Following the May 2025 conflict, India exhibits a reluctance to acknowledge defeat in the war against Pakistan.
The 5 day conflict (May 6-10) absolutely diminished India’s standing as a regional power. Needless to say, scholarly and military analyses recently published regarding the May conflict between the two nuclear armed nations in South Asia profoundly indicate that India cannot achieve a decisive military victory over Pakistan. Undeniably, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons injects an immense level of risk into any conflict, with any escalation carrying a catastrophic potential. On 18 October 2025, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Gen Asim Munir warned India that “there is no space for war in a nuclearized environment”.
Objectively, Pak Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir’s statement highlights the importance of de-escalation, diplomacy and peaceful conflict resolution to prevent any escalation that could lead to nuclear exchange. This stance reflects a commitment to strategic stability and the avoidance of nuclear war. Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear arsenals, which acts as a deterrent against large-scale conventional warfare. Numerous analysts recognize that nuclear deterrence fundamentally constrains India’s options. Former diplomat and analyst Vivek Katju has also acknowledged that even limited strikes are risky, stating that the nuclear umbrella limits the scope of any military response.
Yet recalcitrantly, Indian Army Chief, Gen Upendra Dwivedi, on Friday stated that operation Sindoor dubbed as 1.0 will continue till it achieves the objectives. Make it believe that the idea of a limited nuclear war is widely considered a “dangerous illusion” by many experts, including those in India, because the close geography and high stakes mean there is virtually no buffer to contain the conflict once nuclear thresholds are crossed. Therefore, the corollary that a major conflict could escalate to a nuclear exchange, leading to catastrophic outcomes for both sides, is a major reason a decisive military victory for India is considered nearly impossible.
Analysts have identified strategic flaws in India’s “new normal” policy—a strategy of overt and visible retaliation for sub-conventional threats—when juxtaposed with Pakistan’s reactive “new normal”. The comparison highlights contrasting approaches and differing interpretations of deterrence, which raise the risk of unintended escalation. India’s strategic flaws in its new normal appear to stem from aggressive rhetoric and tactical errors, potentially hindering progress. In contrast, Pakistan has shown readiness in certain areas, such as expediting the Mumbai attack trials as well in the post Pahalgam events where Pakistan security forces showed air readiness.
Pakistan’s “Full Spectrum Deterrence”(FSD) has evolved to include tactical nuclear weapons to counter India’s larger conventional military forces. The FSD-based Pak strategy complicates any Indian plan for a limited, conventional war by blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear conflict. This stance is clearly supported by Lt. Gen Khalid Kidwai (Retd), the pioneer of Pak strategic doctrine while arguing that, “On each occasion, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability has emerged as not only a guarantor of Pakistan’s national security but also as a guarantor of peace and stability in South Asia by keeping India’s aggressive designs in check. One, the nuclear capability, silently visible on the horizon in the background, deters India’s larger war designs and curtails the application of its military choices against a nuclear Pakistan. Two, the nuclear capability invariably shakes and spurs the international community into timely action to prevent things from going out of hand between two heavily armed nuclear powers. It is in nobody’s interest to have a global Armageddon. All in all, Pakistan’s nuclear capability retains the promise of being The Great Equalizer against a much larger adversary”.
These arguments profoundly suggest that India’s strategic approach may be less effective compared to Pakistan’s, specifically if India continues with aggressive rhetoric without correcting its errors. Moreover, India’s attempts to assert conventional superiority were challenged by the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) in May 2025. Some analysts argue this created a new normal where the PAF now acts as a more prominent conventional deterrent. While juxtaposing Pakistan’s new normal with India’s, it is a settled fact that India’s new normal lost its strategic basis with its defeat in the May war; and Pak new normal has established its international standing as CNN has admitted that Pakistan’s diplomatic and military strategies have registered global recognition.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s military demonstration of Bunyan-un-Marsoos and Marka-Haq has been the real testament of affirming Pakistan’s unwavering commitment to its national interests and security while upholding Pakistan‘s subtle resolve to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Additionally, India’s any war plans are further complicated by Pakistan’s fostered strategic and diplomatic policies manifested by its growing alliances with other regional powers. Moreover, Major Powers, the United States, China, Russia, exert pressure to de-escalate conflicts, as seen during the May 2025 crisis whereby President Trump’s intervention exclusively contributed to the ceasefire. This limits either side’s ability to pursue a prolonged military campaign.
In substance, the consensus among many analysts is that the strategic landscape, defined by mutual nuclear capabilities, means that a complete military victory for India over Pakistan is not a realistic objective. Veritably, South Asian strategic stability discourages full-scale warfare and limits conflicts to smaller, sub-conventional levels. The Pakistan narrative of resistance and resilience has resonated with Pak legacy of national unity and purpose. This has enabled Pakistan to maintain a highly level of military readiness and respond effectively to Indian provocations. In this context, India’s obsession to win a war with Pakistan is highly illusionary as Pakistan deterrence posture and diplomatic clout have created a robust defense against Indian aggression. Instead of sponsoring proxy war, this situation underscores the need for India’s surge towards a peaceful environment in South Asia by diplomatically engaging with Pakistan while seeking a viable dialogue on the simmering Kashmir dispute.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also an expert in Conflict and Peace Studies (with special focus on Palestine, Kashmir), is member of European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), including the Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law.
