The 11th 2026 NPT Review Conference convenes in New York (April 27-May 22) as the credo of the-disarmament and non-proliferation regime reaches a critical crossroads.
The credibility of the NPT is under unprecedented scrutiny. In the eyes of a growing number of NNWS, the glaring gap between the obligations set out under Article VI and the actions or inactions of nuclear-weapon states is simply untenable. Decades after the treaty’s entry into force, NWS continue to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenals, rather than take action to eliminate them. The credibility of the NPT’s core bargain (that NNWS will refrain from developing nuclear weapons in exchange for disarmament by NWS) is now seriously questioned. For many, indeed, this bargain appears broken.
Today, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) faces mounting challenges from nuclear-armed states’ modernization programs, lack of progress on disarmament commitments, and erosion of trust among non-nuclear-weapon states. The embolden truth is that despite the treaty’s fundamental goal of promoting disarmament, repeated failures to achieve meaningful reductions—coupled with continued reliance on nuclear deterrence—have rendered the disarmament narrative symbolic rather than substantive. This gap between rhetoric and action undermines the NPT’s credibility and fuels skepticism about its long-term viability.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an international framework designed to uphold the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. As a result of the obligations enshrined within the NPT, the nuclear weapons states (NWS) agree not to assist the nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS) to either develop or acquire nuclear weapons, while the NNWSs are required to refrain from developing and/or acquiring nuclear weapons (Articles I and II).
It is argued that the NPT has not effectively prevented countries from pursuing nuclear weapons, highlighted by North Korea’s withdrawal and acquisition of nuclear weapons, Iran’s non-compliance with IAEA safeguards, and the existence of nuclear-armed states outside the treaty (India, Pakistan, Israel)Geopolitical Rivalry and Erosion of Trust: Rising tensions between major powers US, Russia, China) have resulted in the collapse of bilateral arms control, reduced transparency, and increased reliance on nuclear deterrence, which corrodes trust among NPT members.
Arguably, the effectiveness of a given treaty hinges on states acknowledging the necessity of mem-bership in that treaty, it’s functioning as intended, and its members preferring the treaty’s continued existence. A number of challenges threaten the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT. However, the five factors undermining the NPT’s efficacy include: (1) failure by nuclear-armed states to fulfill disarmament commitments, (2) increasing nuclear tensions and risky behavior raising conflict risks, (3) lack of progress in achieving key treaties like a new Iran nuclear deal or a Middle East nuclear-free zone, (4) repeated failures of NPT Review Conferences to produce consensus, and (5) non-compliance and opaque nuclear activities by some states, eroding trust and verification mechanisms. These challenges weaken global confidence in the treaty’s ability to prevent proliferation and promote disarmament.
Further, the reliance of many non-Nuclear-weapon states on “extended nuclear deterrence” (nuclear umbrellas) provided by allies encourages nuclear dependency rather than elimination. Furthermore, the spread of sensitive, dual-use technology (enrichment and reprocessing) makes it easier for states to achieve “latency”—the ability to quickly produce nuclear weapons. Needless to say, the NPT review process has become deeply polarized, with the 2015 and 2022 review conferences failing to produce final outcome documents, highlighting an inability to agree on bridging the gap between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”.
And above all, nuclear segregation-cum-nuclear apartheid—where certain states retain nuclear weapons while others do not—undermines disarmament by reinforcing global inequality and perceived legitimacy of nuclear possession. This division perpetuates a two-tier system, discouraging non-nuclear states from pursuing disarmament and enabling nuclear-armed states to justify retention. Fear of technological breakthroughs or shifting power balances may trigger arms races, escalating instability. Without equitable engagement and trust, the compliance of NPT framework seems murky. True progress requires addressing both security concerns and systemic inequities.
Although the IAEA’s role has shifted from a primarily clerical, auditing role during the Cold War to a proactive verification agency in the post-Cold War, its role has sparked some controversies, particu-larly its working under political pressure and geopolitical interplay. The critics say that its role must be focused on safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon states, ensuring transparency without direct in-tervention in superpower dynamics.
Iran, a signatory to the NPT framework,under the JCPOA, retained the right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy by limiting only the aspects of its programme that could enable weapons development. The deal restricted centrifuge numbers, uranium enrichment levels (to 3.67%), and stockpile sizes, while allowing Iran to continue research, development, and use of nuclear technology for civilian purposes like power generation and medicine. Given the US-Iran nuclear crisis, this revisionist and pragmatic approach must be principally upheld by Trump’s White House.
To conclude, the challenges facing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) suggest that the narrative of nuclear disarmament has increasingly become a “paper slogan” due to a structural, growing gap between the treaty’s idealistic goals (Article VI) and the strategic realities of 2026. Moreover, India’s assertive nuclear posture and pursuit of strategic dominance in South Asia potentially complicate disarmament diplomacy, while unjustifiably seeking its international recognition as a de jure nuclear-armed state without adhering to the NPT’s commitments.
Nonetheless, ‘’To preserve the NPT’s relevance and effectiveness,’’ States Parties must respond with urgency and effectiveness. Concrete, measurable steps must be taken to restore faith in the treaty’s core bargain and to demonstrate that collective restraint remains possible even in an era of heightened insecurity. NWS must make greater progress in fulfilling their obligations. Needless to say, all stakeholders must resist the temptation to view progress in disarmament as legitimate only when it occurs within familiar institutional frameworks.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also a Peace and Conflict Studies expert, is member of the European Consortium of Political Research, including Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law.
