Since the takeover of Kabul by the Afghan Taliban in mid-August 2021, Pakistan has experienced a renewed wave of terrorism originating from across its western border.
This resurgence represents a return of violence after a decade in which Pakistan substantially reduced terrorist activities through sustained military operations (2007–2017). The last major operation, Zarb-i-Azb, conducted by the Pakistan 2014, cleared large portions of North Waziristan; long regarded as a “no-go” area and a headquarters ofFitna al-Khawarij. Terrorism has again jeopardized Pakistan’s security both along the Pak-Afghan border and in settled areas since Taliban took over the Kabul.
The resurgence of violence poses a grave threat to the Pakistani state and society. Although security forces continue to confront Fitna al-Khawarij with professionalism and bravery, there is an urgent need to broaden and systemize our response. In this regards a two-pronged national strategy is suggested: a) in the security domain, the current efforts of to combat terrorism in the physical domain should continue with renewed mechanism, b) initiation of a diplomatic and political engagement with Afghan Taliban Government and other stakeholders to deny terrorists safe haven and support from Afghan soil. Both tracks must operate simultaneously, closely coordinated, and mutually reinforcing, because the threat is multifaceted and involves domestic, regional, and external actors.
The military and security services must sustain pressure on terrorists while minimizing civilian displacement and collateral damages. Within this domain the strategy should emphasize two priorities: 1) A rigorous border monitoring and control regime, combining physical presence, enhanced surveillance, and actionable intelligence. This will reduce opportunities for infiltration. Well-coordinated surveillance and intelligence sharing among military, paramilitary, and civilian agencies should remain a constant factor as priority. 2) Identifying and neutralizing the domestic terrorist networks which have deeply penetrated into local social fabric. Over the past few years, thousands of terrorists of Fitna al-Khawarij have woven themselves into local communities through ideology, coercion, or criminal activity. Operations that identify and dismantle these networks must be accompanied by careful, community-sensitive approaches. Winning the trust of local populations through protection, consistent rule of law, and confidence-building measures will be decisive. One critical source of terrorist funding which has been observed in settled districts like; Bannu, Lakki Marwat, D.I. Khan etc. is the extortion (bhatta). Intelligence-led actions are needed to identify and disrupt extortion rackets, protect victims, and apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators. Since military pressure alone will not succeed unless accompanied by a sustained socio-political strategy, therefore, there is a requirement for the re-engagement with Afghan Taliban Government. Pakistan must pursue a comprehensive diplomatic, political and may be a social engagement with the Afghan authorities and stakeholders.
Given the documented use of Afghan territory by RAW sponsored and Afghan supported terrorists groups; Fitna al Khawarij and other groups hostile to Pakistan, Islamabad should present clear, evidence-based concerns to Kabul while offering constructive pathways for cooperation. Conflict between the two countries would serve neither side; instead, diplomatic, religious and social channels should be used to rebuild trust and CBMs. State and non-state external actors with strategic interests in destabilizing Pakistan must be engaged through measured diplomacy. Handling these issues requires tact, intelligence, and political foresight. Civil society, religious leaders, educators and media must be mobilized to counter extremist narratives and to support reintegration programs for those willing to abandon violence. Besides, long-term policies should be devised to improve governance, economic opportunity and education in affected areas, which will reduce the social appeal of armed groups.
The deterioration in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations has regional dimensions that must be addressed candidly. External forces like India pursue its own strategic objectives is aimed to create fissures between Islamabad and Kabul. In last two years, the historical linkage between New Delhi and Kabul have been reinvigorated which has intensified the terrorism in Pakistan through Fitna al Khawarij. Recently as an Indian intelligence operative of RAW namely Harish Kumar was declared persona non-grata and expelled from Afghanistan on 17 August 2025. His activities alongside many other RAW operatives remained in Afghanistan even after the fall of the previous Afghan government. Kumar was expelled once found conspiring against the current Taliban set-up at Kabul. RAW wanted to bring its own favourites (within Taliban factions) at the top leadership position in Kabul.
Pakistan should pursue a strategy for re-engagement with Kabul since allowing the gulf between Islamabad and Kabul to widen will permit India to make Afghanistan as a hotbed of terrorism which will be very dangerous for Pakistan and all the regional states, bordering Afghanistan. Pakistan should adopt a coherent national policy to counter the terrorism through; sustained intelligence-based military operations, strengthen border management with integrated surveillance, disrupt terrorist financing, taking high-level diplomatic initiative to re-engage with the Afghan authorities, pursue multilateral pressure through international forums, and coordinate socio-political and socio-economic measures for the security of masses.
Pakistan faces a complex and multi-layered security challenge that cannot be met by military force alone. A comprehensive approach is needed for combining relentless, intelligent security operations with proactive diplomacy and sustained socio-political engagement. This is the only viable path to durable peace. The objective must be to deny terrorists sanctuary and support, to cut their financing and networks, to rebuild confidence with local communities, and to reduce the space for external manipulation. Time is of the essence: Islamabad must act decisively and cooperatively, both domestically and regionally, to safeguard Pakistan’s security and stability.
—The writer is Professor of Politics and IR at International Islamic University, Islamabad.
