FIFTY-four years after it was launched—much water has flown under the bridge—the anti-Pakistan mood in Bangladesh has changed, hence it is time to re-examine the efficacy of launching Operation Searchlight in East Pakistan on 25 March 1971.
Launched by the Pakistan Army, Operation Searchlight was a military action aimed at suppressing the Bengali nationalist movement in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
The operation followed the refusal of West Pakistan’s leadership to honour the Awami League’s victory in the 1970 elections.
While the operation achieved its immediate military objectives, such as taking control of major cities and targeting opposition forces, its long-term consequences were catastrophic.
It led to widespread atrocities, including the targeting of Bengali intellectuals, students and civilians, which fuelled international condemnation and intensified the Bengali independence movement.
The operation is widely regarded as a key factor that escalated the Bangladesh Liberation War and ultimately resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.
The efficacy of Operation Searchlight is highly debated.
Militarily, it demonstrated the Pakistan Army’s ability to execute a coordinated campaign.
However, politically and ethically, it is considered a failure due to the immense human suffering it caused and its role in galvanizing global support for Bangladesh’s independence.
The decision to launch Operation Searchlight was met with opposition from several quarters, including some senior military officials and political figures in Pakistan.
Concerns were raised about the potential for widespread violence and the alienation of the Bengali population in East Pakistan.
Critics feared that the operation would escalate tensions and lead to a full-blown civil war, which it ultimately did.
Operation Searchlight faced significant opposition from various individuals and groups, both within East Pakistan and internationally.
Here are some perspectives:
Bengali Nationalists: The operation was seen as a brutal crackdown on the Bengali nationalist movement, which had gained momentum after the Awami League’s victory in the 1970 elections.
Leaders like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League strongly opposed the military’s actions, viewing them as an attempt to suppress the legitimate aspirations of the Bengali people for autonomy and self-determination.
International Observers and Journalists: Many foreign journalists and diplomats stationed in Dhaka at the time reported on the atrocities committed during the operation.
Their accounts highlighted the widespread human rights abuses, including the targeting of civilians, intellectuals and students.
These reports drew international condemnation and support for the Bengali cause.
Pakistani Dissidents: Some individuals within West Pakistan, including politicians and intellectuals, criticized the military’s actions.
They argued that the operation would deepen the divide between East and West Pakistan and lead to long-term consequences for the unity of the country.
Human Rights Organizations: Although the global human rights movement was not as organized as it is today, various groups and individuals condemned the operation for its violation of human rights and the large-scale loss of civilian lives.
Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, who served as the Governor of East Pakistan from 1969 to 1971, was reportedly opposed to the launch of Operation Searchlight.
He believed that a military crackdown on the Bengali population would lead to disastrous consequences and further alienate the people of East Pakistan.
Ahsan advocated for a political solution to address the grievances of the Bengali population and was critical of the central government’s approach under General Yahya Khan.
His resignation in March 1971, just before the operation was launched, is often seen as a protest against the planned military action.
Ahsan’s stance highlighted his concerns about the unity of Pakistan and the potential fallout of using force to suppress the Bengali nationalist movement.
Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan also strongly opposed the launch of Operation Searchlight.
He advocated for a political solution to address the tensions in East Pakistan rather than resorting to military action.
His stance was rooted in the belief that military intervention would exacerbate the situation and lead to further division.
Ultimately, he resigned from his position as Commander Eastern Command in March 1971, refusing to be part of the operation.
His resignation marked a significant moment in the history of Pakistan’s military and political landscape.
Air Commodore Zafar Masud, who was the Air Officer Commanding in East Pakistan during the launch of Operation Searchlight in March 1971, reportedly opposed the military operation.
He believed that the use of force against the Bengali population would lead to disastrous consequences for Pakistan.
Masud had advised against the operation, emphasizing the need for a political solution to address the grievances of the people in East Pakistan.
His warnings, however, were not heeded and the operation proceeded under the orders of the central government in West Pakistan.
Analysts now question if Operation Searchlight had not been launched, what alternative scenarios could have occurred.
Without the military crackdown, there might have been more room for political dialogue between West Pakistan and East Pakistan.
This could have delayed or even prevented the secession of East Pakistan, depending on the willingness of both sides to compromise.
The operation led to significant loss of life and human rights violations.
Avoiding it might have spared many lives and reduced the scale of the humanitarian crisis.
The brutal crackdown galvanized the Bengali population and international support for their cause.
Without it, the independence movement might have taken longer to gain momentum.
The absence of such a violent conflict could have altered the geopolitical landscape of South Asia, potentially affecting relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Thousands of non-Bengali lives were also lost, which has not been acknowledged.
—The writer, Retired Group Captain of PAF, is author of several books on China. (sultanm.hali@gmail.com)
