Indian Air Force Quagmire

Indian Air Force Quagmire
Air Marshal Irfan Ahmad (Retd)

According to an Indian media report, the Indian Air Force (IAF) will soon retire the remaining two MiG-21 squadrons.

Since 1963, India procured more than 800 aircraft, most of them built under license in Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) between 1966 to 1984. Slated to be retired in 1990s, the aircraft has undergone multiple life extension and operational capability enhancement programmes.

Known for an ordinary combat record and high crash rates primarily due to the IAF’s poor training standards, upkeep and maintenance record, more than 400 aircraft crashed during its operational life, loosing over 200 pilots and 60 civilians; earning the nicknames of “flying coffin” and “widow maker.” Despite diminishing operational relevance and frequent crashes the fleet retirement was later amended to conclude by 2022. Having free access to the international market and plenty of dollars at its disposal why the IAF continue to grapple with obsolescence issue; and what are the future prospects?

IAF has an authorisation of 42 combat squadrons. After retiring two MiG-21 squadrons, the existing strength of 31 squadrons will further reduce to 29; a fact that gets significant attention in India along with a much touted two-front scenario their defence analysts argue all the time alluding to China and Pakistan. Exaggerated national security requirements and “make in India” mantra, the Indian government gains significant political mileage by pitching Teja, a Light Combat Aircraft indigenously developed by HAL, as replacement to MiG-21. According to the reports, the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has already contracted HAL for 180 Tejas in two separate contracts in February, 2021 and December, 2024, in addition to 40 IAF already operates. At the current production rate of 24 aircraft per year, and plans to increase the production rate to 32 aircraft per year in the foreseeable future, HAL has committed to deliver 180 Tejas in 7 to 8 years. Reports also indicate that MoD plans to increase the fleet size to 350 over the next 10 to 12 years.

Commencing in 1983, Teja’s indigenous development programme took 18 years for the maiden test flight in 2001. 14 years later, IAF received the first batch of aircraft in 2015. At best the deliveries are estimated to be completed by 2035; and it seems the aircraft will become obsolete well before the deliveries are completed. That explains the IAF’s frustration with the commitments made by HAL, as observed in February this year when the Indian Air Chief publicly expressed his anger towards HAL due to its production inefficiencies and consequent slow deliveries of Tejas to the IAF.

Concerns have also been raised about its operational effectiveness due to integration of Uttam AESA radar and on-board electronic warfare systems. HAL on the other hand blames periodic configuration changes incorporated by IAF in the Air Staff Requirement for delays in the programme. Some observers also identify issues with supply chain mechanism, especially the delays caused by engine deliveries by General Electric (GE), a US origin engine manufacturer. Other issues such as inefficiencies within domestic production ecosystem, compromised professionalism among key defence production institutions in public sector – overpromised and under delivered without major course correction – allude to significant delays in the induction programme even beyond 2035.

IAF’s agony does not finish with Teja replacing the retiring MiG-21. Six squadrons of 120 Jaguars and three squadrons of 51 Mirage-2000s will fall due for retirement by 2030. Moreover, 260 indigenously produced under license, SU-30s also require an operational upgrade; with 12 more on order the fleet size will grow to 272 aircraft. After losing 4 in Operation Sindhoor, IAF still operates 32 Rafales. Indian Navy has recently ordered 26 aircraft, which may not be available to IAF for its operations.

Loss of seven fighter jets including four Rafales, primarily due to IAF’s weak employment in Operation Sindhoor, has become a political challenge for the Indian government. Indian MoD had a plan to procure more Rafales for IAF; and due to upcoming retirement timeline, it looks like a necessity. While the Indian government would desperately like to erase the memory of recent losses from public consciousness; given the political rhetoric about the operational capability of the aircraft and high price tag, whether or not the Indian MoD will be able to order more Rafales for IAF in the foreseeable future remains a big question mark.

Approaching J-35s delivery timelines to PAF, pressure is growing in India for the induction of 5th-Gen aircraft into the IAF. With Russian SU-57 and the US F-35 options on the table, it is going to be a tough political decision to make for India with strategic implications; complicating the landscape, emerging out of MiG-21 retirement, further for IAF. Therefore, the IAF quagmire is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, primarily due to political handling of the issue by Indian government.

—The writer is the Director at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Lahore, Pakistan. He can be reached at [email protected].

 

Get Alerts