PAKISTAN’S problem isn’t too much democracy or too little democracy. Pakistan’s problem is that governments don’t deliver. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1986-present) delivered 6–7% annual GDP growth. Here’s a government that continues to earn authority through results, not through elections.
Vietnam is a one-party state—governed exclusively by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Elections are held, but only within a tightly controlled framework: candidates are screened, opposition is banned, and political pluralism is virtually absent. In short, the Vietnamese state does not derive its legitimacy from competitive elections. It survives, and thrives, without electoral legitimacy.
In Vietnam, authority flows not from ballots but from results. The CPV stakes its legitimacy on delivery, not democracy. In the 1980s, seven out of ten Vietnamese lived in poverty—today, fewer than one in twenty do. Exports have surged from $700 million to nearly $350 billion. GDP has grown at a steady 6–7 percent clip for the past three decades. Vietnam now ranks among Asia’s top FDI destinations. This is performance legitimacy: when a state secures its authority not through elections, but through outcomes.
Vietnam’s social contract is different: the state delivers stability and growth, the citizens offer continuity in return. One-party rule is tolerated because growth is steady and jobs are created. Here’s a government whose political capital is predictability. Here’s a government that has substituted pluralism for competence. In Vietnam, legitimacy is not a function of choice—it’s a function of performance.
In Vietnam, the military is more than a defence force—it’s part of the governing structure. The People’s Army of Vietnam builds roads, runs state-owned enterprises, supports internal security, and backs economic development. Red alert: This isn’t military rule. It’s a disciplined compact—party, bureaucracy, and armed forces aligned toward a single goal: national capability.
Vietnam picked three sectors: textiles, electronics, and phones. The government then built infrastructure, trained labor, and opened markets. The government didn’t wait for market forces; it directed them. Vietnam proves one thing: when elections are weak, performance must be strong—or the system breaks down. Vietnam survives because it delivers. Exports rise, investment flows, state discipline holds. Governance is predictable. Outcomes—not ballots—keep the system intact. That’s the lesson for Pakistan. In Vietnam, the military and the party stayed firmly in command—but used that control to build capacity, not block change. The model is clear: authority through delivery, not through ballots.
Vietnam invested heavily in building a technocratic bureaucracy—something Pakistan has dismantled over decades. Vietnam rewards competence. Pakistan rewards connections. Vietnam aligns its elite around national goals, Pakistan fragments its elite around personal gain. Vietnam earns. Pakistan borrows. Vietnam is about export-led growth. Pakistan is about loan-led survival. Vietnam funds its development through exports. Pakistan funds its dysfunction through debt. The Vietnamese model shows what disciplined governance can achieve. The lesson is not to abandon democracy. The lesson is to embed state authority in delivery. The lesson is not to abandon democracy. The lesson is to root legitimacy in results. The lesson is to govern not by slogans, but by outcomes. Yes, authority must come from somewhere. If not the ballot box, then from performance. If not from performance, then from neither—and that is where Pakistan now stands.
The writer is a journalist and political analyst and currently
executive director of the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS)..
