RECENTLY India issued a NOTAM, notice to airmen for August 20-21, sparking potential concerns both regionally and globally.
India’s recent missile developments, particularly the expanded danger zone, raise concerns about global peace and security. The extended range of these missiles poses a threat not only to its neighbours, China and Pakistan, but also has broader implications. Given the potential impact on both regional and global balance of power and existing security frameworks, the strategic implications of India’s missile programme warrant careful examination. While India emphasizes its missile programme as a deterrent, the truth upholds that its capabilities of reaching far-off targets with nuclear warheads could inadvertently destabilize the trans-regional stability by creating a sense of insecurity and encouraging further military build-up.
India’s recent extension of its Notice to Airmen (NOTAM)– to 4,800 km into the Indian Ocean indicates a missile test and potentially an enhancement of its long-range missile capabilities–has sparked widespread concern globally, raising questions about the potential implications for trans-regional global security. This development may have repercussions on regional and global peace and stability. Needless to say, the global security implications of India’s NOTAMs are multifaceted. For one, it highlights the complexities of airspace management in regions with contested territories or sensitive geopolitical dynamics. Moreover, the NOTAM‘s impact on international flight routes and operations could have significant economic and logistic repercussions. As the situation unfolds, it remains to be seen how India will navigate these growing challenges.
Arguably, a NOTAM, especially one related to airspace restrictions or military exercises, can be easily misinterpreted as a precursor to offensive action, particularly if there are pre-existing tensions or unresolved disputes. The latest Indian NOTAM could be misinterpreted and potentially lead to heightened tensions or even a crisis in South Asia. This is especially true given the existing nuclear backdrop and the possibility of miscalculation between India and Pakistan, or even India and China. Moreover, in the context of South Asian strategic stability, the NOTAM has added another layer of complexity to the already tense regional security dynamics. Neighbour countries are closely monitoring the situation while sharing concerns about escalations and miscalculations. Further, the NOTAM’s impact on South Asian strategic stability is fundamentally complicated by the region’s history of military crises accompanied with the near miss incidents. As tensions simmer beneath the surface it poses big security challenges to India’s neighbours, particularly to Pakistan.
Following the Agni-V (MIRV) test on March 11, 2024, India continues to develop its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities. The Agni-V, a nuclear-capable missile with a range of 8000 km, positions India as a nation, provoking a nuclear arms race in the region. With nuclear-armed states like India and Pakistan, the risk of miscalculation leading to nuclear escalation is a constant concern. A previous incident involving an accidental BrahMos missile inside Pakistani territory (March 9, 2022) highlighted the risks of miscalculation, indicating India’s role as an irresponsible nuclear state.
Further, this extended range suggests the testing of a missile system with a longer range capability, potentially indicating a strategic unpredictability. Notably, the limitations of the MTCR in preventing a missile arm race in South Asia highlight the complex dynamics at play, particularly with India’s advancement in long-range missile technology, such as the Agni-V ICBM, which has sparked concerns about regional stability in South Asia. Still, some analysts suspect the upcoming nuclear missile test might involve the Agni-VI or BrahMos-ER missile system. Regardless of the specifics, this development could trigger an arms race with Pakistan and potentially escalate tensions with China. Though in form, India fosters a nuclear policy based on “credible minimum deterrence,” yet in substance, New Delhi is pursuing a policy of ‘’nuclear hegemony’’ in South Asia. It is ironic that despite its potential disregard for international nuclear norms, India has been enjoying the NSG waiver since 2008. And the truth of the matter is that India is continuously undermining strategic stability in the region.
In this scenario of India’s hegemonic nuclear agenda in the region, the global strategic community must ask India to provide logical answers to these warranted questions: first, is India’s threat perception regional or global? Second, what is the core motive of India’s long range nuclear delivery system? Third, are not India’s long range nuclear delivery systems beyond South Asia prestige driven? Fourth, does India aim to achieve its global level power status via its nuclear and missile programmes? Fifth, does India’s saffron terror’s agenda is to acquire and advance nuclear technology to fulfill its ulterior ends? And finally but most importantly, what measures so far New Delhi has taken to prevent the access of Hindu extremist groups to its nuclear arsenal?
Obviously, the Indian motives behind the ongoing nuclear weapons expansion trajectory remain unspecified and foggy. India’s smoke-screen stance –of maintaining strategic deterrence—seems no more appealing. This is about nothing but a regional power projection, or a quest for nuclear weapons supremacy in the region. But make no mistake, Pak military operation Marka-e-Haq clearly prevented India from achieving its strategic goals, effectively challenging India’s regional hegemony.
Yet alarmingly, instead of following a path where both India and Pakistan should strengthen their CBMs, particularly those related to nuclear risk reduction and communication, to prevent misinterpretations and accidental escalation, India is following a dangerous trajectory. These risks highlight the need for careful consideration of the Indian missile programme’s impact on geopolitical dynamics and arms control efforts. The situation demands that in the interest of regional peace and security, the two nuclear armed states must focus on forging ‘’Regular strategic dialogues,’’ and establishing “strategic risk-reduction centres”, customized to the Southern Asian strategic environment , which could act as central clearinghouses for information and prevent misinterpretations during crises.
—The writer, based in Pakistan, an independent IR & International Law analyst, also an expert in Conflict and Peace Studies (with special focus on Palestine, Kashmir), is member of European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), including the Washington Foreign Law Society/American Society of International Law.
