SINCE partition in 1947, Pakistan and India have fought several wars and countless skirmishes, yet none have altered the fundamental balance of power.
In 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999, India’s numerical advantage was consistently offset by Pakistan’s superior strategy, morale and tactical precision. Over time, Pakistan’s defence posture rooted in credible deterrence and operational readiness has ensured that India could never achieve decisive dominance despite its larger size and resources. Against this historical backdrop, India’s latest military adventure, Operation Sindoor, unfolded as yet another example of strategic miscalculation and political theatrics rather than credible warfare.
Operation Sindoor, launched in May 2025, was India’s unilateral attempt to project regional power under the pretext of responding to a terror incident in Pahalgam, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan without presenting evidence. On May 7, Indian aircraft carried out cross-border strikes deep inside Pakistani territory, claiming to target terrorist camps. However, Pakistan’s air defence network detected the intrusion early, tracked hostile aircraft and responded immediately through coordinated interception and precision counterfire. Within hours, Indian jets were forced to retreat and several were shot down near Sialkot and Bhimber. Pakistan’s retaliatory response executed, neutralised the offensive with remarkable efficiency, exposing India’s overconfidence and intelligence failures.
The objectives of Operation Sindoor were clear: to assert India’s military posture before national elections, divert global attention from the worsening human rights situation in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and demonstrate deterrence against Pakistan. The central question is whether India will dare to launch another round of large-scale strikes. Theoretically, New Delhi could attempt a sequel under the same or a different codename to reassert deterrence or reclaim domestic political capital. If India nonetheless pursues a “next phase,” it would likely avoid overt, full-scale confrontation. The probable approach would be a hybrid one: cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, cross-border drone intrusions or limited artillery duels meant to test Pakistan’s readiness. Such actions would carry plausible deniability while satisfying domestic audiences. Yet even here, India’s room for manoeuvre is shrinking. Pakistan’s counter-intelligence and digital-warfare units have improved significantly, intercepting drone swarms and neutralizing propaganda networks almost in real time. The information domain, once India’s comfort zone, is no longer uncontested.
In essence, the likelihood of another Operation Sindoor is minimal unless India faces an extraordinary provocation. Even then, the response would probably be symbolic and short-lived. The risks of escalation, international backlash and domestic blowback far outweigh the fleeting psychological advantage of limited strikes. For India, repeating Sindoor would mean walking into the same trap twice; for Pakistan, it would offer another opportunity to showcase operational superiority and diplomatic maturity.
Ultimately, the 2025 episode proved that South Asia’s stability depends not on India’s coercive displays but on Pakistan’s restraint. India’s attempt to impose dominance through kinetic means has already failed once. A “Phase Two” would likely end faster and worse, reaffirming that in this region, reckless ambition cannot overcome disciplined deterrence. Pakistan’s calm readiness remains the most effective answer to India’s restlessness and as the world watches the subcontinent closely, it is clear that peace not another Sindoor is the only path that offers India dignity and Pakistan advantage.
—The writer is contributing columnist.
