THE activation of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye marks a significant development in Muslim geopolitics. More than a security arrangement, it represents an effort by three influential Muslim nations to establish a collective defence framework amid escalating Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia. The key question is: what does this alliance seek to achieve?
At its heart lies deterrence. Saudi Arabia intends to signal that attacks on its territory, energy infrastructure and the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah will no longer be treated as a bilateral dispute with the Houthis but as a challenge to a broader security partnership. As strategic theorist Thomas Schelling observed, “The power to hurt is bargaining power.” Effective deterrence depends not on waging war but on convincing adversaries that aggression carries unacceptable costs.
For Riyadh, the agreement provides strategic depth. For Ankara, it expands regional influence and reinforces Türkiye’s standing as a leading military power in the Muslim world. For Islamabad, it strengthens ties with a long-standing partner that has repeatedly extended eco-nomic assistance and hosts millions of Pakistani expatriates.
The military dimension is equally important. Intelligence sharing, coordinated planning, integrated air-defence systems and joint deployments could strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to counter missile and drone attacks. Türkiye’s expertise in drone warfare and Pakistan’s professional military capabilities could substantially enhance the Kingdom’s defensive posture.
Three possible trajectories merit attention: The first, and most likely, is limited defensive co-operation. Pakistan and Türkiye could contribute intelligence, surveillance, logistics, naval security and missile-defence capabilities while avoiding direct combat operations inside Ye-men. Such an approach would demonstrate solidarity without drawing either country into a prolonged conflict.
The second scenario involves expanded military engagement. Should attacks against Makkah, Madinah or critical energy infrastructure intensify, pressure for a stronger response could be-come difficult to resist. Pakistani and Turkish air, naval or special-forces assets might then assume more direct roles. Yet military history repeatedly demonstrates that tactical superiority does not necessarily translate into strategic success.
The third, and most dangerous, possibility is regional escalation. The Houthis are widely regarded as Iran’s most capable non-state partner in the Middle East. If Tehran interprets the alliance as part of a broader anti-Iran security architecture, it may deepen support through weapons transfers and asymmetric responses. What began as a conflict centred on Yemen could evolve into a wider strategic contest stretching from the Red Sea to the Gulf.
Another danger lies in miscalculation, covert action and information warfare. The Middle East has repeatedly witnessed provocations and competing narratives that amplified tensions and complicated decision-making. Policymakers must remain vigilant against attempts by external actors to inflame divisions within the Muslim world.
A particularly alarming scenario would involve an attack on Islam’s holiest sites in Makkah or Madinah that is immediately attributed to the Houthis before credible evidence emerges. Such an atrocity would generate immense pressure for retaliation and could draw multiple Muslim countries into a wider confrontation. Whether perpetrated by a state actor, proxy force or clandestine network, the objective would be identical: inflame emotions, widen conflict and foreclose diplomacy. In such circumstances, verification must precede retaliation. Facts must prevail over passion.
The alliance also intersects with the broader US-Iran rivalry. Although it aligns with Washington’s preference for greater regional burden-sharing, Tehran may perceive it as another layer in a strategy aimed at containing Iranian influence. Yet portraying the arrangement as explicitly anti-Iran would be an oversimplification. Neither Pakistan nor Türkiye seeks confrontation with Tehran. Both maintain important economic and security relationships with Iran. Pakistan values Saudi support but also shares a long border with Iran and has invested considerable effort in maintaining stable relations.
Islamabad therefore faces a delicate balancing act. It must reassure Riyadh of its commitment to the Kingdom’s security while avoiding any perception that it has joined a wider anti-Iran coalition. The distinction between defending Saudi sovereignty and participating in offensive operations inside Yemen may prove decisive. Diplomatic finesse will be as important as military capability. Pakistan’s parliament rejected direct military involvement in the Yemen conflict in 2015, reflecting reluctance to become entangled in sectarian rivalries. If the alliance is presented as defending Saudi sovereignty and safeguarding Islam’s holiest sites rather than targeting a sectarian actor, domestic resistance may be limited. The Makkah Alliance stands at the intersection of opportunity and risk. Properly managed, it could strengthen deterrence, enhance collective security and reduce dependence on external powers. Mishandled, it could widen the Yemen conflict and deepen regional polarization. For Pakistan, the stakes are especially high. Success would reinforce its credentials as a responsible regional stakeholder capable of balancing complex relationships.
Ultimately, the alliance’s greatest achievement would be deterrence without war; its greatest failure would be becoming the catalyst for a wider Muslim-on-Muslim confrontation born of miscalculation, provocation or manipulation. As policymakers in Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad weigh their choices, they would do well to remember that wars begin with military calculations but end with political consequences.
The real test of the Makkah Alliance is not whether it can mobilize armies but whether it can prevent a crisis from becoming a catastrophe. In an era of drones, disinformation and covert operations, truth is often the first casualty. If outrage is allowed to outrun evidence, Muslim nations may find themselves trapped in a conflict shaped by others but paid for by the Muslim world. Strategic patience, rigorous verification and political wisdom are not signs of weakness. They remain the strongest instruments of statecraft.
—The writer is an Air Force veteran, defence analyst and author of several books on China.
