Rethinking economic governance: Missing economic link

M Fareed Malik

PAKISTAN is not suffering from a dearth of economic visions, growth strategies, development frameworks and institutional arrangements to achieve them at national and provincial levels. From the Board of Investment, the Federal Ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs to the Planning Commission and the newly empowered Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), the nation claims to have a myriad of institutional arrangements of economic wellbeing. Yet, a fundamental implementation chasm persists between macro-economic plans and on-the-ground realities. Economic and public policy experts often observe that the country’s growth strategies falter because they lack an execution structure at the grass root level. The overarching question remains unanswered, “to whom rests the responsibility for cultivating economic growth, boosting productivity and connecting local producers to global markets within a specific division or district”?

The economic governance of the country is predominantly designed from the top down, policies are conceived in provincial or federal capitals under the erroneous assumption that implementation will organically cascade downwards. However, economic activity is inherently a place-based activity. Factories, farms, mines, logistics and labour force exist within specific geographical confines. While the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics and provincial agencies generate vital district-level empirical data, the country lacks localized institutions to synthesize this information into actionable economic intelligence and take targeted action.

Historically considered the nucleus of civil government management, district administration today is heavily overburdened and conceptually misaligned with modern development requirements. Deputy Commissioners are engulfed in reactive duties, from price control and anti-encroachment drives to disaster management and security concerns. This pervasive “firefighting” culture leaves little institutional capacity for proactive economic stewardship. Consequently, district authorities operate largely blind to their own economic realities. They often lack knowledge of GDP and poverty levels, production factors, the value of natural endowments and the economic potential of their jurisdictions. Moreover, they have little say in provincial or federal resource allocation and lack an organizational structure to support economic development. The Punjab government’s recent move to add Additional Deputy Commissioners for Municipal and Social Services, while neglecting Economic Services, is a glaring example. It highlights a fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s bureaucratic structure: it remains focused on control and regulation rather than development and economic growth.

In stark contrast, successful economic models demonstrate the power of decentralized, localized economic management. China’s rapid economic ascent has been propelled by localized interventions led by specialized administrations with extensive operational powers. Local cadres often function as economic managers, with career advancement linked to local GDP growth and investment attraction. Vietnam has similarly institutionalized this approach through its Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), which ranks the economic governance of its 63 cities and provinces on business environment and regulatory ease, encouraging local competition to attract private enterprise. Across the developed world, local authorities play a central role in regional prosperity. In the United States, municipal and county economic development corporations serve as local growth engines, while Germany relies on regional development agencies and districts to guide economic policy and innovation. These models demonstrate that decentralized local units can attract investment, create jobs, improve infrastructure and deliver essential services more effectively.

In order to bridge this missing link, policy experts propose a profound structural reform: the institutionalization of local intelligence through a dedicated Economic Development Function at District and Divisional levels. Rather than spawning new bureaucracies, this involves cultivating economic leadership within the existing administrative framework, supported by statisticians, local business chambers and academic institutions. Under this model, districts would maintain an annually updated economic profile, meticulously tracking labour force dynamics, industrial capacities and logistics connectivity and leverage the localized factors for economic wellbeing with the active and institutionalized involvement of private sector. The power of these regional micro-economies and the necessity of localized planning become undeniable when examining the country’s industrial hubs. Faisalabad, for instance, is not merely a district; it is a sprawling textile matrix. A generic national policy cannot resolve its specific needs for specialized skills, localized energy reliability or environmental infrastructure for industrial wastewater. Conversely, Sialkot stands as a testament to the efficacy of localized, private-sector-led ecosystems. This implementation gap is equally glaring in overarching investment and infrastructure planning. While central bodies like the SIFC are pivotal in circumventing bureaucratic inertia to attract capital, their macro-level facilitation must eventually interface with capable district economic cells. Investors do not inject funds into an abstract “Pakistan”—they invest in specific localities necessitating land, utilities and municipal services. If the local system is unequipped to deliver these prerequisites, the investors would get frustrated and investments will inevitably stall.

Moving forward, the panacea for Pakistan’s economic malaise is not another sweeping national vision or newly minted federal committee, but an economic operating system anchored at the district and divisional levels. The recurring discourse on smaller provinces will yield substantive success only if linked to broader economic growth. Any prospective provincial units must be financially sustainable, empowered by independent economic growth models. Through mechanisms like a district economic development compact, localities could transition from passive recipients of provincial schemes to active economic engines. This paradigm shift requires local officials to act not only as administrative enforcers but as chief coordinators of local economic ecosystems. Until district administrations are restructured into specialized cadres, evaluated and held accountable as managers of local economies, national strategies will continue to languish within a hierarchy designed for maintaining order rather than propelling growth. Ultimately, sustainable economic prosperity requires growth to have a localized postcode.

—The writer is an experienced economic development practitioner, graduated from London School of Economics.

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