ISLAMABAD — A change meant to modernise satellite connectivity opened sensitive debate. Pak Datacom’s move to UAE-based satellite network is now facing questions over security, oversight and control of government data.
A Senate committee raised serious concerns over Pak Datacom Limited’s decision to use foreign satellite operator for communications involving several sensitive government institutions as members questioned whether Pak Datacom had obtained all the necessary approvals before shifting part of its satellite communications network to infrastructure located outside Pakistan.
Pak Datacom’s GM said the company got clearance from all relevant government authorities before making the change. But lawmakers remained concerned about the security implications of routing government-related communications through a foreign-based satellite network.
The committee chairman stressed that the security of government information could not be taken lightly. Senator Saadia Abbasi also questioned whether moving communications through an overseas system could itself create security concerns.
Pak Datacom is Pakistan-based satellite communications company operating under the broader oversight of the Ministry of IT and Telecom through the Telecom Foundation. The company shifted backup satellite connectivity for more than 400 National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) branches, as well as networks linked to the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and Accountant General Pakistan Revenues (AGPR), from the domestic PakSat system to Yahsat’s YahClick service.
These connections relied on PakSat satellites, with VSAT hubs based in Karachi and Islamabad. The new arrangement uses Yahsat infrastructure, including satellite capacity and a major gateway located in the UAE. Yahsat is now part of Space42, a UAE-based space and satellite communications company backed by Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala sovereign wealth fund.
This change has raised questions because part of the communications infrastructure is now outside Pakistan. Critics argue that this reduces the country’s direct control over the systems carrying sensitive government communications.
Pak Datacom defended the decision, saying it was mainly driven by technical limitations and cost considerations. The company says PakSat-1R had reached the end of its operational life. Although Pakistan has a newer PakSat-MM1 satellite, PDL maintains that it did not provide the specific Ku-band capacity needed for the existing network.
Moving hundreds of sites to a completely different setup would also have required substantial investment in new equipment.
YahClick, according to PDL, offered a more suitable option through its High-Throughput Satellite (HTS) and Ka-band technology. The company says the arrangement allowed it to modernise the network while avoiding the much higher cost of replacing equipment across hundreds of locations.
PDL has also maintained that the move was made after obtaining the required regulatory and government approvals. It says the arrangement complies with rules that allow foreign satellite capacity to be used when suitable domestic capacity is not available.
The company has pointed out that YahClick has already been operating in Pakistan for several years and has provided satellite services to customers in different sectors, including government, finance and defence.
The company’s position has been challenged by its former CEO, Brigadier (Retd) Syed Zulfiqar Ali. He raised concerns about the arrangement with the Ministry of IT and Telecom in a letter during July and August 2026. He later briefed the Senate committee, warning that using a foreign satellite operator for government communications could create security vulnerabilities.
He called for Pakistan’s security agencies to look into arrangement and assess the possible risks. Ali previously recommended that the networks of NBP, OGDCL and AGPR be moved back to a dedicated PakSat system with hubs located inside Pakistan.
Is government data actually being moved abroad?
One of the most important points in the controversy is understanding what “data transfer” actually means in this case. There is no publicly confirmed evidence that large government databases have simply been copied and stored in the UAE.
The bigger concern is about data and communications travelling through foreign infrastructure. When a branch or government office uses the satellite network, its communications and transactions can pass through the satellite system and the associated gateway. In this case, part of that infrastructure is outside Pakistan.
Encryption, VPNs and firewalls can provide strong protection against many forms of interception. However, critics argue that they do not completely remove the risks associated with relying on infrastructure controlled or operated in another country.
The location of the gateway also matters. If critical infrastructure is physically located overseas, Pakistani authorities have less direct control over it and may face additional legal and jurisdictional issues. Satellite signals can also theoretically be intercepted, although the actual risk depends heavily on how strong the encryption and other security controls are.
The concerns become more serious because of the institutions involved. National Bank of Pakistan handles significant government-related financial activity. OGDCL is one of the country’s major energy-sector companies, while AGPR deals with government accounts, payments and financial records.
A serious security incident affecting these networks could therefore have consequences beyond an ordinary communications failure. Sensitive financial information, operational details or government communications could potentially be exposed if security controls were ever bypassed.
Senate committee is also looking beyond the technical side of the issue. Members want to know whether the proper procurement procedures were followed and whether all required approvals were obtained before the transition took place. Questions have also been raised about licensing arrangements for the foreign satellite capacity and the role of local companies involved in providing the service.
Ministry of IT has already ordered a halt to further Yahsat installations while allowing existing services to continue. That move suggests that authorities want to examine the arrangement more closely before allowing it to expand.
Pakistan needs reliable connectivity in remote and difficult-to-reach areas, and foreign satellite operators can sometimes provide services that domestic systems cannot easily match. The use of foreign satellite capacity is also not unusual internationally. Countries and businesses often rely on overseas operators when domestic capacity is limited or when foreign services offer better technology or lower costs.
Senate committee recommended an independent audit by the National Telecom and Information Security Board (NTISB). Such audit could provide a clearer picture of whether the current arrangement is actually secure and whether all regulatory and procedural requirements were followed.
The review should ideally look at the complete network architecture, including encryption, firewall protections, access controls, network segmentation, monitoring systems and the information passing through the foreign gateway.
It should also establish what level of access the foreign operator has, what security arrangements are in place at the overseas facilities and what risks remain even after existing safeguards are applied.
That would allow the government to make a decision based on technical evidence rather than relying solely on claims from either Pak Datacom or its former executive.
Pak Datacom however got valid argument as ageing satellite, limited domestic capacity and the high cost of replacing equipment at hundreds of locations make alternative satellite services attractive. But the concerns raised are also difficult to ignore. For institutions dealing with government finances, energy infrastructure and sensitive public-sector information, keeping critical communications under national control has obvious advantages.
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