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Bangladesh: Volatile geo-strategic milieu

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MORE than half a century has gone by: the truth has triumphed. The inner soul of the Bangladeshi people has reasserted itself. They have disregarded the development made. Ironic as it is, Sheikh Hasina has had to flee the country after 15 years of absolute rule, marked by repression and extreme disregard for the sentiments and aspirations of the Bangladeshi people. The revolution, now being called the second revolution, is also a significant setback for India since the 1962 war. In one stroke, the students and people of Bangladesh have washed away fifty years of RAW’s web of intrigues in that part of the subcontinent.

Two-nation theory stands reasserted. India failed to annex East Bengal on 16 Dec 1971 notwithstanding the strong appeals emanating from East Bengal and RSS leadership. A La International pressures, West Pakistan intact, and geo-strategic matrix existing at that time. The existing revolution has its root in 1971 debacle. The manifesto of elections of 1971 did not give any right to Mujib to seek for separate country. His assertions after the elections that six points were the trust of the people given to him were a flawed claim. It violated Legal Fame Work Order to which Awami League was a signatory. This was a ruse, during the elections there was massive rigging by Awami League. Civil Administration was helpless due to the shortage of law enforcement.

The voters were threatened by the goons of Awami League. In the follow-up of elections Mujib’s stubborn attitude towards West Pakistan prompted Bhutto, himself power hungry, resulted in the clash of these two personalities, each one of them pressurising establishment to accept their demands. Bhutto with only 81 seats in the National Assembly demanded to be part of government claiming majority representative of West Pakistan, a claim not justified. The President of Pakistan was also a stumbling block in the settlement of the issues. The postponement of the National Assembly session in Dhaka, on March 4, under pressure from Bhutto and his advisors was grave political error.

The sentiments of the people of East Pakistan were totally ignored. Awami League announced civil disobedience in the province. The province came to a standstill. The trains, buses were stopped so was the river transportation. Massive logistic problems cropped up due to the civil disobedience. The bureaucrats in the province became subservient to Awami League dictates. They did nothing to stop the killing right from March 4, 1970 onwards. Over half a million Urdu-speaking Pakistanis who had migrated in 1947 and the Punjabis/Pathans serving in various departments fell victim to mass killing by the Bengali mobs. Pakistan Army was ordered not to react. It was orchestrated by India through RAW. The policy was to create terror. With flexibility, tragedy could have been avoided. There was great anxiety among Pakistani troops, both West Pakistani and Bengali, in East Pakistan. In February 1971, Indira Gandhi declared in the Lok Sabha that India could not remain unconcerned about the political turmoil in East Pakistan. This should have sounded alarm bells in West Pakistan, but it did not.

The parleys from March 7 to 25 were partially successful. Mr. Brohi was summoned from West Pakistan to draft a Presidential Order for the transfer of power to address the constitutional gap. The proposed draft was agreed upon by both parties on March 23. However, at the last minute, Mr. Tajuddin, a close associate of Sheikh Mujib, presented a new draft agreement suggesting a confederation. The President remarked, “I am here to discuss a federation, not a confederation.” Tajuddin contacted Mujib, who agreed to drop the suggestion. Final issues were related to financial matters and renaming the Civil Armed Forces as Bangladesh Forces. Brohi returned to Karachi frustrated, signalling to Mujib that the President was not interested. The talks were sabotaged by hawks on both sides: Mujib-ur-Rahman’s faction, including Tajuddin, and hawkish advisors to the President, along with the inflexible attitude of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Despite strong and persistent advice, the President opted for strong military action due to Mujib’s attitude and the breakdown of civil government. Sahibzada Yaqub warned that the operation was no longer in aid of civil power; the ground situation had become extremely volatile and would lead to the disintegration of Pakistan. Sahibzada resigned and was demoted upon returning to Karachi. The talks stalled, and Bhutto flew back to Karachi. As 2IC, I was in touch with Headquarters Artillery and GSO 2 in Dhaka at Division Headquarters. The troops, both West Pakistani and Bengali, were under immense stress and anxiety. The news of the killing of non-Bengalis was very disturbing. I gathered my regiment for a motivational talk and warned the families to prepare for disturbances. In Dhaka, the President held a final round of talks and ultimately opted for military action. The execution orders for Operation Search Light were verbally delivered by commanders, as all communications were bugged. Awami League spies in the military and Air Force provided minute-to-minute information. At the airport, as soon as the President boarded the aircraft, Air Commodore Khandkar informed Mujib that “the cat has run away.” Intelligence reports indicated that Colonel Usmani (later General of Mukti Bahini) had planned to take the President hostage. Thus, the political horizon of East Pakistan darkened.

The victory claimed by the Mukti Bahini in 1971 is a hoax. By the end of May, the Mukti Bahini had been eliminated from the soil of East Pakistan. There was peace between June and September and the Mukti Bahini lacked the strength to regain control. The real challenge came from India’s naked aggression, which violated Pakistan’s sovereignty with a force nearly 40 times stronger than the Pakistani troops, who numbered only 22,000. The 4,000-kilometer border made it technically, tactically and humanly impossible to stop such a multi-pronged attack. This is even acknowledged by Field Marshal Manek Shah, who, in an interview years later, praised the bravery and exceptional courage of the Pakistani Army in defending their country. According to him, there was no viable scope for Pakistan to mount an effective defense.

Though the Awami League won all the seats, it did not fare well in terms of voter percentage. There was public disillusionment with the turn of events. Within four years, Sheikh Mujib was assassinated by his own army, plunging the country into turmoil. The return of Sheikh Hasina Wajid, with the support of RAW, was met with disdain.

Although she managed to put the economy on a positive trajectory through collaboration with Indian companies, she failed to revive the national spirit. The Bengali nation, deeply rooted in its Muslim identity, could not overcome the historical pangs of the Pakistan struggle. The exploitation of Bengali nationalism in 1971 remains a bitter memory. Sheikh Hasina’s rise to power, supported by RAW, saw the agency controlling virtually every department of Bangladesh from a six-story building in Ramna, Dhaka. Under RAW’s influence, the Awami League inflicted a reign of terror, tyranny, barbarity and suppression upon its political opponents.

People of the Bangladesh did not support her actions. The hanging of children in 1971, and currently students agitating branded as Razakars, a term used for Pakistani youths, who supported army in 1971, backfired. It was this crime that they were hanged through the kangaroo courts. The slogans changed, we all are ‘Razakars’. The “second revolution” in Bangladesh, drived by the Gen Z population aged 20-30 and supported by the broader public, clearly reflects that the events of 1971 were misrepresented and manipulated by India. Two brothers may fight over their rights, but they remain brothers. Hasina’s ouster marks a significant setback for India, which has deeply infiltrated Bangladesh’s army, judiciary, bureaucracy, and education sectors. There are strong trade ties and mutual dependence between Bangladesh and India, and these factors may now be exploited.

St Martin Island, a small island located west of Cox’s Bazar near the edge of Malacca Strait, has now been raised by Hasina. It never was significant but China and USA, South China Sea issue has made it important. Coxes Bazar port is being developed by China can be monitored from this island, and also Malacca Straits. A new allegation US wants to create a Christian country on the eastern tip of Bangladesh could become a thorny issue. US will have more ingress in Bangladesh but that suit India. As both are in for the containment of China in Quad. Chinese will also woo new government. Bangladesh is an important strategic entry point of Silk Road (BRI) and anchor on the border of six sister states of India/Assam. Bangladesh political situation is fluid. There are reports now surfaced in Washington Post and New York Times India has been pressing US to ignore human rights and irregularities, that Bangladesh is India’s strategic concern .There are voices in India to expand Chicken Neck passages due to turmoil in Bangladesh. I asses India may resort to aggression in Sylhet conclave to gain space taking advantage of the fluid state of affairs in Bangladesh.

Pakistan needs to articulate its new policy towards Bangladesh with caution. There should be no rush or attempts to impose itself, avoiding the mistakes made in Afghanistan. In the long term, Pakistan should explore options for most-favoured-nation status and defence cooperation. A strong and friendly Bangladesh could provide mutual support against Indian advances and address internal security needs, particularly in the aftermath of the “second revolution.” As a nuclear power, Pakistan is an important player in the region. During the tenure of General Irshad and General Zia in 1986-87, a serious effort was initiated by leaders from both countries to forge a relationship—possibly a union or another form of cooperation—while maintaining their respective autonomies. However, RAW caught wind of the plan, resulting in the toppling of Irshad and the sabotage of the initiative.

—The writer is a senior researcher and analyst. He regularly contributes to the national press.

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