ADVENT of nuclear technology was truly a revolution in military affairs (RMA) that, due to its ability to cause colossal damage and destruction, required stringent regulations, state monopolization and installing non-proliferation regime. The events of 6th and 9th August 1945, when USA’s first ever use of nuclear weapons against Japan during the World War-II, resulted in over 250,000 deaths, compelled the world leaders to contemplate: (i) nuclear weapons must never be used as weapons to fight wars, (ii) possession of nuclear weapons along with will and means of their delivery in the form of triad is a deterrence that can never be ignored, (iii) advertent or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons by a nuclear State against another nuclear State means, ‘Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)’, (iv) protection of non-nuclear States against the nuclear States through incorporation of Positive Security Assurances (PSAs) and Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) is a non-conclusive arrangement and (v) introduction of nuclear non-proliferation, strategic arms control and arms limitations regime in terms of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty(NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START/New START), Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) etc.
In the post-World War-II geopolitical setup, the P-5 nuclear States acquired Veto Power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in exchange of a promise to maintain peace and security in the world. In the same context, one of the major tasks of P-5 was to devise and implement the nuclear non-proliferation regime which stood on the pillars of transparency and impartiality with no grant of exceptionalism and preferential treatment to any State. With this context in hindsight, there’s a need to critically analyze the current state of nuclear non-proliferation regime vis-à-vis ever-increasing number of armed conflicts and absence of peace in the world. In this regard, let’s analyze a few of the armed conflicts in the contemporary world. Starting anticlockwise, let’s begin with the Russia-Ukraine War in Europe. Dispassionate analysis reveals that at the time of its independence from the (erstwhile) Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited maximum number (the third largest) of nuclear facilities. However, it gave up this revolutionary capability on the assurances given both by the USA and Russia about safeguarding its security and sovereignty. Since 2008, Ukraine has continuously compromised its sovereignty, suffered political unrest, faced external interference, negotiated military action from its neighbors and lost sizable chunks of its territory. It is continuously hopping between the Western promises to acquiring NATO’s membership and self-reliance to restore its sovereignty and reclaim its lost territory.
Next comes the Middle East. Iran, on one hand, has been subjected to severe economic and trade sanctions since the last 47 years, forced into wars and is facing military ‘obliteration’ for allegedly ‘intending’ to pursue nuclear technology. On the other hand, Israel though maintaining the state of ambiguity, however, believed to have acquired nuclear weapons in as early as 1967 and according to SIPRI’s Yearbook 2026, currently holds 90 nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Grant of tacit exceptionalism and preferential treatment to Israel and slapping heavy economic and trade sanctions on Iran for identical reasons not only speaks of double standards of the Western world on nuclear non-proliferation but also does not promise enduring peace and security to the Middle East.
The next example in line is of South Asia, with particular reference to Pakistan and India. Pakistan faced existential threat from four to five times bigger and stronger India since its inception. It was only after Pakistan acquired nuclear capability in 1998 that ensured Pakistan to act as the regional security stabilizer and establish nuclear deterrence against the Indian hegemony. Nevertheless, just like the Middle East, within the South Asia as well, there has been a grant of exceptionalism and preferential treatment to India by its Western apologists. Despite internationally known cases of criminal negligence of theft of nuclear material and nuclear technology related incidents, India has not only been granted membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) but ironically, also allowed to keep 08 out of its 22 nuclear power reactors outside the IAEA safeguards.
Historically, as part of the nuclear non-proliferation efforts, after years of negotiations, treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons was implemented in 1970 for 25 years. However, in May 1995, it was extended indefinitely. The treaty, within the contemporary geopolitical environment has an inherent flaw as it resonates the geopolitical settings of the cold war era and hence does not reflect today’s realpolitik. It identifies only five nuclear weapon states whereas, in reality India and Pakistan became nuclear states in 1998 while Israel and North Korea joined the group in 1967 and 2006 respectively. Similarly, treaties and agreements like START/New START and SALT represent geostrategic arrangements mainly between the USA and Russia and as such do not reflect contemporary geopolitical realities. Therefore, under the ambit of changing geopolitical and geostrategic realities vis-à-vis ever-increasing security vulnerabilities amongst the smaller and non-nuclear states, there is a dire need to re-negotiate and re-orchestrate the non-proliferation regime before it is too late.
—The writer is a retired Air Officer from the PAF and currently serving at the DHA Suffa University (DSU), Karachi.
