IN October 2025, Pakistan’s western frontier erupted into a new phase of volatility.
Following a series of cross-border attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and affiliated groups operating from Afghan soil, Islamabad launched precision strikes targeting terrorist infrastructure across the Durand Line. These kinetic actions—described by the Inter-Services Public Relations as “limited, proportionate and necessary”—marked a significant shift in Pakistan’s rules of engagement. For the first time in years, Pakistan openly targeted Taliban command nodes and training centres inside Afghanistan, signalling a recalibration of its strategic patience.
The strikes were not merely tactical response to provocations. They were emblematic of a broader frustration: the Taliban regime’s unwillingness—or inability—to rein in anti-Pakistan militant groups. Despite repeated diplomatic overtures and trilateral dialogues involving China, the Taliban’s posture has remained defiant. Kabul’s retaliatory shelling across multiple provinces, including Kunar and Nangarhar, only deepened the crisis.
Amid these shifting dynamics, another actor lurks in the shadows—India. While publicly advocating for regional peace, New Delhi has quietly expanded its footprint in post-2021 Afghanistan through intelligence linkages, consular networks and strategic patronage of anti-Pakistan elements. Multiple reports suggest that Indian intelligence operatives, operating under diplomatic cover, have cultivated ties with factions of the TTP and Baloch insurgents, leveraging Afghan soil as a proxy theatre. This covert architecture—reminiscent of Chanakya’s doctrine of indirect warfare Mandala—aims to encircle Pakistan, disrupt CPEC and dilute Islamabad’s strategic depth. The revival of Indian-funded media outlets and think tanks in Kabul further amplifies anti-Pakistan narratives, complicating Islamabad’s diplomatic outreach. As Iqbal warned in Zarb-e-Kalim: “Jang-e-makar-o-riya mein faqat ziyan hai”—in wars of deceit, all sides lose. Pakistan must expose these machinations through evidence-based diplomacy, while reinforcing its internal resilience against hybrid threats. Yet, as Pakistan asserts its sovereignty and security imperatives, it finds itself navigating a delicate geopolitical tightrope. China, its “iron brother” and principal strategic partner, has voiced concern over the escalation. Beijing’s Foreign Ministry urged both Pakistan and Afghanistan to “exercise restraint” and resolve disputes through dialogue. China’s discomfort is not rooted in moral diplomacy alone. It stems from a strategic calculus. Beijing has long viewed stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan as essential to its Belt and Road Initiative. The recent clashes threaten not only infrastructure projects but also China’s broader ambitions in Central and South Asia. Moreover, the spectre of US re-engagement in the region—especially around Bagram Air Base—has reignited Chinese anxieties about encirclement and strategic competition.
These tensions were further compounded by Pakistan’s mineral diplomacy. In early October, Islamabad dispatched its first shipment of enriched rare earth elements to the United States under a $500 million deal. The move, hailed domestically as a breakthrough in economic diversification, triggered unease in Beijing. Reports surfaced that Pakistan had gifted rare earth samples to US officials—claims China swiftly dismissed as “baseless.” Nonetheless, Beijing tightened export controls on rare-earth technologies shortly thereafter, signalling its displeasure.
At the heart of China’s reservations lies a strategic paradox. Pakistan’s mineral reserves—estimated at $3 to $5 trillion—are a potential game-changer for global supply chains. As the world pivots toward clean energy and advanced manufacturing, rare earths have become the new oil. China, which dominates global processing capacity, views any US-aligned mineral corridor as a threat to its monopoly. Pakistan’s overtures to Washington, however pragmatic, risk unsettling this balance. Islamabad must recognize that kinetic actions, while sometimes necessary, are not substitutes for sustained strategy. The Taliban’s duplicity—sheltering TTP while professing neutrality—requires measured response that blends military deterrence with diplomatic isolation. Pakistan should leverage multilateral forums, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to build consensus on counterterrorism norms and expose the Taliban’s deception.
China’s concerns must be addressed with clarity and confidence. Pakistan should reaffirm its commitment to CPEC and offer joint oversight mechanisms to protect Chinese investment in conflict-prone zones. Simultaneously, Islamabad must assert its sovereign right to diversify economic partnerships. The mineral deal with the US is not a zero-sum game—it can coexist with China’s interests if managed transparently.
Pakistan should propose a trilateral mineral governance framework involving China, the US and itself. Such a mechanism could include joint exploration zones, technology-sharing agreements and environmental safeguards. By positioning itself as a bridge rather than a battleground, Pakistan can transform mineral diplomacy into a platform for strategic convergence. This is not unlike the ancient Silk Road ethos—where trade was not conquest, but connection. Pakistan must revive that spirit, not merely in commerce but in diplomacy. Domestic consensus is vital. Pakistan’s mineral wealth must not become another casualty of elite capture or opaque deals. Civil society, academia and provincial stakeholders should be engaged in shaping a national mineral strategy that prioritizes sustainability, equity and long-term value addition.
Finally, Pakistan must invest in narrative architecture. The world needs to hear not just about Pakistan’s threats, but its vision. Editorial diplomacy, cultural soft power and strategic storytelling—rooted in heritage and hope—can help reframe Pakistan’s image from a reactive state to a resilient steward of regional stability. Pakistan stands at a crossroads. Its kinetic actions against the Taliban were a necessary assertion of sovereignty. But the road ahead demands more than firepower—it requires foresight. China’s concerns, while valid, must be balanced against Pakistan’s evolving strategic needs. And the mineral diplomacy with the US, if navigated wisely, could herald a new era of economic empowerment. The challenge is not choosing sides. It is choosing a strategy.
—The writer, Retired Group Captain of PAF, is author of several books on China.
