TERRORIST organizations aim to instil fear and intimidation in society for political purposes and they engage in propaganda wars to simultaneously gain the support of a specific segment of society. Losing complete support in the social environment is detrimental for them; they could not succeed without a deceptive propaganda campaign. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its client organization, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), threaten peace in Pakistan alike. In Pakistan, TTP uses the same playbook to commit violence. Mostly, ISKP consists of former commanders and militants of the TTP, while a few disgruntled elements of Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban have also joined it. As a result, human sources, ideologies, terrorist tactics and targets overlap so heavily that these banned outfits are identical. Terrorists have perpetrated some major attacks in Pakistan recently; the TTP, TJP, Ansar-ul-Islam and ISKP have claimed responsibility for this violence. Interestingly, the planning of these attacks in specific areas of Afghanistan suggests that these groups operate within a single militant ecosystem.
Following their takeover of Kabul in August 2021, the Afghan Taliban initiated a mass prisoner exodus, leading to the unfortunate opening of all jails in a state of excitement. The Afghan Taliban released around two thousand TTP and ISKP militants. Now, these militants are posing a significant threat to the Afghan Taliban, and ISKP presents an insurmountable challenge in terms of operations and ideology within Afghanistan. The challenge posed by ISKP to the Afghan Taliban is unsettling; the former Afghan government was unable to break them or create a counter-narrative, but ISKP has successfully accomplished both. It denounces the agreement with the United States as a betrayal of Jihad, and its harsh criticism of the Taliban’s policies is gaining support among the local population. Afghan Taliban lack the capability for precision operations against ISKP, and they conduct large-scale counterproductive killing sprees as collateral damage turns the local population against them. Moreover, analysts suggest that the Afghan Taliban could not overcome ISKP without further assistance, as only air strikes have been successful against it in the past.
Some analysts believe that, despite pressure from Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban’s inaction against the TTP is due to fears of defections to the ISKP. Following Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s self-proclamation for the caliphate in 2014, TTP commanders and some Afghan Taliban members pledged allegiance to him. ISKP declared TTP commander Saeed Khan Orakzai as its Amir, with defected Afghan Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim as his deputy chief. After Saeed Khan’s death in 2016, the Afghan Taliban claimed leadership of subsequent ISKP chiefs, including Abdul Hasib Logari, Abu Omer Khorasani, and Sanaullah Ghafari. The 2015 announcement of Mullah Omar’s death, concealed for two years, intensified defections within the Afghan Taliban and worsened internal divisions. Leadership disputes over his successor further fractured the Taliban, with commanders like Mullah Muhammad Rasool and Mullah Mansoor Dadullah breaking away, leading to heavy infighting. This internal strife facilitated more defections to ISKP, posing a significant challenge for the Afghan Taliban’s cohesion and control.
TTP has been prone to internal power games and infighting since its inception. The death of Baitullah Mehsud in 2009 sparked a struggle for leadership roles between Hakimullah Mehsud and Shehryar Mehsud. After Hakimullah’s death in 2013, Mullah Fazlullah and Khan Said Sajna engaged in a power struggle to seize the TTP’s assets. The TTP leadership was attracted to wealthy Arab militants, leading to an alliance with Al-Qaeda for funds and prestige. This material-driven alliance caused further division during Al-Qaeda’s 2014 leadership crisis. To counter ISIS, Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban glorified Mullah Omar, but TTP’s deception persisted. Many TTP commanders and militants aligned with ISIS, even fighting the Afghan Taliban to profit from ISIS’s illicit oil trade.
The latest report from UNSC also confirmed that TTP was using different group names in the attacks for plausible deniability. Its chief, Noor Wali Mehsud, identifies himself with the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban for his glorification; on the other hand, the ISKP abhors the Afghan Taliban and condemns them in propaganda campaigns. Strangely enough, it has a soft approach towards TTP, strengthening the perception that they are collaborating on some level. Moreover, the Pashtun tribal construct of TTP retains militants from various ethnicities, Central Asian states, and the Arab world within the ISKP, thereby giving the Mehsud tribe an advantage in territorial conflicts. In this regard, the most worrisome aspect for Pakistan is the presence of Indians in ISKP. Recently, investigators found TTP and ISKP retracting their claims about some suicide attacks on mosques and religious gatherings, revealing a nexus among militants. Therefore, investigators and analysts conclude that TTP is behind these attacks, and it claims responsibility for deception through ISKP.
—The writer is a contributing columnist.
