THE war between Iran and the United States has disrupted trade in the Strait of Hormuz and tension between Iran-aligned Yemeni Houthis and Saudi Arabia is spoiling the safety of sea lanes in the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea maritime corridors. The increasing militarist activities of the Houthis in the Red Sea are alarming for seafaring nations including Pakistan. Since the Houthis announced their open support for Iran, they have been using the Red Sea as strategic leverage to settle a score with Saudi Arabia.
The Houthis announced a Red Sea blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20, 2026, compounding the current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, affecting global maritime trade. Subsequently, the Houthis have started attacking vessels crossing the Red Sea, which effectively closed the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait and Suez Canal, sealing both ends of the Red Sea. According to estimates, Bab al-Mandeb is a channel for approximately 12% of global trade and nearly 15% of seaborne trade.
Last week, the targeting of a vessel in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has threatened to disrupt Pakistani trade through the Red Sea. Pakistan has already been suffering economically due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the vulnerability of merchandise in the Red Sea further jeopardizes its economy. On August 11, 2026, three Pakistani sailors were killed in the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb. Though the Houthis have not claimed responsibility for targeting a vessel in the waters of Bab al-Mandeb, the pro-Riyadh Yemeni government is convinced that the Houthis were the perpetrators of the attack.
Islamabad strongly condemned the killing of three Pakistani nationals and injuring one aboard Tanzania-flagged vessel Tihamah, a non-combatant commercial vessel, crossing Bab al-Mandeb Strait/Red Sea. Foreign Minister of Pakistan Ishaq Dar strongly condemned the Houthi attack. He said that such attacks “endanger innocent lives, constitute a violation of international law and pose a serious threat to freedom of navigation, maritime security and the safety of commercial shipping in the Red Sea.”
While anticipating the challenges in the Red Sea, Pakistan had already joined Saudi Arabia’s established naval coalition to protect shipping from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait on July 30, 2026. So far, 14 states—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Yemen and the Comoros—announced their support for a multinational maritime defense coalition aimed at safeguarding freedom of navigation, international trade and energy supply routes in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The question is whether the coalition can prevent Houthi disruption in the Red Sea.
Being a member of the maritime coalition to secure maritime traffic in the Red Sea, Islamabad is prepared to assist Riyadh in protecting merchant vessels in the maritime corridor. On August 12, 2026, Foreign Office spokesperson Tahir Andrabi reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to the maritime defense coalition. He pointed out that “Pakistan is a signatory of this coalition. We abide by its communiqué and we are ready and willing to assist Saudi Arabia and other coalition partners as an operationalization of this communiqué to preserve the safety and security of global maritime.”
The evolving Red Sea turmoil augments the efficacy of the Saudi-Pakistani Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement concluded in September 2025 and the recently constituted trilateral agreement—the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA) by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye—which aimed to strengthen “collective deterrence against any act of aggression.” Pakistan’s foreign ministry described the MJDA as a reflection of a “shared commitment” to strengthen the region’s “collective security further.” Indeed, after realizing the increasing vulnerabilities of their trade in the Red Sea, the chances are that Ankara, Islamabad and Riyadh intensified their mutual efforts to establish a secretariat, develop a consensual doctrine for institutional development, define procedures, build integrated command structures for military planning and interoperability and carry out regular joint operations grounded in real and hypothetical contingencies.
The current Middle Eastern order is rapidly transforming and its new security architecture is evolving, deepening Pakistan’s integration in the new strategic setting. The transforming regional strategic environment augments Pakistan’s role and stature as a middle power in regional and international politics. Simultaneously, it demands Islamabad’s proficient diplomacy to sustain balance in its relations with Tehran and Riyadh, while joining Saudis and its allies against the pro-Iran Houthis in the Red Sea. Thus, Pakistan must continue its constructive engagement with Iran and other regional stakeholders.
—The writer is Vice Chancellor of the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
