Dr Rizwana Abbasi
A retrospective analysis of India’s policies towards Pakistan reveals a recurring pattern in which deception has become an important instrument of statecraft.
Globally, India uses this approach to enhance its political prestige and power projection ambitions. Regionally, it employs the same strategy to gain military advantages, establish strategic dominance and pursue hegemonic ambitions in South Asia, particularly against Pakistan. The roots of this playbook can be traced to India’s annexation of Jammu and Kashmir and its continued denial of the Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination as mandated by the United Nations. Since the 1980s, repression in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJ&K), including disputed elections, human rights violations, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, has fueled resistance among Kashmiri youth. Instead of addressing these grievances, India has consistently portrayed the movement as state-sponsored terrorism backed by Pakistan, thereby externalizing an indigenous struggle.
A similar pattern is evident in India’s nuclear trajectory. Under the US-led Atoms for Peace initiative, India received nuclear technology intended for peaceful purposes. However, it later used foreign-supplied civilian materials to facilitate its 1974 so-called “peaceful nuclear explosion.” The international community viewed this as a setback to non-proliferation efforts, leading to the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to regulate the transfer of sensitive technologies. During the 1980s and 1990s, India steadily expanded its plutonium production capability, missile technologies and weapons-related research. While publicly supporting discussions on nuclear restraint, it refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and blocked consensus at the Conference on Disarmament. In 1998, India conducted overt nuclear tests, becoming the first state in South Asia to openly introduce nuclear weapons into the regional security environment.
The rise of China as a major economic and strategic power at the beginning of the twenty-first century altered global geopolitics. India effectively leveraged growing US concerns about China to secure greater international acceptance, including an NSG waiver that provided access to global technology markets. According to the author, this integration has facilitated India’s military modernization and strengthened its strategic position against Pakistan. Following overt nuclearization, India adopted a doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), supported by policies of massive retaliation and No-First-Use (NFU). Critics argue, however, that India’s expanding arsenal and force posture exceed the requirements of minimum deterrence and reflect broader ambitions to project power beyond South Asia.
India’s conventional military doctrine also evolved significantly. In 2004, it introduced the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), designed to enable limited military operations under a nuclear overhang. Subsequent doctrines, including the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF-2017) and the Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD-2018), refined these concepts. Notably, JDIAF-2017 formally incorporated surgical strikes into India’s military strategy, while LWD-2018 outlined the possibility of limited punitive actions against Pakistan. To support these doctrines, India invested heavily in military modernization aimed at improving its capacity to conduct swift and limited offensive operations. The author argues that India’s attempt to execute a surgical strike against Pakistan in 2019 failed to achieve its objectives and was met with an effective Pakistani response. Shortly afterward, India revoked Articles 370 and 35-A of its Constitution, ending the special status of Jammu and Kashmir.
According to the author, India has simultaneously advanced a broader narrative strategy aimed at delegitimizing the Kashmiri freedom movement and portraying Pakistan as the source of regional instability. This serves three purposes: legitimizing offensive military doctrines and cross-border operations, justifying extensive military modernization and securing international support through a sustained blame narrative against Pakistan. Within this context, the Pahalgam incident of 2025 is presented as part of a broader pattern in which militant attacks are followed by the rapid attribution of responsibility. The timing coincided with significant domestic political developments, including upcoming elections in Bihar and growing opposition to the Waqf Amendment Bill. The author argues that these circumstances increased the political utility of a strong security narrative for the ruling BJP.
The Pahalgam incident also provided India with an opportunity to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance and employ water as a strategic instrument. The author contends that such a move weakens the credibility of a treaty that had long remained insulated from political disputes and undermines broader principles of international water law. It also sets a concerning precedent whereby upstream states may seek to suspend water-sharing arrangements during periods of political tension. The article concludes that India’s unilateral revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomous status and its actions regarding the Indus Waters Treaty cannot alter the legal realities surrounding these issues nor contribute to lasting peace. Instead, the author argues, India’s statecraft has weakened regional deterrence, undermined strategic stability in South Asia and challenged international legal norms, agreements and multilateral institutions. Sustainable peace requires adherence to international law and a commitment to resolving disputes through dialogue rather than coercive policies and strategic narratives.
—The writer is a Professor of IR at NUML, a non-resident fellow of CISS, Islamabad, and a visiting fellow at the Central European University in Austria.
