RUSSIA, the mighty power of cold-war era, has seen its global influence and clout decline after the end of the cold War and is perhaps not the same roaring lion it used to be in 50’s,60’s and 70’s.
Its global influence steady declined after 80’s. Some experts say that the decline started after the humiliation it suffered in Afghanistan as they had to exit after 8 years of fruitless and unnecessary war which damaged their image as a super power-parallel to USA. Its engagement in Africa, Asia and Middle East also suffered due to drain on their resources during the Afghan War which prolonged far beyond than what they perhaps estimated.
Russia’s role in Southeast Asia is multifaceted, encompassing defense cooperation, trade, and diplomatic engagement, but its influence is generally considered less significant than that of China or the United States. Russia has sought to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian nations through arms sales, joint military exercises, and participation in regional forums like ASEAN, while also positioning itself as a counterbalance to Western and Chinese influence. However, its influence has been impacted by the war in Ukraine, which has led to some countries distancing themselves from Moscow due to concerns about violating national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Russia has been a significant supplier of military equipment to Southeast Asian countries, especially Vietnam and Myanmar, though sales have declined in recent years as nations turn to alternative sources. It participates in joint military exercises, including naval drills, to showcase capabilities and build ties, while also engaging in military-technical cooperation through training programs and defense technology transfer. Russia remains active with ASEAN as a dialogue partner, with trade turnover reaching a record high in 2023, according to Russian figures. Bilateral trade with individual countries, particularly Indonesia, has also increased, highlighting Russia’s continuing engagement in the region.
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), led by Russia, has also increased trade with ASEAN member countries. Southeast Asian nations view Russia as a potential counterbalance to the influence of China and the US, allowing them to pursue strategic pragmatism. Russia, as chair of BRICS, has played a role in welcoming Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam as official partners, with Indonesia later becoming a full member. It has been vocal in its support for ASEAN’s central role in the region and has sought to strengthen its engagement with the organization. The war in Ukraine has negatively impacted Russia’s image in some Southeast Asian countries, with some distancing themselves due to concerns about violating national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Russia’s arms sales in Southeast Asia have been declining as some countries seek alternative suppliers, while others with close economic ties to China remain cautious of fully embracing Moscow amid Beijing’s growing influence. The war in Ukraine has further complicated Russia’s engagement, yet it continues to pursue regional interests. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia had quietly expanded military ties and diplomatic outreach in Southeast Asia, though these efforts received less attention compared to its activities in Africa or Eastern Europe. Today, however, that influence is fading, leaving Moscow increasingly marginalized in a region critical to global politics.
Moscow, absent from Africa for decades after the Cold War, has recently reasserted itself across the continent. The Brookings Institution notes Russia signed 19 military cooperation agreements with African governments between 2015 and 2019, while the Tony Blair Institute highlights its deployment of private military contractors in at least 21 countries, mostly in Africa. Through the Wagner Group, Russia has backed anti-democratic figures such as Gen. Khalifa Haftar in Libya and Col. Assimi Goita’s junta in Mali, while also aligning with new regimes in Niger and Gabon. In Eastern Europe, the Kremlin has attempted coups in Montenegro and Moldova and continues destabilization through influence operations and disinformation, alongside its ongoing war in Ukraine.
Similarly, Moscow had not played a major role in Southeast Asia since the Vietnam War era, but in recent decades countries in the region had increasingly turned to Russia for cheap and reliable arms. In fact, the Stockholm Peace Research Institute noted that Russia had sold about 30 percent of all the weapons purchased by Southeast Asian countries between 2010 and 2019, often using flexible funding arrangements, including barter. As The Economist noted, in the 20 years prior to the war in Ukraine, Russia was by far Southeast Asia’s biggest arms supplier, to the tune of $11 billion in sales. Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar and several other states in the region still rely on Russian weapons for many of their arms platforms
Russian arms industry and its export capabilities have long been, as Russian President Vladimir Putin put it, a point of national pride. Even after launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia claims to be able to meet growing domestic demand and continue arms exports. State-sponsored propaganda promotes the prowess of Russia’s military-industrial complex to reassure both domestic and international audiences of Russia’s ability to not only sustain its war effort in Ukraine but also further leverage its arms sales for geopolitical influence. These statements are seemingly designed to project confidence that Russia can outlast the West. These messages starkly contrast with more pessimistic assessments appearing in both international and Russian media.
Russian political and military leadership consistently reports on the “successes” in the import substitution programs and new developments that improve the existing military systems based on real-life combat experience. Throughout 2023 and into early 2024, the Russian state-run arms exporter “Rosoboronexport” reported signing new contracts, noting stable international interest in Russian weaponry and government approvals of new systems for export. Reports of declining arms sales, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2023 estimates, are dismissed as faulty, with officials claiming that not all sales are disclosed due to sanctions. Even acknowledged declines are portrayed as temporary setbacks, which, it is implied, will be followed by another boost in exports after the war.
—The writer is Former Civil Servant and Consultant (ILO) & International Organisation for Migration and author of seven books.
