INDIA has been developing a diverse range of missile systems, including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. This development and deployment exacerbate the security dilemmas of neighbouring states. Moreover, these advancements alarm major powers, as New Delhi seeks to safeguard its strategic autonomy in international geopolitics. Its balancing efforts recently prompted the US State and Treasury Departments to impose sanctions on 19 Indian companies and two Indian nationals for “enabling Russia’s prosecution of its illegal war.
During the last two decades, the Indo-US strategic partnership systemically evolved into the Indo-US threshold alliance. Despite increasing multidimensional cooperation, the Americans did not object to India’s military purchases, including S-400 missiles from Russia. Indian companies and Russian state-owned enterprises have been cooperating for a long time. Therefore, the recent sanctions against the Indian companies seem strange, especially when elected President Donald Trump’s cohorts are publicizing the continuity of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Trump administration 2.0’s hardened approach against China would be one of the few policy areas that continue from Biden to Trump. Hence, the minilateral security group—Australia, India, Japan and the United States (Quad)—could be further energized. The Americans are supposed to strengthen Quad. However, the sanctions against the Indian companies could discourage India from playing a proactive role as a staunch ally of the US to contain China in the Asia-Pacific region. Though the sanctions could be quashed sooner, India is not allowed to be a free-lancer or an autonomous actor in the global strategic environment.
The US does not desire India to acquire a military capability that could undermine Western nations or its heartland security. Therefore, the American strategic community closely monitors India and may discourage its pursuit of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) potential. On October 3, 2003, the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, while responding to the Washington Post’s reporter question regarding India-US space cooperation, said: “We also have to protect certain red lines that we have concerning proliferation because its sometimes hard to separate within space launch activities and industries and nuclear programs and that which could go to weapons and that which could be solely for peaceful purposes.” Nevertheless, after two years, the Bush administration agreed to build closer cooperation with India in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch.
The Indo-US close cooperation in space indirectly assisted India’s ICBM project. The critical elements of ICBM—hardware and technology—were obtained from India’s gigantic Polar Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV) purchased from the US in the 1960s. The review of literature published by Western and Indian scholars reveals that the Surya-ICBM project systematically evolved. The Surya is a three-stage ICBM missile with the first two Surya stages derived from PSLV’s solid-fuel rockets and the third Surya stage uses a Russian-supplied cryogenic upper stage for the Geosynchronous Space Launch Vehicle (GSLV).
Recently, the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) categorically denied the existence of the Surya-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) project. On November 10, 2024, India’s Defence Research Wing website published an article titled: “Pakistani Analyst Claims India’s Surya ICBM Could Concern Washington, Europe and Russia.”<https://idrw.org/pakistani-analyst-claims-indias-surya-icbm-could-concern-washington-europe-and-russia/>. According to the article, “India has consistently denied the existence of any Surya ICBM project. Past statements from DRDO officials have clarified that India is focused on enhancing its defence capabilities within its strategic requirements with no public confirmation of plans to develop ICBM that extends beyond the reach of its current Agni series. The Surya missile concept is believed to have originated from speculative reports and discussions within circles but has not been substantiated by any official Indian government source.” It also reconfirmed the continuity of India’s no-first-use (NFU) policy.
The determinants of the recent denial of the existence of the Surya project could be five: first, the indirect pressure of the United States (fear of sanctions). It has little impact on India’s ambitious missile programme. Second, there is a technological failure (adoption of PSLV and GSLV). Third, Surya’s size and weight make it difficult to conceal its launch site, which likely makes it vulnerable to attack before launch. Fourth, its vulnerability makes it more useful for first-strike weapons, which is contrary to India’s declaratory NFU policy. Fifthly, India’s Agni project has steadily advanced, which has provided India the option to shelve the Surya project and advance Agni into ICBM.
The Agni-V is a solid propellant three-stage missile with a range of 5000-8000 kilometres, and the Agni-VI is a solid propellant three-stage missile with a range of 8000-10,000 kilometres. On March 11, 2024, India successfully conducted a test of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology on Agni-V. The Agni-VI can reach Western nations and the Agni-VI can reach the United States. Thus, the Agni ICBM brought far-flung targets, including the United States and entire Western Europe, into the range of India’s nuclear arsenal.
—The writer is Prof at the School of Politics and IR, Quaid-i-Azam University.
