Maj Gen (R) Zahid Mahmood, HI(M), TBt
When double, dealing becomes habit, it is no longer a tactic, it becomes a nation’s defining character.
After calling China the number one threat and accusing it of backing Pakistan in the Pahalgam incident, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now planning a visit to Beijing. The question is unavoidable: what happened to India’s loudly proclaimed national security principles?
India likes to wear the badge of a “reliable partner” in global affairs, a rising democratic power that others can trust, a pillar of stability in a turbulent region. This carefully cultivated image plays well on international platforms. Yet, recent events have exposed an uncomfortable truth: when diplomacy does not go its way, or when global pressure mounts, India has no hesitation in switching positions, changing friends, and rewriting its own narrative. The chameleon effect in Indian foreign policy has always been visible, but in recent years, it has become almost an art form. Only a few weeks ago, China was painted as India’s foremost security threat. After the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in 2020, Indian leaders openly labelled Beijing an aggressor, with Godi media rhetoric bordering on war talk. Yet today, Modi is preparing for an official visit to China, a move signalling not reconciliation after genuine resolution of disputes, but a calculated pivot motivated by trade opportunities and strategic bargaining and seeking reset. This is not an isolated case. The same pattern emerges in India’s dealings with Russia. During the Ukraine war, as soon as the United States pressed India to reduce oil imports from Moscow, New Delhi went in the opposite direction, dramatically increasing purchases of discounted Russian crude until it became one of Russia’s largest customers. This was swiftly followed by high-profile diplomatic engagements, including the urgent visit of National Security Advisor AjitDoval to Moscow, a move widely interpreted as a signal to Washington that India would not be dictated to. The underlying message was clear: principles are negotiable; necessity is paramount.
India’s transactional style is not limited to adversaries. Modi once proudly called Donald Trump “my friend,” with their camaraderie on full display at high-profile rallies like Howdy, Modi in Houston and Namaste Trump in Ahmedabad. But such warmth in Indian diplomacy often lasts only as long as interests align. Today, the friendship has cooled as Trump criticises India over its Russian oil imports and threatens major tariff hikes. Instead of seeking a quiet resolution, New Delhi has responded by publicly accusing the U.S. and European Union of “double standards” — turning a once-celebrated partnership into a very public quarrel. It is another reminder that in Indian diplomacy, smiles in the spotlight can quickly turn into sharp retorts when the winds change.
India’s current outreach to China is particularly striking when contrasted with its earlier accusations after the Pahalgam incident. In that episode, Indian security officials claimed that Beijing was covertly assisting Pakistan in efforts to destabilise Indian-administered Kashmir. China was even named alongside Pakistan as part of a hostile axis. Yet, only months later, India is engaging China through forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and preparing Modi’s Beijing trip as if those grave charges had never been made. This is not principled diplomacy, it is selective amnesia for political convenience.
India has simultaneously portrayed Pakistan, China, and Turkey as part of an “anti-India” front in both military and diplomatic arenas. Indian media narratives often accuse these countries of working in concert to undermine its interests. Yet in multilateral and sometimes bilateral settings, New Delhi has shown no hesitation in sitting across the table with China and Turkey, exploring trade opportunities, or even discussing joint projects when it sees potential economic or strategic advantage. The ability to work with rivals is not inherently problematic, it is a necessity in modern diplomacy, but in India’s case, the speed and frequency with which hostility turns into cooperation raises questions about consistency and credibility.
The United States has invested heavily in building India up as a counterweight to China, signing defence pacts, encouraging technology transfers, and proposing deeper trade integration. But when Washington raised concerns over human rights issues or pressed India to cut oil imports from Russia, New Delhi slowed trade negotiations and openly tilted towards Moscow and Beijing. It is a familiar pattern: when relations are smooth, India smiles warmly; when pressure mounts, it finds a new dance partner without hesitation. This style of diplomacy is beginning to create a widening trust gap. Strategic partners are learning that New Delhi’s commitments last only as long as they serve immediate national interests. Whether it is the sudden Moscow trip, Modi’s planned China visit, or the whiplash, inducing swing from accusing Beijing of aiding Pakistan to embracing it in global summits, the message to allies and adversaries alike is the same: India will change its stance without warning.
Diplomacy requires flexibility, the ability to adapt to shifting geopolitical realities is an essential skill for any nation. But there is a difference between strategic flexibility and opportunistic shape-shifting. What India has been practising is the latter. In the short term, this approach might deliver cheaper oil, advantageous trade deals, or diplomatic support in multilateral forums. But in the long run, it risks leaving India isolated, with no partner truly confident in its word. India will eventually have to pay the price for playing both sides. In an era where global alliances are hardening, straddling multiple camps may no longer be a viable long-term strategy. You cannot be the “trusted partner” of the free world while courting its primary adversaries the moment a deal turns sour. You cannot label a nation your enemy in one breath and pose for a friendly summit photograph in the next without eroding your credibility. India’s double-faced diplomacy may be yielding short-term gains, but it is also shaping its global reputation in ways that will be difficult to undo. As the world becomes more polarised, the tolerance for this brand of transactional engagement will diminish.
The United States has begun to see through India’s two-faced diplomacy and its harmful application of Hindutva. Washington is now seriously considering measures to cut India down to size, and trade tariffs could well be followed by placing New Delhi under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions. Indians would do well to keep their fingers crossed.
No amount of carefully staged photo-ops will mask the reality that India’s foreign policy, for all its skill and theatrics, has developed a habit of shifting colours, just like a chameleon.
—The writer is Defence, Security Analyst and Principal, NUST Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies ( NIPCONS), Islamabad.
