RELATIONS between Pakistan and Afghanistan are deteriorating at an alarming pace.
The establishment’s narrative suggests that Afghans are acting as India’s proxies. While this argument may resonate with the general public, those familiar with the region’s complex history and geopolitics understand that the reality is far more nuanced. To better grasp the situation, it is essential to recall some historical context before posing a few questions that merit serious reflection. Historically, nearly all invasions of the Indian subcontinent passed through Afghanistan. Neither the Persian nor the Chinese empires ever sought to conquer India. Afghan incursions were typically driven by motives of plunder and the ambition to control territories bordering Afghanistan. At different points in history, Afghan rulers held sway over regions that today constitute parts of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Balochistan provinces.
However, it’s also true that Indian rulers invaded Afghanistan for centuries. Emperor Ashoka of the Mauryan dynasty governed Kandahar as early as 300 BCE. In more recent history, Maharaja Ranjit Singh pushed Afghan forces back and extended his rule up to the current borders of Pakistan, even intervening in Afghan politics to install his preferred leaders. The point is clear: the regions of former Indian Punjab (modern-day Pakistan) and Afghanistan have a long history of rivalry, conquest, and contestation. I have long argued through my columns that the Afghan Taliban are primarily a nationalist movement rather than an Islamist one. I recommended that Pakistan ensure it was present as a stakeholder in any geopolitical negotiations concerning Afghanistan. Pakistan’s repeated meddling in Afghan affairs—especially by facilitating foreign interference—has made us the scapegoat for much of Afghanistan’s suffering. In many ways, the Taliban are the very monster we helped create, now operating beyond our control.
Even aside from the Taliban, Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees from the days of the Soviet invasion to the present. Therefore, the fact that the Taliban were unwilling to stop their TTP ‘guests’ and other terrorist groups from attacking Pakistan has justifiably struck a raw nerve in Islamabad. I also cautioned that Afghans view access to a seaport essential for their independence from Pakistan’s trade routes. Gwadar, therefore, remains of strategic interest to them—one reason they are suspected of extending support to the Baloch insurgency. The reality is that the Afghan Taliban have their own agenda. If that aligns with India’s interests, they will not hesitate to collaborate, pursuing what they see as a mutually beneficial arrangement. Let’s examine the current dynamics. China has long been the most active mediator between Afghanistan and Pakistan, organizing several trilateral meetings. As I have often said, China’s regional framework views “Af-Pak” as a single geopolitical unit rather than using our preferred “Indo-Pak” formula. Beijing continues to advocate dialogue and stability in the region, emphasizing the importance of cooperation to prevent further deterioration of ties between Islamabad and Kabul.
Ultimately, what we are witnessing is a continuation of the “Great Game,” with India, China, Russia, and the United States all vying for influence in the region—while Afghanistan and Pakistan serve as their proxies. Tragically, both nations are being manipulated by foreign interests, with short-sighted leaders trading national security for personal or institutional gain. Despite the efforts of friendly nations to mediate a lasting peace and promote dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the talks between Islamabad and Kabul in Istanbul have broken down. Pakistani officials attribute the failure to the intransigence of the Afghan Taliban, particularly their refusal to provide firm and verifiable assurances that Afghan territory would not be used by terrorist groups such as the TTP to target Pakistan. This proved to be the main obstacle to reaching an agreement.
At this stage, Pakistan finds itself at a sensitive crossroads. The defence minister has issued a stern warning, declaring that Pakistan would strike targets in Afghanistan if terrorist attacks persist, while also describing the western neighbour as a “hub of international terrorism.” The United Nations, however, has expressed hope that despite the breakdown in dialogue, both countries will refrain from escalating tensions or engaging in new hostilities. The greatest threat to Pakistan today is not from Afghanistan or India—but from within: a small, unaccountable, and jingoistic elite controlling the nation’s decision-making apparatus. This internal decay poses the most serious danger to Pakistan’s stability and future. At this point, Pakistan has limited good options. The state must remain vigilant and ensure that any infiltration attempts by Afghanistan-based terrorists are decisively prevented. The defence of the nation is non-negotiable. At the same time, diplomatic engagement must persist, keeping in mind that terrorism emanating from Afghanistan endangers the entire region, not Pakistan alone.
—The writer is former Secretary Election Commission of Pakistan and currently Chairman National Democratic Foundation.
