TEHRAN – US strikes shattered Iran’s weapons factories, but Tehran supplies kept finding their way in. Behind the scenes, a sprawling network of numbered companies and overseas intermediaries helped Iranian government secure billions of dollars in goods to sustain its missile and drone programmes.
An investigation by Reuters exposed network of numbered entities, overseas intermediaries and financial channels that allegedly helped Tehran secure everything from rocket fuel ingredients to trucks capable of carrying missile launchers. More than 5,000 entities have been linked to Iran’s Ministry of Defence, revealing procurement system that continued operating amid war with US and Israel.
According to Reuters, more than five thousand hidden agencies are helping supply Iran with military equipment. 🇮🇷
One agency alone imported two point three billion dollars in goods over eighteen months. The cargo included rocket-fuel ingredients, detonators, aircraft components and hundreds of heavy trucks.
Records list China, Russia, Germany and the United Arab Emirates as shipment origins. Behind these shipments lies an unusual payment system.— Donald J Trump Posts TruthSocial (@TruthTrumpPost) October 29, 2026
One entity alone imported $2.3 billion worth of supplies between in last 1.5 year, as findings show explanation for how Iran has continued replenishing its missile and drone capabilities despite sanctions, attacks on military production sites and a US naval blockade. It mentioned entities carrying names beginning with “MOD”, followed by 5/6 digits. They share the address of Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics headquarters in Tehran.
Their documents list February 11, 1979, the date associated with the victory of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, as their establishment date. Corporate records, however, indicate that most were actually created in 2013, when tightening sanctions were squeezing Iranian oil exports and putting pressure on its currency.
The report mapped network with 240 Analytics, a consultancy analysing threats facing Washington and Tel Aviv. The investigation describes system supported by frontmen, overseas shell companies and trusted intermediaries who arrange purchases and payments. Revenue allegedly generated through illicit oil sales helps finance the transactions.
Experts call the operation an entire military trading system that had supplied Iran’s armed forces for years before the current conflict. According to the import records reviewed, the majority of shipments were settled without transferring currency across Iran’s borders. Instead, trusted intermediaries abroad used money already held in foreign banks to purchase supplies and arrange delivery.
The arrangement allegedly allowed transactions to avoid some of the scrutiny associated with international transfers into or out of Iran.
Among its beneficiaries were the military unit overseeing Iran’s ballistic missile programme and Sahara Thunder, a company sanctioned by Washington in 2024 over allegations that it helped produce and supply drones to Russia for use in Ukraine.
Bank Sepah provides banking services connected to salary and pension payments for Revolutionary Guards personnel. The records listed entities’ names, identification numbers and account balances. According to the investigation, 36 entities held a combined $1.2 billion in foreign currency accounts at the end of 2024.
Other entities in the network held approximately $1.8 billion in local currency, with those accounts containing an average balance equivalent to about $360,000. Further documents connected same entities to oil revenues and purchases of goods suitable for both civilian and military use.
Customs figures published in Iranian media put its imports at $442 million in the 12 months ending in March 2023. In the following year, that figure rose to $988 million, placing it among the country’s 10 largest importers. The goods included explosives, rocket fuel ingredients, aircraft engine components, electronics, heavy vehicles and industrial machinery.
Almost all the imports examined were exempt from customs duties and classified in the records as military equipment. The investigation price reviewed thousands of banking, government and corporate documents, alongside roughly 19,000 import records. A portion of the import data was checked against shipping documents, satellite imagery, social media footage and state media reports.
Between January and April 2025, MOD 346428 imported 886 tonnes of chemicals through Bandar Abbas, with China listed as their country of origin. The customs classification covered substances including sodium chlorates and other perchlorates, some of which can be used in solid rocket fuel production.
Imported chemicals were stored with Sina Port and Marine Services Development Company, owned by the Mostazafan Foundation, which operates under the supreme leader’s direct control. The company’s head said at the time that the incident involved misdeclared cargo delivered without documentation or labels.
US sanctioned Mostazafan Foundation in 2020, alleging that an organisation established to support the poor was being used to benefit the supreme leader’s office and reward allies.
Heavy vehicles formed another major part of the procurement trail. The vehicles were subsequently sent to Dubai-based Deilami Trading, which shipped them to Bandar Abbas. The final buyer’s identification number matched MOD 346428, while the packing list named Sahara Thunder as the final destination.
The manufacturer said it found no record of the reported 2022 sale to the Iranian citizen and that most trucks identified at the customs yard in 2025 had originally been intended for Central Asia.
Iran also imported Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser vehicles in bulk, per investigation. Revolutionary Guards personnel and affiliated groups use such vehicles with heavy machine guns mounted at the rear.
Before US launched attack, a ship reached Bandar Abbas carrying tonnes of unwrought titanium listed as Chinese in origin. Arms and sanctions specialists said the metal could be used in missile airframes and rocket motor casings. During the month before the war, ships also delivered 268 tonnes of nitrocellulose and 276 tonnes of other chemicals listed as originating in China, the report said.
The customs codes included perchlorates, which can have applications in rocket fuel and explosives. Monthly purchases fell 47% from February to $54 million in March, before recovering to $77 million by May. Later, Tehran received $1.9 million worth of detonators from Russia. It was the fifth such Russian shipment since the beginning of 2025, bringing their combined value to $7.6 million.
Salisbury said the overall pattern suggested an industrial-scale effort to replenish or expand Iran’s weapons stocks, demonstrating the system’s ability to adapt under pressure. Routes through Russia, China and Central Asia
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