poised to the hilt to eradicate the menace of terrorism, extremism and radicalization from the Pakistani soil.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law. He deals with the strategic and nuclear issues.
