Bolton’s venomous bias towards Pakistan
RECENTLY, the former US National Security Advisor (NSA) John Bolton has expressed venomous thinking about Pakistan, which is reflected in his piece published in the Washington Post (23 August) ‘The time for equivocating about a nuclear-armed, Taliban-friendly Pakistan is over’.
Sadly, John Bolton’s piece to the hilt is filled with an unqualified criticism against Pakistan — pointing finger at Pakistan’s nuclear programme — a depiction of Western propaganda to deliberately malign Pakistan in the international community.
Conversely to Bolton’s slant, the truth proclaims that by no means is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal unsafe, rather it is more secure than any other de facto nuclear state’s nuke.
How unjustifiably, John Bolton has accused the ISI of supporting the Taliban (the then Mujahideen) during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; while washing his hands to allege the American CIA role to accomplish that mission — an emboldened truth known to the world community at large.
In the post- withdrawal of the American/NATO forces, the former US NSA has raised his scepticism — about the future of Pakistan — brimming with unpredictability.
Bolton’s narration seems nothing but the embodiment of the personal bias that he ingrains in mind about Pakistan.
Undeniably, the past US Administrations, — Democratic or Republican — used Pakistan’s military and intelligence services for the last many decades.
Whether it was the war on terror in Afghanistan or the Western agenda to combat the expansion of Communism in South Asia, the Pentagon and the US State Department fully utilized the services of Pakistan in terms of its regional agenda.
In his view, America is no longer dependent on Pakistan, Washington must exert pressure on Pakistan vis-a-vis its nuclear programme — what an illogical and imbalanced assertion that he tries to apply.
Unfortunately, it is not for the first time that the Taliban factor has been exploited by the US policy managers, including the former US National Security Advisor.
During the past four decades since the Soviet forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, it has been a Western fashion to pressurize Pakistan by pointing the Taliban factor which in no way determines the contours of our foreign policy.
And yet, Bolton’s remarks hold no justification given the current regional situation where Pakistan is ardently committed to defending its national security interests by fostering its policy of a full spectrum nuclear deterrence.
It is fairly argued by the nuclear pragmatists that nuclear balance in the South Asian region is core to peace and stability in the region.
It is why the Pakistan National Command Authority (NCA) is determined to upgrade/regulate our nuclear policy highly enshrined in the nuclear safety and security protocols.
Positively, Pakistan is proud to acclaim its nuclear credentials as a responsible nuclear weapons state where its nuclear strategic culture is the epitome of our national security policy.
From the Pakistani point of view, the strategists in Pakistan level arguments that negate the narration of the Baton’s perception.
These arguments can be summarized accordingly: First, the ambivalent facts highly reject the apprehension levelled by John Bolton.
The fact is that Pakistan’s defence forces are a half-million strong being run under the skilled professional command, and the nuclear affairs of the state are highly monitored by a well-prestigious institution of national security — the NCA.
Second, Pakistan as a country represents a moderate Muslim populace with a history of repeatedly rejecting religious political parties for the last five decades.
The country is by no means gravitated towards the Taliban narrative, so the apprehension that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of the Taliban holds no leverage.
Third, nuclear security is a domain that comes under nuclear management — intrinsically covering both the nuclear arsenal and peaceful nuclear energy.
The force goals and the size of the nuclear arsenal are determined by a comprehensive examination of national threats and timely and appropriate responses to them. Meanwhile, nuclear energy requirements are based on long-term national development planning.
While mixing the two together as a general expansion of nuclear capacity confuses the issue. Factually, the terms proliferation and nuclear security are often used interchangeably.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ system has risen independently from its civil nuclear fuel cycle, thereby using indigenous uranium.
Fourth, the evolution of nuclear security culture, a system of sensitive material control and accounting was promptly introduced.
The system was derived from modern training, possibly modelled on US national laboratory procedures.
The system involved regular and surprise inspections to tally material production and waste in order to maintain transparency and accountability.
Under a careful institutional plan by the SPD, professional guards at static sites and escorts with tight security procedures are involved during transportation.
To that end, special theft- and tamper-proof vehicles and containers are used. Notably, in peacetime, nuclear weapons are not mated with their delivery systems and are not operationally deployed.
Operational secrecy precludes the management of nuclear arsenals, but a two-man rule and, in some cases, a three-man rule is followed, with physical safety and firewalls built into the weapon system to prevent any unauthorized launch.
And finally, Pakistan has a long time-tested experience in producing, transferring and storing fissile stocks and weapons.
Pakistani security experts have also learned to put in place detection equipment and security barriers, as well as set up checkpoints and customs posts.
Still, from time to time, the SPD has been committed to enhancing and improving performances and measures What the Biden Administration today needs is its capability to jettison the Cold War thinking of regional dominance in the South Asian region.
As for the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, today, Pakistan fosters a policy of sustainable peace and stability through the formulation of an inclusive Afghan government in Kabul. Given the merit of the above-stated arguments, John Bolton’s criticism holds no appeal.
Therefore, it is highly suggestible that instead of adopting a critical approach, the Biden Administration must adopt an even-handed/non-discriminatory approach—warranted by the inevitability of nuclear balance in the South Asian region—the sheet anchor of regional peace.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law.
