PAKISTAN is once again preparing to reform its civil service. The latest initiative is ambitious: the federal government has proposed 11 specialised professional cadres, changes to the Central Superior Services (CSS) examination, reforms in senior-level appointments and promotions, greater emphasis on merit and performance, digitalisation, revised training and performance-linked financial incentives. The proposed National Executive Service would also open positions at BS-20 and above to serving civil servants, academics and private-sector professionals through competitive processes.
The government’s latest consultation, led by Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal, follows a reform process initiated in 2024. According to the Planning Ministry, the reform framework has been developed through extensive consultations and is intended to create a specialised, merit-based, accountable and technology-enabled public administration. These are important objectives. Pakistan undoubtedly needs a more professional, specialised, accountable and performance-oriented public administration. But one fundamental question deserves far greater attention:
Can Pakistan reform its civil service without reforming the system of governance within which the civil service operates? Pakistan’s history suggests that the answer is far from straightforward. A history of repeated reform
Since independence, Pakistan has repeatedly attempted to restructure its administrative machinery. The inherited colonial administrative system was modified through the creation of the All-Pakistan Services in the 1950s. The Ayub Khan era brought significant administrative and management changes. The 1973 reforms abolished the old CSP structure and introduced occupational groups and a unified grading system. The Musharraf government subsequently introduced the 2001 devolution system, transferring substantial administrative responsibilities towards elected local governments. In 2006, the National Commission for Government Reforms, headed by Dr Ishrat Husain, was established to undertake a comprehensive review of federal, provincial and local government structures and civil-service management. Its report was completed in 2008.Yet many of the problems identified decades ago remain.
The World Bank has noted that Pakistan has experienced multiple attempts at civil-service reform, with implementation often weakened by factors such as lack of institutional ownership, resistance to change and changes in political priorities. It specifically documented how the 2008 reform report was shelved after a change of government. This history should make us cautious about viewing the latest initiative simply as another restructuring exercise.
The challenge is not merely how civil servants are recruited. The greater challenge is how they are subsequently governed, protected, evaluated, transferred, promoted and held accountable. The problem is not necessarily the civil servant. Pakistan has produced highly qualified, capable and dedicated civil servants who have served the country with distinction, both at home and abroad. The deeper problem lies in the system of incentives, pressures and institutional relationships within which they work. A brilliant recruitment examination cannot compensate for an environment in which merit is subsequently undermined. A sophisticated performance-management system cannot deliver genuine accountability if performance assessments themselves are vulnerable to influence. And digitalisation cannot guarantee transparency if the underlying decisions remain arbitrary.
An officer may enter the civil service through one of the most competitive examinations in the country and spend decades acquiring professional and administrative experience. But if his or her subsequent career can be affected by political pressure, personal connections, arbitrary transfers or uncertain tenure, merit-based recruitment becomes only one part of the story. This is why civil-service reform must go beyond recruitment and training. It must address the environment in which an officer is expected to make decisions.
A professional civil service requires professional independence—not independence from an elected government, but protection from improper interference. This distinction is critical. Politicians should formulate policy. Civil servants should implement lawful government policy professionally and impartially. Democratic accountability requires civil servants to remain answerable to elected governments. But democratic accountability should not mean that individual officers are expected to serve political interests, personal networks or partisan objectives. Without this distinction, even the best recruitment system cannot guarantee an impartial and effective civil service. The consequences of politicisation go beyond morale. An officer who believes that an honest or professionally justified decision may result in an undesirable transfer, stalled career progression or personal pressure can gradually become risk-averse. Over time, such an environment can discourage initiative, weaken institutional courage and encourage officials to priorities personal security over institutional responsibility. During and after my own experience in the bureaucracy, I encountered numerous accounts of officers facing precisely this dilemma. There have also been concerns about the treatment of officials who pursue sensitive matters involving powerful economic interests.
Individual accounts, however, cannot by themselves establish a universal pattern. The broader institutional question is more important:What happens when a civil servant takes a lawful and properly documented decision that adversely affects a powerful interest? The answer should be straightforward. If the decision was lawful, made in accordance with established procedures and taken in the public interest, the officer should receive institutional protection. That is why transparent appointments, merit-based postings and predictable tenure are not merely administrative conveniences. They are safeguards for professional integrity. The issue of tenure is not new. The Supreme Court’s landmark judgment commonly referred to as the Anita Turab case established important principles concerning appointment, posting, transfer and tenure of civil servants, emphasising that such decisions cannot be exercised arbitrarily and must be grounded in law and public interest. —To be continued
—The writer is Senior Retd bureaucrat, based in Lahore.
