THE announcement of a two-week ceasefire in the war between the US, Israel and Iran resolves none of the issues which caused the conflict.
Beyond an agreement to cease attacks, the arrangements that will hold during the two-week period appear themselves unclear. Each side in the last hours seemed to commit to different versions of the ceasefire in key areas. From Israel’s and USA point of view, the bottom line is clear. The Iranian regime has been significantly weakened in its capacities in a number of key areas though not to the extent, both wanted. Iran has shown remarkable resilience and defiance in the face of blatant Israeli aggression and has met with suitable reply by Iran, though its top leadership has been targeted by Israel and its intentions remain unchanged. This means that whether or not fighting resumes after the current uneasy ceasefire, a long war is set to continue.
Regarding the precise details of the ceasefire, Pakistani Prime Minister said that the deal, brokered by Islamabad, applied “everywhere, including Lebanon.” Such an interpretation would not be to Israel’s liking. A key objective from Jerusalem’s point of view throughout has been to separate the Lebanese front from any larger US-led arrangement with Iran. Israel believes that the Lebanese Hezbollah made a severe error in choosing to enter the war on March 4 after the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. It wants to use the opportunity to establish a buffer zone north of the border, to put the residents of Israel’s northern border communities out of range of Hezbollah’s anti-tank missiles and free of the constant danger of an October 7-style ground incursion. This process is not yet completed and five IDF divisions are currently in Lebanon engaged against Hezbollah south of the Litani River as Israel wants to deploy greater force against Hezbollah.
A statement from the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office quickly clarified that from Israel’s point of view, the ceasefire does not extend to Lebanon, as Pakistan’s Prime Minister said. Rather, it applies only to strikes against Iran. President Donald Trump, for his part, did not mention Lebanon in his statement announcing the 14-day ceasefire. Iran responded to the Israel PM’s office statement by declaring that “Strikes (in Lebanon) will lead to the resumption of fighting on all fronts.” US pressure could oblige Israel to desist from further advances in Lebanon. It remains to be seen in the days ahead if such pressure will be applied and it works. There was a similar ambiguity regarding the transit of ships though the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire period.
Iran made a significant concession in agreeing to any form to a temporary ceasefire, which it had previously explicitly ruled out. But the establishment of a de facto Iranian “toll booth” at Hormuz represents the main Iranian achievement in the course of the war. The Strait, according to Iranian statements, will reopen and Iran, in coordination with Oman, will charge transit fees. While this indeed proves to be the arrangement moving forward, it is difficult to see how the US Administration can present the ceasefire as a clear achievement. After all, prior to the war, Iran did not have the ability to impose costs on ships passing through this international waterway. Trump, in his statement, did not appear to contradict the details supplied by Iranian Foreign Minister. He wrote only that there would be a “complete, immediate and safe opening” of the Strait.
Iranian gains in Hormuz, if they prove durable, are of strategic significance. This affects the global economy, but not the Israeli interest. Israeli oil imports don’t directly transit through Hormuz. The war failed to address the Israel and USA intentions for regime change in Iran though it partially damaged Iran’s defence capabilities. Iran’s ballistic missile capacities have been damaged to some extent in the course of the war, yet Iran has continued to fire at targets in the Gulf and Israel. In any case, for as long as the regime survives, Iran possesses the native capacities to rebuild in this area and will do so. Repair and replenishment will take time. Hamas, supported by Iran has not been significantly damaged by the war. Hamas is concentrating on the 47 percent of Gaza it still retains.
The Houthis and the Iraqi Shia militias played a limited role in this war and their positions in Yemen and Iraq respectively have not changed as a result. Lebanese Hezbollah has been materially damaged significantly, but not strategically. It remains the dominant player within Lebanon. As of now, therefore, for all the considerable sound and fury brought forth during and after the war, nothing has been resolved. Changes in South Lebanon and in the status of Hormuz are of potential significance. If they become institutionalized, they will represent significant gains for Israel and for Iran, respectively. But even gains of this kind are incremental advances, not game changers.
The essential components of the regional strategic picture remain unchanged. Israel and the US view Iran as a dangerous power seeking to expel US influence, dominate the Gulf States and threaten Israel, while they remain committed to resisting these ambitions. The recent events reflect only one round in an ongoing struggle. Although Israel and the US have demonstrated clear conventional military superiority, Iran’s defiance and resilience have surprised the world. Despite superior technology and firepower, they have not achieved a decisive strategic outcome. Thus, no clear winner or loser emerges, but rather a narrative of endurance and resistance against a stronger adversary.
—The writer is Former Civil Servant and Consultant (ILO) & International Organisation for Migration and author of seven books.
