Anum Istafa
The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf is once again on the road. Thousands of PTI supporters have begun a long march towards Islamabad, demanding the release of Imran Khan, following the failure of negotiations between the government and the opposition. The talks ended in a deadlock, with access to Khan and disagreements over counterterrorism policy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa among the major points of contention. For PTI, this is another moment of confrontation. But perhaps it is also a moment for introspection.
Every political movement eventually reaches a point where mobilization alone is no longer enough. It must decide whether it wants to remain a movement of resistance or evolve into a political institution capable of negotiating, governing and building a sustainable political future. PTI stands precisely at that crossroads. A protest is successful not merely because people participate in it.
The present long march comes after negotiations failed. PTI says the government was unwilling to accommodate its demands, while the government has blamed PTI for the breakdown. Both sides have their narratives. But perhaps PTI needs to ask itself a different question: if one strategy repeatedly produces confrontation without producing the desired political outcome, when does persistence cease to be political strength and become strategic rigidity?
If the release of Imran Khan is PTI’s central objective, then every component of the party should logically be aligned towards that objective: its lawyers, parliamentarians, provincial governments, political negotiators and street mobilization. Instead, the party has at times appeared to move between legal battles, parliamentary politics, protests, negotiations and confrontational rhetoric without a clearly visible long-term sequence connecting these efforts.
Could some of PTI’s own strategic choices have made the political and institutional space for Khan’s release narrower rather than wider? That is not an argument for abandoning the struggle. It is an argument for examining the method of the struggle. Perhaps PTI’s biggest strategic challenge now is escaping two extremes.
At one extreme lies permanent confrontation—the belief that every political disagreement must culminate in a street battle and every compromise amounts to betrayal. At the other lies political surrender—the abandonment of principles merely to obtain temporary accommodation. Neither has to be the only choice. There is a middle ground, and political maturity often lies precisely there.
PTI can continue demanding constitutional rights, due process and political space for Imran Khan while simultaneously recognizing that negotiation is not surrender. It can challenge the government while remaining part of the parliamentary process. It can protest while keeping channels of dialogue open. It can defend its political mandate without turning every disagreement into an existential confrontation.
This may ultimately be the most important question: Does PTI want to be remembered as the party that never stopped resisting? Or does it want to be remembered as the political movement that transformed resistance into institutional strength? The first can create powerful moments. The second can create a lasting political legacy.
The current long march may succeed in generating political pressure; it may also deepen the existing confrontation. At this stage, it is too early to know what its ultimate political consequences will be. What is clear, however, is that PTI’s future cannot depend indefinitely on the repetition of the same political cycle: protest, confrontation, deadlock and another protest.
The party has already demonstrated that it can mobilize. The next test is whether it can strategize. Perhaps PTI’s most important political journey is, therefore, not the road from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Islamabad. It is the journey from confrontation to political maturity.
—The writer is a former journalist with the National Herald Tribune and a former member of the Foreign Correspondents Club, Hong Kong.
