THE future of arms control in an era ushering beyond the New START fundamentally hinges on whether Washington and Moscow can agree to a new bilateral treaty– addressing modern challenges like missile defense, hypersonic weapon and strategic stability.
As there are no binding constraints after New START’s expiration, it appears unavoidable to include emerging technologies—including artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities—within future agreements between the nuclear powers. Needless to say, without renewed cooperation, nuclear risks may be crucially rising. Given the nuclear build-ups and stockpiles of both the US and Russia, it is necessary that they must engage constructively in a new framework that could be aligned to establish transparency, verification mechanisms and limits on disruptive systems, more importantly setting a precedent for arms control in the 21st century.
Arms control has been a primary focus of international relations throughout the Cold war, the post-Cold War era and continues to be so in the current multipolar order. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was a significant bilateral treaty –between Washington and Moscow –entered into force on December 5, 1994 and concluded its reduction phase by December 5, 2001. It capped, among other things, 6,000 accountable warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers). In the same vein, The NEW START signed in 2010, remarkably capped the number of deployed strategic warheads for both the US and Russia to 1550 respectively. The treaty was officially expired on Feb 5, 2026, paving the way towards an unpredictable nuclear arms race between its signatories.
From the US perspective, US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, argues, ‘’Arms control advocates and many voices in the media have tried to cast the expiration as a sign that the United States is initiating a new nuclear arms race. These concerns ignore that Russia ceased implementing the New START treaty in 2023, after flouting its terms for years. A treaty requires at least two parties and the choice before the United States was to bind itself unilaterally or to recognize that a new era requires a new approach…’’
On the contrary, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, has expressed skepticism about the future of arms control after the expiration of the New START treaty, emphasizing that US compliance with existing limits is questionable. He suggests that without a new agreement, strategic stability will be at risk, especially as Russia continues to develop advanced systems like the Sarmat missile in response to perceived US military advancements.
Moreover, a neutral strategic perspective suggests that the expiry of New START increases global strategic instability, removing a key verification mechanism that fostered transparency between the US and Russia. Without it, arms control gaps widen, raising risks of miscalculation, arms races and reduced crisis stability. This uncertainty disproportionately affects Europe and other regions reliant on deterrence stability. However, the absence of data sharing and inspection rights undermines trust, potentially triggering responses from non-nuclear states and increasing regional tensions.
As described by former Department of State official, Tom Countryman, “Arms control agreements are not a concession made by the United States, nor a favour done for another nation; are they an essential component of, and contributor to, our national security.” As per the SIPRI,China is estimated to have at least 600 nuclear warheads, SIPRI says – well below the 800 each at which Russia and the US were capped under New START. Probably, it is why China argues that Beijing is not interested to negotiate any multilateral framework. Additionally, the nuclear expansions of Russia, the US reflects growing concerns about the stability of global strategic balance. Some strategists argue while Russia and the US maintain large stockpiles, traditional bilateral frameworks like New START become increasingly inadequate.
And yet, the strategic stability dilemma between the US and Russia arises from asymmetric nuclear postures, evolving doctrines and mistrust in arms control. Though the US and Russia have revived the communication through the Strategic Stability Dialogue, apprehensions yet continue. The US emphasis on precision and defense systems contrasts with Russia’s continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, potentially triggering destabilizing responses
Undeniably the absence of enforceable commitments increases uncertainty, particularly as nuclear arsenals expand globally. Thus, given the exigencies entailed by these perspectives, a bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the US, Russia, is necessary to prevent an unconstrained two-way arms race, increase strategic stability and manage the risks of miscalculation following the expiration of bilateral treaties. While a new framework would bring transparency and limits to these powers’ capabilities, covering modern threats.
In conclusion, the future of arms control hinges on political will, transparency and the capacity to adapt treaties to evolving strategic landscapes. Arguably, in three major aspects, the strategic challenges appear unavailingly complex after the expiry of New START: firstly arising from the end of compartmentalized arms control between Moscow and Washington, secondly arising from the future of verification without on-site inspections and finally from quantitative expansion in nuclear warheads. Thus, a successful successor agreement could include verification mechanisms, limits on novel weapons and pathways for inclusion of other nuclear-armed states.
As the 11th NPT Review Conference convenes, the future of nuclear disarmament appears uncertain, especially post-New START expiration. While the NPT framework enshrines a legally binding commitment to disarmament, progress remains stalled due to geopolitical tensions and lack of concrete actions by nuclear-armed states. The absence of a successor treaty to New START heightens instability, making long-term disarmament goals seem vague and unpredictable. However, renewed calls from non-nuclear states and civil society for accountability, justice and transparent disarmament steps offer potential pathways forward. As President Trump has expressed his prompt desire to continue arms control, a broader agreement between Washington and Moscow can address not just warhead numbers, but also emerging technologies like hypersonic glide vehicles, advanced missile defences and cyber capabilities.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also a Peace and Conflict Studies expert, is member of the European Consortium of Political Research, including Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law.
