Kamran
PAKISTAN’S governance debate has reached a point where even a senior member of the government has described the existing system as having “collapsed” and called for changes in existing system. The remark was striking not because Pakistan’s governance problems are new, but because it came from within the government itself. For decades, Pakistan has experienced different forms of government, yet the same problems persist: weak institutions, poor law enforcement, administrative inefficiency, corruption, political interference and inadequate public services. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi further called for political parties to sit together and settle major national questions, including the creation of new administrative units. He subsequently reiterated that the government would complete its constitutional term, while maintaining that governance required structural change. The discussion has gradually developed into a broader consideration of whether the country’s present administrative arrangements are still suited to the changing scale and increasingly complex needs of its population.
The International Monetary Fund’s Governance and Corruption Diagnostic, published in 2025, identified persistent corruption risks, weak institutional efficiency, fragmented oversight, inconsistent enforcement of rules and constraints on the rule of law. The IMF’s assessment is significant because it treats governance not as an isolated political problem but as an economic one. Weak institutions affect investment, public-sector performance, regulatory certainty and the government’s ability to manage public resources effectively. The condition of public finances adds another layer to the problem. A July 2026 World Bank report on Pakistan’s fiscal federalism found that the country’s federal, provincial and local governments face structural weaknesses affecting fiscal discipline, revenue mobilisation and the quality of public services. The report examined the consequences of the 18th Constitutional Amendment and the 7th National Finance Commission Award, which transferred significant service-delivery responsibilities and resources to the provinces.
The creation of administrative units could reshape the distribution of political authority, public resources and administrative responsibilities. At the same time, the World Bank’s assessment suggests that many of Pakistan’s governance challenges are broader in nature, extending across all three levels of government. The question is not simply how many administrative units Pakistan has. It is also how effectively those units raise revenue, manage expenditure, coordinate responsibilities and deliver services. In May 2026, the IMF Executive Board completed Pakistan’s third review under its Extended Fund Facility and second review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, releasing about $1.1 billion and $220 million, respectively. The IMF has repeatedly linked Pakistan’s longer-term economic performance to structural reforms, including improvements in governance, anti-corruption institutions, state-owned enterprises, the business environment and regulatory systems.
The IMF’s governance diagnostic was particularly direct in identifying weaknesses in fiscal governance, market regulation, financial-sector oversight, anti-money-laundering controls and the rule of law. These are problems that cannot be addressed merely by redrawing administrative boundaries. The credibility of any governance system ultimately depends on whether institutions operate according to predictable rules. Pakistan’s constitutional history has been marked by repeated disruptions and disputes over institutional authority. The country has also experienced prolonged tensions between elected governments, opposition parties, courts and other centres of state power. In such an environment, governance becomes vulnerable to institutional overlap and political contestation.
Pakistan’s population has also expanded rapidly, increasing pressure on education, healthcare, employment, housing, transport, water, energy and local administration. The World Bank’s 2026 fiscal federalism report specifically linked the need for effective public-resource management to the requirements of a rapidly growing population. That pressure has strengthened arguments for bringing government closer to citizens through stronger local and administrative structures. But administrative proximity and institutional effectiveness are not the same thing. A new province may create another layer of government. It does not, by itself, guarantee stronger courts, better schools, more reliable healthcare, efficient taxation or cleaner administration. Pakistan’s political history contains repeated examples of institutional experimentation.
The latest assessments from the IMF and World Bank instead point towards weaknesses embedded across Pakistan’s existing institutional architecture. That is why the governance debate cannot be reduced to a question of provincial boundaries. Pakistan’s governance problem is ultimately visible in the gap between the state’s formal architecture and its performance. International assessments continue to identify weaknesses in institutional efficiency, rule of law, transparency, accountability and public-resource management. The latest call for an administrative reset has reopened a debate that Pakistan has carried for decades. Whether the country has four provinces or more is only one part of that debate. The deeper issue is whether institutions can operate consistently, whether constitutional and legal rules command predictable compliance, whether public resources are managed effectively and whether government can translate authority into functioning public services.
—The writer is an educator, based in Sindh.
