As the global climate summit COP30 convenes in Belém, Brazil (10–21 November 2025) un-der the umbrella of the Paris Agreement, the issue of climate finance stands out as perhaps the most critical test for trust between developed and developing nations. For decades, de-veloping countries have stressed that without reliable, sufficient and accessible funds, miti-gation and adaptation efforts, let alone recovery from climate disasters, remain wishful thinking. This year’s COP is all about whether world leaders will do more than talk and ac-tually help. The roots of the crisis lie in a long-standing commitment that was poorly deli-vered. As part of the Paris Agreement and earlier UNFCCC accords, developed countries agreed to mobilize US$100 billion per year by 2020 to help developing countries with miti-gation and adaptation. Yet by 2020, the goal remained unmet, a failure widely acknowledged by both developed and developing parties. However, there was progress in 2022: a report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that developed countries had “provided and mobilized” a total of US$115.9 billion for climate finance in that year, thereby technically exceeding the $100 billion annual target for the first time.
Despite that milestone, critics argue the achievement is misleading in many respects. First, much of the finance remains skewed toward mitigation (e.g., clean energy), while adapta-tion, vital for climate-vulnerable countries, remains underfunded. Second, much of the money comes in the form of loans rather than grants, which raises concerns about how much debt these already weak economies will have to bear. So, even though it appeared like something that would work on paper, it didn’t fully restore trust. Many poor countries saw it as a temporary fix rather than a reliable solution. At COP29 in Baku (2024), a new Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance was introduced. Under the NCQG, developed countries leading the effort must mobilize an even greater scale of finance for developing countries. Although the NCQG remains under negoti-ation, early proposals suggest a ramp-up to US$300 billion annually by 2035, with eventual scaling up (some analyses speak of as much as US$1.3 trillion per year) depending on evolv-ing needs.
This shift may reflect a long-overdue recognition that the climate challenge for the Global South is much larger than previously thought, both in scale and financial cost. Under NCQG, the ambition is to cover a broader range of needs: mitigation, adaptation, resilience-building and support for recovery from extreme weather events (loss & damage). Heading into COP30, many developing countries, including small island states, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and climate-vulnerable nations like Pakistan, placed high hopes on meaningful commitments under NCQG, as well as concrete steps on operationalizing financial mechanisms to deliver funds to where they are most needed. By the close of COP30, however, results look lukewarm. Reports indicate that while adapta-tion finance was committed to be tripled by 2035, the final agreement lacked clarity on who would foot the bill and how the funds would be delivered. In short, COP30 reached a weak “compromise deal.” Still, many people in the Global South and civil society think the out-comes are too small, especially given how severe and common climate disasters are becoming worldwide.
Climate funding is a matter of life and death for countries like Pakistan. The terrible floods of 2022 harmed tens of millions of people and ruined infrastructure, crops and homes. They also made it hard for people to make a living on a vast scale. In follow-ups to COP27, Pakis-tan’s leaders made it clear that they wanted fair access to cash from the Loss and Damage Fund to help rebuild and make the country more resilient to climate change. Without suffi-cient, predictable, grant-based funding, Pakistan and similar nations risk entering a spiral of debt, reconstruction delays and repeated vulnerability to climate jobs. Indeed, mobilizing new loans, even under the banner of “climate finance”, may shift the burden from climate risk to debt stress, undermining long-term development and stability. The shortcomings of COP30 underscore a harsh reality: for many developing countries, cli-mate diplomacy may no longer be about ambitious mitigation targets but about survival, rebuilding homes, livelihoods and resilience after disasters, while still trying to develop sus-tainably. At its core, the climate finance debate is a trust issue. For decades, developing na-tions accepted a “common but differentiated responsibilities” architecture: industrialized nations, being historically responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions, should lead the financial burden of addressing climate change. The original $100 billion pledge embodied that principle.
For the NCQG to restore faith, it must deliver more than numbers on paper. It must:
• ensure predictable, grant-based and upfront funding, especially to finance adaptation and loss-and-damage recovery; • set transparent mechanisms for disbursement, prioritizing climate-vulnerable and disas-ter-hit countries; • create accessible channels so even poor or debt-distressed nations (without high credit ratings) can apply for funds — not just those with high institutional capacity; • and guarantee accountability and monitoring, so funds are used for climate resilience and not diverted into generic development loans. For countries like Pakistan and for millions of people in climate-vulnerable regions, the dif-ference between success and failure is not measured in parts per million of carbon — but in homes saved or destroyed, lives secured or lost, crops harvested or ruined, debt borne or avoided. As the world moves from COP30 to COP31 and beyond, the test will not be whether international summits pass declarations, but whether those declarations translate into justice, resilience and real-world support for those who need it most.
—The writer is a International Law expert with a rich experience in negotiation, mediation and Alternate Dispute Resolution.
