Chinese policymakers have shown strong commitment to further developing, diversifying and expanding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through its 15th five-year plan.
However, due to drastic changes in global geopolitics, its pace, progress and productivity are expected to slow down, particularly in Latin America during 2026.
The US attack on Venezuela and the abduction of its President, Nicolás Maduro, was a clear signal to China to stay cautious in Latin America, at least for the near term. China’s initiatives—from satellite tracking stations in Argentina and port development in Peru to economic support for Venezuela—have long been viewed as irritants by successive US Administrations, including that of former President Trump. International experts suggest that the US intervention aimed, in part, to counter China’s socio-economic influence and to secure smooth access to Venezuela’s cheap oil.
While the attack may temporarily cool Latin American engagement with China, the long-term foundation of Sino-Latin trade remains strong. Bilateral trade between Latin America and China has more than doubled in the last decade, growing from $235.9 billion in 2015 to $518.47 billion in 2024 and could exceed $700 billion by 2035. China has become the second-largest trading partner of the region and the largest for countries such as Brazil and Argentina. Chinese financial institutions have provided an estimated $303 billion in financing across Latin America between 2000 and 2023, far exceeding US lending, according to the AidData research institute.
At the 2025 China-CELAC forum, which brings together 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, President Xi Jinping announced a new credit line exceeding $9 billion for regional cooperation projects. Denominated in the Chinese Yuan, these loans reflect Beijing’s efforts to reduce reliance on the US dollar and expand its financial influence.
The US, lacking China’s extensive industrial chain, cannot easily replace China as a source of demand for Latin American exports. Attempting to do so could trigger a severe economic shock and potentially a wave of migration. Meanwhile, China remains the largest investor in Latin America, encouraging governments to pursue quality development and trans-regional connectivity. Investments range from Bolivia’s lithium sector and Brazil’s green transition—where 90% of solar panels are imported from China—to port development in Peru, highlighting stable and sustainable bilateral ties. In contrast, US strategies primarily help private corporations extract rent from natural monopolies rather than fostering public welfare.
Interestingly, even politically right-wing and pro-US governments have maintained financial and commercial relations with China, illustrating the universal value of BRI investments in poverty alleviation, job creation and women’s empowerment. Argentina’s President Javier Milei renewed a $5 billion currency swap with China, while former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro maintained Brazilian agricultural exports, showing that political ideology alone cannot sever economic ties with China without harming domestic interests.
The abduction of Maduro does not necessarily imply the collapse of the Venezuelan government or the Bolivarian process. The United Socialist Party of Venezuela retains a strong social base, a loyal military and armed popular militias. It remains unclear how the Trump administration could seize control of Venezuela’s oil infrastructure without being drawn into a costly guerrilla conflict. Nonetheless, the US action has delivered a blow to BRI engagement in Latin America, though it is premature to declare the initiative in the region derailed.
In the short term, regional governments may reconsider ongoing and future projects due to US threats. However, Latin America’s trade with China, which forms the backbone of BRI engagement, will be far harder to adjust. China’s influence in Venezuela has been effectively marginalized by the current US military operation and Chinese engagement now seems to require tacit approval from Washington for loans, infrastructure projects, joint ventures in oil production and imports of commodities such as oil and gold.
Additionally, the US may continue to push Chinese companies away from critical port operations near the Panama Canal, the key waterway connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The starkness of the US–China rivalry in Latin America is further highlighted by China’s third policy paper on the region and the US national security strategy, both reflecting distinct and conflicting socio-economic and geopolitical interests. China’s policy paper, regarded as a “road map” and “guidebook” for its Latin American ties, pledges opposition to “hegemonism,” “unilateral bullying,” and “power politics,” directly referencing US influence. It also emphasizes defending international fairness, upholding multilateral trade, safeguarding global supply chain stability and steering economic globalization in the “right direction.”
In contrast, the US national security strategy focuses on protecting its vested interests in Latin America and the Western Hemisphere, illustrating the conflicting visions of the two powers. The US attack on Venezuela has multiple dimensions: Washington’s attempts to control Venezuelan oil could force Chinese financial institutions to write off billions in outstanding loans, potentially prompting Beijing to retaliate against US interests. Measures could include restricting critical mineral supplies to US companies, hampering manufacturing, or placing selected US firms on China’s unreliable entity list.
Despite these tensions, the geopolitical chessboard remains open. China, as the “factory of the world,” must navigate conflicting realities through dialogue, diplomacy and development, while the US intervention in Venezuela represents a significant setback to the Global South, BRICS and even SCO initiatives. The future prospects of BRI and Chinese investments in Latin America during 2026 and beyond will depend on the geopolitical recalibration of China and Russia and the strategic strength of these international forums.
In summary, while the US attack on Venezuela temporarily disrupts China’s influence in the region, it does not fundamentally undermine the long-term strategic importance of BRI in Latin America. China’s strong trade ties, financial commitments and sustainable investments provide resilience against geopolitical shocks. Both the US and China are maneuvering to protect their interests, but the enduring economic interdependence of Latin American countries with China will continue to shape regional development, stability and the prospects of BRI in the coming years.
