For nearly three decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the international system operated under American unipolarity.
Western thinkers declared the “End of History,” assuming liberal democracy and market capitalism had achieved a permanent global triumph. Yet history has reasserted itself. As the world advances through the mid-2020s, the unipolar moment has clearly faded, giving way to a complex and evolving multipolar order. This transformation is not theoretical—its impacts are visible in disrupted supply chains, shifting diplomatic behaviour and the strategic decisions of capitals from Brasilia to Jakarta. Multipolarity—where several states share significant power rather than a single hegemon—often triggers anxiety in Western capitals, but historically it has been the global norm. The real challenge today is learning how to manage this emerging order. Doing so requires moving beyond Cold War binaries and adopting a more flexible, interest-driven approach to global affairs.
The rise of the Global South is central to this shift. China is a major driver, but the redistribution of influence extends far beyond Beijing. Washington’s pivot from engagement to “strategic competition” has not halted the diffusion of power. With the G7 accounting for a shrinking share of global GDP, it is increasingly unrealistic for any single centre of authority to dominate international politics. Crucially, countries across Africa, Latin America and Asia do not want to choose sides between the United States and China. Their reluctance to join sanctions regimes or geopolitical blocs reflects a desire for strategic autonomy rather than anti-Western sentiment. For many states, multipolarity offers the flexibility to diversify partnerships and pursue development free from political conditionalities. From China’s perspective, the goal is an “equal and orderly multipolar world.” Beijing’s emphasis on economic integration, connectivity and non-interference provides developing countries with an alternative to Western engagement models, which often come with governance-related demands. Many Global South nations see China’s approach—focused on infrastructure, investment and long-term development—as more aligned with their domestic priorities.
A broader institutional shift is also underway. Post-1945 structures such as the IMF, World Bank and UN Security Council no longer reflect contemporary power realities. Consequently, alternative platforms have gained traction. The growing influence of BRICS, the expanding relevance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the strengthened role of the G20 all underscore the demand for more representative global governance. The current moment is perhaps most accurately characterized by the rise of “Active Non-Alignment.” Instead of accepting binaries like “West vs. the Rest” or “Democracy vs. Autocracy,” states are forming flexible, issue-based coalitions driven by their own national interests. The G20 “Troika” of India, Brazil and South Africa has ensured that Global South priorities—such as climate finance, debt relief, technology transfer and food security—remain at the centre of global conversations. Meanwhile, the weaponization of global finance and payment systems has accelerated interest in local-currency settlements and alternative financial infrastructures, pushing the world toward financial multipolarity alongside geopolitical diversification.
A defining feature of this era is the rise of empowered middle powers. No longer passive actors, states such as Brazil, Indonesia, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are shaping regional outcomes and influencing global debates. Brazil, under President Lula da Silva, has embraced a multi-aligned foreign policy that prioritizes development and autonomy. By deepening economic ties with China while maintaining engagement with the United States on climate and energy, Brasilia avoids zero-sum alignments and positions itself as a constructive diplomatic actor. Indonesia provides another compelling example. Its doctrine of a “free and active” foreign policy has matured into a pragmatic, development-oriented strategy. Under President Prabowo Subianto, Jakarta continues to attract Chinese investment for industrialization while maintaining strong defence and maritime cooperation with Western governments. Its refusal to become part of containment strategies shows a sophisticated understanding that balanced engagement is essential for long-term national prosperity.
In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 has driven an increasingly diversified foreign policy. While maintaining cooperation with the United States, Riyadh is expanding partnerships with China, Russia and emerging Asian economies. Its enhanced diplomatic role, including mediating regional disputes, signals a desire to be recognized as a global player rather than merely an energy supplier. The transition to multipolarity is not without risks. Heightened competition among major powers, rising nationalism and institutional fragmentation could destabilize the global system if mismanaged. Yet multipolarity also spreads influence more widely, compelling great powers to consult, negotiate and compromise instead of acting unilaterally. Labeling this transition as a threat to the “rules-based order” overlooks the fact that the previous order was not always inclusive or representative. Long-term stability will depend on the United States and China developing a framework for peaceful coexistence—one that recognizes competition but avoids escalation. Equally, it will require Global South nations to assert their agency and participate in shaping a fairer, more sustainable multipolar system. The unipolar era has ended; the key question is whether the emerging multipolar dawn leads to confrontation or opens the way for shared prosperity.
—The writer is Chairman of the Belt and Road Initiative for Sustainable Development.
