Quintessentially, believing that any stabilization mission in Gaza needs to ground international support in a credible, sustainable political and legal mandate that meets the needs of the moment while paving the way to an independent Palestinian statehood, the Trump Administration, on November 18, despite Israel’s opposition to the phrasing of establishing Palestinian statehood in the US moved resolution, succeeded in securing UN’s Security Council approval for Trump’s Gaza peace plan, including deploying an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, for a period of 2 years. Hence, the ISF would play its role—under the umbrella of the Board of Peace formed by President Trump – amid hopes could face intricate political, security and operational challenges, including gaining the consent and trust of all parties, operating in an active and dangerous conflict zone, and navigating severe humanitarian and infrastructural crises. As per the proposed peace plans, the ISF will play its significant role in fulfilling three basic objectives: Security & Disarmament, Humanitarian Aid & Reconstruction, and Political Transition & Governance.
First: Security & Disarmament: the ISF would work to stabilize the security situation in Gaza, allowing for a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces (IDF) from cleared areas. In this regard, a primary objective would be to disarm non-state armed groups by destroying and preventing the reconstruction of military and terror infrastructure, including tunnels and weapons production facilities. In order to ensure ceasefire compliance, the force would monitor and enforce the ceasefire agreement, responding to violations and working to prevent a return to conflict. Further, the ISF would help secure Gaza’s border areas to prevent the smuggling of weapons and other munition.
Challenges: Active hostilities and security risks: deploying 20000 thousands of foreign soldiers in dense urban terrain with multiple armed actors, potentially new local forces, and the Israeli army) creates an “intolerable risk” for the force. Here, a key point of contention is whether the ISF will be tasked with the permanent decommissioning of weapons from non-state armed groups, a high-risk operation that some countries are unwilling to undertake because of unclear specifics about “Force Protection and Rules of Engagement’’. Obviously, the force needs clear rules of engagement and robust protection against threats, including IEDs and armed conflict. Yet, another important area is to maintain ‘Internal Security and Law and Order while addressing the challenge of a collapsed civilian police force and armed gangs, also securing aid convoys and maintaining public safety extremely difficult. Second: Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction, the ISF would have to work accordingly: 1-The force would be responsible for civilian protection, a crucial function in a densely populated area that has suffered extensive damage.;2-The ISF would secure humanitarian aid corridors and distribution centers to ensure aid reaches the population without diversion by armed groups, which is essential to address famine conditions and massive need; 3-The mission would assist in restoring vital services like electricity and water infrastructure to gain initial legitimacy and improve the quality of life for Gazans.
Challenges: The ISF would operate amidst an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, including famine conditions, widespread displacement, and destroyed infrastructure. One of the biggest challenges is to regulate Aid Logistics without any obstruction amid the brewing constrains of damaged roads, unreliable supply lines, bureaucratic delays by Israeli authorities, and violence against aid workers. Moreover, the ISF will have to repair the devastated civic amenities by restoring basic services like water, electricity, sanitation, and medical facilities, which requires entry of heavy machinery and essential materials often banned as “dual-use” by Israeli authorities. Additionally, the Force will have to clear the extensive unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from main supply routes and residential areas.
Third: Political Transition and Governance: The ISF will have to fill the security and governance vacuum emerging after Hamas power vacuum, particularly preventing anarchy. Notably, training local forces, exclusively supporting a new, vetted Palestinian police force to gradually transfer internal security responsibilities to Palestinian institutions –Supporting the transition, The force would operate under the strategic guidance of a temporary, international transitional administration under a “Board of Peace “which would oversee reconstruction, economic development, and preparations for the Palestinian Authority to eventually assume control –Paving the way for a political horizon: By providing a secure and stable environment, the ISF would enable progress toward a broader political resolution of the conflict, potentially involving a path to Palestinian self-determination and a two-state solution.
Challenges: The force requires consent from both Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to be viable. However, the Palestinian militant group Hamas strongly opposes demobilization, and some potential troop-contributing nations are hesitant to participate in a mission that requires militarily disarming terror groups, preferring a more traditional peacekeeping role. The ISF must avoid being perceived as just another occupying force. Gaining local legitimacy requires a clear, time-bound mandate and a visible pathway to local, Palestinian governance and self-determination.
And ostensibly, the current situation risks creating a duality of governance where an Israeli-occupied zone thrives while other areas remain insecure and devastated. And therefore, defining a transitional role for the Palestinian Authority and ensuring the force’s efforts are linked to a future, functional Palestinian state are crucial political hurdles. The Trump administration’s team boastfully argues that their Gaza peace plans aims to entrench Israeli dominance over Palestinians; the reality suggests the opposite. Hamas has categorically opposed the ISF arguing that its deployment is tantamount to placing another occupying force in Gaza.
Needless to say, the establishment of an Independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital –the basis of two state solution–must be the end goal of any stabilization mission in Gaza. Several Arab states, including Jordan and Pakistan, have explicitly declared a zero tolerance policy for any displacement of the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, to overcome these complex challenges, some strong and impartial monitoring mechanisms will have to be formed, particularly strict ceasefire compliance. Israel has so far shown no adherence to the ceasefire deal, brokered by President Trump on 13 October.
—The writer, based in Karachi, regularly contributes to the national press.
