Brig Naseem Akhtar Khan (R)
MY articles on governance in Pakistan have merely been my own reflection of events gained through direct/indirect access at various levels of governance during the past 3-4 decades. I undertook this initiative out of a sense of responsibility, to draw attention of people towards distressing state of our governance mechanism. The aim is to set the ball rolling and leave the rest to the brilliant minds. The prevailing system of the governance falls much short, to handle the elite capture, that controls our political structure. In my opinion, presidential form of governance, with a strong local governance system, may be a better option. With security environment getting so complex, army’s input on security issues at national and international level, remains inevitable. Are appraisal of our educational system, institutional reforms and framing SOPs for sectarian/ethnic activities, isolating them from their foreign linkages, inevitable.
I am glad that feedback to these articles has been good. However, a sizable number of respondents did express some reservations. Interestingly, some linked presidential form of governance with army role. Their feedback, however, prompted me to write this article with particular reference to military’s role in the governance, and base the narrative on a case study with facts and figures. The history of governance in Pakistan starts with an interesting note. The first coup, so called” constitutional coup”, was conducted in 1953, when Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the government of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, even though, it enjoyed the support of the Constitutional Assembly. In October 1958, President Iskander Mirza abrogated 1956 Constitution, and declared martial law, appointing Gen Ayub Khan as Chief Martial-law Administrator. Subsequently, Ayub Khan was named as the Prime Minister and three Lieutenant Generals were given ministerial posts. Bhutto was also amongst the cabinet members. These appointments were viewed as President’s attempt to neutralise Ayub Khan’s authority as army chief and as a reaction, Iskander Mirza was forced to quit.
During Ayub Khan’s election for the presidency, Bhutto as Foreign Minister, developed the electoral campaign for him, based on a resolve to settle Kashmir issue, even if it has to be through a war. In post 65 war scenario, Bhutto anticipated gaining from what the President had lost, broke away, joined the opposition, and in due course, organized his own political party.
Confronted by rising opposition, Ayub Khan announced his retirement in March 1969 and country plunged into another martial law under Yahya Khan who reconstituted the original four provinces of West Pakistan. Yahya resigned after 1971 War and Bhutto assumed the Presidency as a civilian Chief Martial Administrator and began his surge for total monopolization of power. Strong protests by the opposition, however, forced Gen Zia to overthrow Bhutto’s government on 4 July 1977and imposed Martial Law. Gen Zia was killed in a mysterious air crash on 17 August 1988 and the new Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto began the journey from where her father had left. She began her pursuit by challenging army and sacked Gen Hamid Gul, DGISI, replacing him by a retired Army General. Her husband joined her to monopolize the wealth. President Ishaq Khan was left with no option but to sack her government.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif replaced her as Prime Minister. Surge for power continued which led to the resignation of both Prime Minister and President. Thereafter, interim arrangements continued till Nawaz Sharif again came to power, with a more resilient plan to snatch a total monopoly of wealth and authority. He defused the President through 13th Amendment to the constitution and tried to bulldoze further amendments to keep his party members and the judiciary under thumb. He even, forced the army chief, Gen Jehangir Karamat to resign and replaced him by Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif was exposed to another testing time when in mid-1999 Pakistan Army planned to re-take Siachin glacier by blocking the Indian supplies at Kargil. Though he, himself had approved the plan, not only backed out due to international pressure but discredited Pakistan army’s success. Fearing army’s backlash, Sharif attempted to replace General Musharraf but army reacted and took over.
Despite a brilliant start Gen Musharraf’s government also got bogged down in politicking and lost the power. Subsequent governments of PPP and PML(N) were merely a repeat of the political drama. However, some positive developments in Pakistan’s economy and foreign relations under the present regime, are encouraging but their team also seems to lack the depth and maturity. The case study clearly indicates that Pakistan has been through an age of turbulence, mainly due to poor governance and the study leaves no room for any blame game. Political parties lack internal democracy and rely on patron-client networks and politics revolves around individuals. Political leadership mostly based on inheritance/family patterns and structured from ‘top to bottom’ rather than ‘bottom to top’, has always been our weak link. Number of splitter groups created by dictatorial regimes, to use them as pressure groups in main political stream, created adverse repercussions. Political instability has adversely affected economic development and supremacy of law. Religion/sect/ethnicity is used to exploit the emotions of people. Government Institutions are politicised, corrupted and divided.
We have a two-front war at hand. Exploiting loopholes in our internal realm, our foreign adversaries have penetrated amongst the pressure groups, governmental institutions and media, to expand their agenda. Injecting anti-army feelings is part of their strategy. With enlarged security spectrum, military diplomacy has become an accepted norm. Our geo-political/geo-strategic environments demand us to rely on two prong strategy: guaranteeing national security and promoting a unifying factor. We need to review/revise our policies to earn effective and efficient governance to handle the scenario. We need to adapt to the circumstances and choose a system of governance conforming with the existing political culture. This misconceptions/apprehensions about the army need to be clarified. While, ISPR is doing a good job, all other stakeholders also need to look at things from a renewed/factual perspective.
— The writer is Security Management Professional, based in the UAE.
