Umair Nawaz
THE conflict in the Gulf is often discussed in Pakistan as an oil story, a shipping story or a diplomatic story.
It is all three. But it is also an agrifood story. For countries like Pakistan, the Strait of Hormuz is not just a distant maritime chokepoint. It is a gateway through which energy, fertilizer, remittances and food security are tied together. The latest FAO information note on the 2026 Middle East conflict is valuable because it forces us to see these interconnections. Under normal conditions, around 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined products pass through Hormuz, roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. Within days of the conflict, tanker traffic through the strait reportedly collapsed by more than 90 per cent, disrupting flows of oil, LNG and fertilizers.
For Pakistan, the first danger is not merely expensive petrol. It is the transmission of energy shock into agriculture. The Gulf region is not only a leading supplier of oil and gas; it is also a major exporter of nitrogen fertilizers. FAO notes that Gulf countries account for roughly 30–35pc of global urea exports and around 20–30pc of ammonia exports, while up to 30pc of internationally traded fertilizers normally transit Hormuz. Once maritime flows are disrupted, the consequences move into fertilizer prices, farmer costs, crop decisions and, eventually, food prices.
This is why the crisis must be viewed through a Pakistani food-systems lens. Rising fertilizer prices do not first appear as panic in retail markets. They often show up quietly: delayed procurement, lower input use, reduced application rates and weaker planting decisions. The eventual result can be lower yields and tighter domestic supply in the next crop cycle. FAO explicitly warns that higher fertilizer and fuel costs may reduce fertilizer use, with lower application likely to reduce crop yields and tighten global grain supplies. Pakistan is directly exposed to this chain. The FAO note specifically names Pakistan among countries dependent on imported fertilizers that may face higher costs and shortages severe enough to compromise crop yields.
There is also a second, less discussed channel of risk: remittances. For many Pakistani households, remittances from the Gulf help pay for food, school fees, healthcare and debt repayment. Pakistan received $3.3 billion in remittances in February alone, while total inflows during July–February FY26 reached $26.5bn. Arab countries still accounted for 53.3pc of those inflows. If conflict weakens Gulf growth or disrupts labour markets, the effect will not remain in Dubai, Riyadh or Doha. It will be felt in Pakistani homes through tighter budgets. A remittance shock arriving alongside higher food, fuel and fertilizer prices would squeeze both sides of household welfare at once: incomes would weaken just as essential costs rise.
Pakistan’s exposure is, therefore, twofold. Farm production comes under pressure through costlier energy and agricultural inputs. Household resilience comes under pressure if remittance inflows soften. The value of the FAO note is that it points not only to risks but also to policy options. In the short term, it calls for alternative trade routes, stronger market monitoring, targeted support for vulnerable import-dependent countries and financial support for farmers. In the medium term, it recommends diversification of import sources, regional coordination and contingency planning. In the longer term, it argues for domestic agricultural expansion, more sustainable fertilizer production, renewable energy investment and structural adjustment to cope with persistent volatility.
For Pakistan, these recommendations should be turned into a concrete resilience agenda. The first priority is to protect the coming crop cycle through close monitoring of fertilizer arrivals, landed prices, inventories and district-level availability. The second is to plan targeted seasonal support for smallholders and vulnerable producers, rather than waiting for shortages to show up in reduced output. The third is to treat fertilizer security as seriously as grain security. Unlike oil, fertilizer does not benefit from internationally coordinated strategic reserves, which makes supply disruptions harder to manage.
Pakistan also needs a cross-government agrifood risk cell linking agriculture, commerce, finance, petroleum, shipping and provincial authorities. The problem is no longer sectoral. Energy policy affects fertilizer; fertilizer affects crop output; remittance shocks affect food access. These are exactly the kinds of interlinked risks that fall through the cracks when ministries think in silos. The final lesson is strategic. Pakistan should treat the current crisis as a warning about structural dependence, not as a passing headline. A country whose farm economy can be shaken by disruptions in distant energy and fertilizer corridors needs resilience built into national planning through diversified input sourcing, better fertilizer risk management, targeted support for smallholders and a more integrated view of food security. That is the real significance of Hormuz for Pakistan. It is not only a maritime chokepoint on a map; it is a pressure point in the country’s food system. Pakistan still has time to prepare. It should use it.
—The writer is a development practitioner-scholar and a LUMS alumnus.
