THE United States is once again in a mode of pressurizing Pakistan to toe Washington’s line in a bid to turning the strategic failure in Afghanistan into a victory but at the cost of the national interests of Pakistan.
In the backdrop of conflicting reports about the US demand and Islamabad’s ‘no’ on the issue of military bases, Washington has now openly acknowledged that it is holding direct talks with Pakistan over the use of a vital air corridor to Afghanistan.
Gen Frank McKenzie, who heads the US Central Command, confirmed at a congressional hearing on Tuesday that the US and Pakistan were “involved in ongoing deliberations” over the air corridor.
This explains the move in the US Senate aimed at imposing sanctions both on the Taliban and their supporters including Pakistan with demands by some Senators that Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan be probed.
It is quite evident that the move is a part of the pressure tactics to force Pakistan to agree to the proposition of an air corridor that the US intends to use to violate sovereignty of Afghanistan and to gather intelligence against regional countries, imperilling Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban Government as well as some other friendly states.
The remarks made by Chairman of the Joint Chief General Mark Milley at the Senate Armed Services Committee meeting on Tuesday also hinted that the US was once again raising the bogey of security threats to the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan as part of its strategy to keep Islamabad under pressure.
The impact of these moves have started appearing on Pakistan’s fragile economy as the stock market became volatile on Tuesday and the benchmark index plunged the most since March 2020.
Under these circumstances, it has to be seen what our leadership does to safeguard the core national interests.
There is a price that Pakistan will have to pay in either case – grant of permission or refusal for establishment of the so-called air corridor and ground communication facilities.
The permission would, obviously, strain Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban with accompanying repercussions for security and law and order while a ‘no’ would also entail a similar reaction.
It is time our policy-makers carry out an in-depth analysis of what Pakistan gained and lost during its long strategic association with the United States and what it should do to maintain its status as a dignified sovereign state. It is also time to learn a lesson from the bitter past experience of one-sided friendship.
An effective national response is the answer, which can only be formulated after a threadbare discussion by Parliament but regrettably the Government seems to be in no mood to allow Parliament to assume such a role.
